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Abstract 
            
 
This thesis analyses the relationship between the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
alter-globalization movement through the theoretical framework of Robert W. Cox. A Coxian 
perspective highlights that the WTO is a central international organization of the current 
nebuleuse, and one integral to enforcing, promoting and defending transnational corporate 
hegemony. The emergence of the protest movement inaccurately labelled the ‘anti-
globalization movement’ can be described as a Coxian counter-hegemonic structure. From the 
plethora of protesters making up this ‘anti-globalization movement’ who dispute the 
legitimacy of the WTO, a distinct alter-globalization movement can be identified. It 
prescribes the alternative principles of public accountability, the rights of people and the 
protection of the environment as guides to reforming the WTO towards a Coxian ‘new 
multilateralism’. This thesis asks: to what extent has this alter-globalisation movement 
succeeded in altering the policies and processes of the WTO in accordance with these 
principles? In Coxian terms the questions of how far the campaign for ‘new multilateralism’ 
has successfully altered the hegemony of the current world order and avoided trasformismo 
are asserted. 
 
After illustrating corporate structural power within the WTO’s policies and procedures, the 
alter-globalisation movement is defined as an entity of overlapping social movements and 
Non-Governmental Organizations (Alter-NGOs). The thesis identifies and evaluates three 
strategies employed by the alter-globalisation movement to place its values at the heart of the 
WTO: demonstrations on the street; assisting developing states during negotiations; and 
submitting amicus briefs to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The obstacles 
presented by the WTO’s policy of trasformismo are then detailed, namely: political elites 
coopting the alter-globalization movement’s principles into their own rhetoric; the cooption of 
NGOs by political elites from the developing world, and the cooption of NGOs and the fierce 
rejection of any NGO influence within the WTO. In its conclusions the thesis details the 
manner in which trasformismo is a significant tool in the armoury of corporate hegemony for 
resisting reform, and thereby informs existing literature on the problems faced by all social 
movements and NGOs engaging with reforming the world order. 
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Chapter One 
            
Introduction 
 
Neoliberal economic globalization … is to bring about a situation in which 
private capital and ‘the market’ alone determine the restructuring of economic, 
political and cultural life, making alternative values or institutions subordinate.1  
 
One must beware of ignoring the principle of dialectics by over emphasising 
the power and coherence of a structure, even a very dominant one. Where a 
structure is hegemonic, critical theory leads one to look for a counter-structure, 
even a latent one, by seeking out its possible bases of support and elements of 
cohesion.2 
 
1.1 The Subject and Nature of the Problem 
In the past a three-day international trade summit would have passed without public 
knowledge and the conclusions of the negotiations would have only been allotted a 
small column in the financial sections of the broadsheets. All this changed when 
50,000 people walked onto the streets of Seattle during the 30 November and the 3 
December 1999. Non-violent mass protest marches were held; barricades to stop the 
delegates reaching the trade summit were built; the global brand names of Starbucks, 
MacDonalds, Nike and The Gap were attacked; to establish order – mirroring the Star 
Wars Storm Troopers – complete with tear gas, pepper spray, rubber bullets and 
truncheons - stood police in black armour, and the Mayor of Seattle declared Marshal 
                                                 
1 Barry K. Gills. ‘Introduction: Globalization and the Politics of Resistance’, in Barry K. Gills (editor), 
Globalization and the Politics of Resistance, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000, p. 4. 
2 Robert W. Cox. ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, in 
Millennium: Vol. 10, No.2, 1981, p. 144. 
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Law. All these factors converged to ensure that the protests at the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) 1999 Millennium Ministerial Conference in Seattle brought a 
wider public audience to think critically about the legitimacy of neoliberal economic 
globalization, and the emergence of a democratic deficit within international 
organizations.  
 
In order to understand the significance of the events at Seattle they must be seen in 
the context of wider communication, economic, ideological, institutional, legal and 
political developments which have occurred in the latter half of the 20th century. 
Together these developments have been termed ‘globalization’.3 What this concept is 
argued to draw attention to is that the world had become greatly integrated by the late 
20th century in the economic, environmental, military, political and technological 
spheres. Unique to today’s world is the utilisation of technological revolutions in data 
processing and communication, which overcome the borders of the state. This 
technology has brought about the compression of ‘time and space’, and allows ‘real 
time’ interaction amongst states, non-state actors and individuals, such that the world 
can be seen as a ‘single social space’. A further consequence of the diffusion of 
technology is that a ‘global consciousness’ is argued to be emerging as more 
individuals acknowledge that events outside of their territory have a direct impact on 
the quality of their life and many cultures are exposed to new ideas and influences. 
Detailing the spheres, actors and factors of this integrated world order called 
globalization, however, does not get to the causes of why the world has become more 
                                                 
3 David Held et al. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, London: Polity Press and Blackwell 
Publishers, 2000, David Held and Anthony McGrew. Globalization/Anti-Globalization, London: Polity Press and 
Blackwell Publishers, 2003, and David Held and Anthony McGrew. ‘Introduction’, in David Held and Anthony 
McGrew (editors), Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, London: Polity Press and 
Blackwell Publishers, 2003, Richard Higgot. ‘Economics, Politics, and (International) Political Economy: The 
Need for a Balanced Diet in an Era of Globalization’, in New Political Economy, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1999, p. 23-36, and 
Richard A. Higgott, Geoffrey R. D. Underhill and Andreas Bieler (editors), Non-State Actors and Authority in the 
Global System, London: Routledge, 2000.Ankie Hoogvelt. Globalization and the Postcolonial World: The New 
Political Economy of Development, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001.Grazia Ietto-Gillies. Transnational Corporations: 
Fragmentation Amidst Integration, London: Routledge, 2002, and Jan Aart Scholte. Globalization: A Critical 
Introduction, London: MacMillan Press Limited, 2005. 
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integrated. Indeed, it becomes an apolitical description of the current world order, 
which hides agency, intent and the pursuit of specific interests. 
 
This integration has emerged because of cooperation and coercion amongst state and 
economic elites through centres of political authority outside of the state, which has 
been termed supraterritoriality.4 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) (now the WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank had all been created in the immediate post-World War Two era to manage 
Keynesian capitalism amongst member states. Structural Adjustment Programmes 
from the IMF and World Bank have been significant in coercing members to accept a 
new form of transnational capitalism.5 Similarly the construction of the WTO in 1995 
has been a deliberate decision to change the context and institutional structure within 
which international trade is defined.6 The creation of the WTO, established the central 
international organisation for coordinating, codifying, enforcing and surveillance of 
international trade agreements. Like its sister organization it does so by protecting 
and enhancing the prevailing economic interests of the WTO’s dominant actors – 
primarily the European Community7 (EC) and the United States of America (US) 
with the aid of the other members of the Quadrilateral Group (Canada and Japan).8 
                                                 
4 Jan Aart Scholte. Globalization: A Critical Introduction, London: MacMillan Press Limited, 2005. 
5 Thomas J. Biersteker. ‘The Triumph of NeoClassical Economics in the Developing World: Policy Convergence 
and Bases of Governance in the international Economic Order’, in James N. Rosenau and Ernest-Otto Czempiel 
(editors), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992, p. 121, Walden Bello, with Shea Cunningham and Bill Rau. Dark Victory: The United 
States, Structural Adjustment and Global Poverty, Oakland, California: Institute for Food and Development 
Policy, 1994, p. 4-5, and Richard Snyder. Politics After Neoliberalism: Reregulation in Mexico, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 7. Ankie Hoogvelt. Globalization and the Postcolonial World: The New 
Political Economy of Development, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001. 
6 For example Richard Blackhurst. ‘The Capacity of the WTO to Fulfil its Mandate,’ in Anne. O. Krueger (editor), 
The WTO as an International Organization, London: The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 1998, Bernard M. 
Hoekman and Michel M. Kostecki. The Political Economy of the World Trading System: From GATT to WTO, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, Bernard M. Hoekman and Michel M. Kostecki. The Political Economy of 
the World Trading System: The WTO and Beyond (2nd Edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, John H. 
Jackson. Restructuring the GATT System, (Royal Institute of International Affairs), London: Pinter Publishers Ltd., 
1990. 
7 The term EC is used to refer to the European Community, which represents all member states of the European 
Union at the World Trade Organization. 
8 Richard Steinberg. ‘In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the 
GATT/WTO’, in International Organizations, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2002, p. 342, Theodore H Cohn. Governing Global 
Trade: International Institutions in Conflict and Convergence, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2002. p. 
123-160. 
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For example, although the WTO’s Charter states that it provides a forum for the 
voluntary multilateral negotiations of trade liberalisation to bring about universal 
prosperity, only certain sectors of trade are subject to negotiation. Trade negotiations 
have focused on liberalising service markets and the high-tech industries throughout 
the world9, but not the highly subsidised markets for agriculture or textiles in the EU 
or US, which are subjected to strong domestic social forces. At the same time 
protection has been introduced to international trade through the WTO’s agreement 
on Trade-Related Property Rights (TRIPS). The current world order, therefore, 
reflects a reorganisation of the policies of these institutions to promote and enforce a 
particular form of transnational capitalism. A neoliberal market ideology is also 
promoted by these institutions on a global scale to justify the establishment of this 
form of transnational capitalism within member states. Nearly all the states of the 
world are members of these international organisations, and so their policies to 
institute transnational capitalism are restructuring societies, life chances and quality 
of life of almost the entire world, as well as impacting on the health of the planet. 
 
As the creation of economic policies and exercise of political power have shifted to 
these international organisations, in parallel the forces that contest and influence the 
exercise of political power have shifted their focus to them also. Seattle illustrated 
that the exercise of political power and the organisation of the demos to question this 
political power had fundamentally changed. The core claim made by the activists was 
that a small transnational political elite had been responsible for unleashing market 
forces on a global scale with the justification of a neoliberal ideology. The promotion 
of market economies by neoliberal globalization, the protesters argued, was not 
serving the people; the people were serving Transnational Corporations (TNCs), 
which in turn controlled governments. The activists also drew attention to: colossal 
global inequalities in health, opportunity and wealth; the undermining of the rights of 
                                                 
9 Linda Weiss. ‘Global Governance, National Strategies: How Industrialized States Make Room to Move Under 
the WTO’, in Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 12, No. 5, 2005, p. 723-749. 
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the individual; accelerated pollution and the exhausting of the earth’s resources; and a 
decline in democratic participation nationally, and its non-existence internationally. 
Thus, in the final weeks of the 20th century, political elites were confronted, not only 
by protesters in Seattle, but by an increasing number of people throughout the world, 
asking the “cardinal question of political life concerning power and rule, namely: who 
rules, in whose interests, by what means and for what ends?”10 Suddenly it seemed 
the world was watching, and a new generation of protesters had provoked the public 
and the media to ask questions about the decisions that were being made by political 
elites within international organizations in the name of the demos. 
 
Since Seattle, demonstrations by social movements have become a common feature of 
intergovernmental meetings, ranging from concerns over environmental degradation, 
the social justice of economic policies, women’s, human and labour rights, and the 
use of military force.11 Yet the protesters are described and labelled as a single anti-
globalization movement. The language often used to describe the protesters 
inappropriately portrays them as a single movement, and one that is inherently anti-
global governance, if not pro-anarchist. A more accurate description of the protesters, 
as seen at Seattle, acknowledges the many diverse social movements, civil society 
groups and NGOs that were present from all over the world. Within this plethora of 
groups a distinction can then be drawn between those that reject global institutions 
and policies, and those that assert a positive and constructive attitude to the 
integration of the world. The latter can be described as the ‘alter-globalization 
movement’ because it demands a reform of the global system so that the values of 
democracy, economic justice, environmental protection and human rights take 
precedence over dogmatic economic theory. The slogan of the alter-globalization 
                                                 
10 David Held and Anthony McGrew. Globalization/Anti-Globalization, London: Polity Press and Blackwell 
Publishers, 2003, p. 58.  
11 Mark Rupert. ‘In the Belly of the Beast: Resisting Globalisation and War in a Neo-Imperial Moment’, in 
Catherine Eschle and Bice Maiguashca (editors), Critical Theories, International Relations and ‘Anti-
Globalisation Movement’: The Politics of Resistance, Abingdon: Routledge, 2005, p. 36-52. 
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movement is “another world is possible”. Reforming the existing institutions of global 
governance, such as the WTO, to embrace the values of this movement are activities 
directed towards the creation of this better world. Together these social movements 
and NGOs have engaged in campaigns to place pressure on governments to alter the 
agenda and principles of the current world order. This has included attempting to 
influence negotiations and the dispute settlement system within international trade 
governed by the WTO, so that they reflect the democratic, egalitarian, and 
environmental values this alter-globalization movement holds. 
 
It is important to see this rise in the profile of social movements within the context of 
specific developments in the years prior to the 21st century.12 Since the 1980s political 
parties and governments, especially within the Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), have embraced the ideology of neoliberal globalization 
and developed close working relationships with corporations. As political parties have 
converged around the acceptance of neoliberalism there has been an absence of 
parties offering alternative policies. Market forces have therefore been brought into 
nearly every aspect of life. Coupled to this is the fact that more political decisions are 
taken outside the national setting and within regional and international organisations. 
These state-centric international organisations predominantly have very limited 
provision, often superficial, for the direct participation or representation of civil 
society groups. The key decision-making organs of these organisations are often 
concealed, as decisions and negotiations are made by elites, behind closed doors and 
free from public scrutiny.  
 
                                                 
12 Mark Blyth and Richard S. Katz. ‘From Catch-all Politics to Cartelisation: The Political Economy of the Cartel 
Party’, in Western European Politics, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2005, Peter Mair and Ingrid Van Biezen. ‘Party Membership 
in Twenty European Democracies, 1980-2000’, in Party Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2001, and Jeffery J. Ryan. Painful 
Exit: Electoral Abstention and Neoliberal Reform in Latin America, Manuscript for Latin American Studies 
Association, Washington, DC, September 6-8, 2001. 
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Not unrelated to these developments, in the new millennium, it has been suggested 
that party membership and voter turn-out at elections are declining in both the 
established and newly democratised states. Simultaneously however, there has been a 
significant increase in citizens participating in protests at the meetings of international 
economic organisations, and against the use of state violence in international disputes.  
“Not in My Name” was a key statement on placards used during the 2003 anti-Iraq 
war campaign, and the chant: “This is what democracy feels like” was frequently 
heard at demonstrations. Both of these statements illustrate the gulf many 
demonstrators felt between themselves and their political leaders. The membership of 
NGOs has also greatly increased.13 Using the tools of the technology revolution these 
social movements and NGOs are voicing their criticisms to a wider audience, 
attracting new members, and organising transnationally to lobby and protest. 
Consequently, social movements and NGOs are providing an alternative focal point 
for people to express dissent, unite and find solidarity outside of traditional party and 
electoral structures.  
 
The legitimacy of the WTO is also called into question because citizens perceive that 
they have little control over it. Without transparency and public oversight there is no 
assurance that the WTO’s multilateralism is not used as an institution promoting TNC 
interests. To overcome this democratic deficit and crisis of legitimacy there have 
been calls from the alter-globalization movement for more formal and structured 
engagement of NGOs within the WTO.14 These NGOs are asserted to represent the 
interests of global civil society generally. The call for a democratising function for 
NGOs has not been met with universal agreement. It is denied that a democratic 
                                                 
13 Data from Mary Kaldor, Helmut Anheier and Marlies Glasius (editors), Global Civil Society: 2003, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 13. 
14 Steve Charnovitz. ‘The Emergence of Democratic Participation in Global Governance (Paris, 1919)’, in Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 10, No. 45, 2003, Daniel C. Esty. ‘Environmental Governance at the WTO: 
Outreach to Civil Society’, in Gary P. Sampson and W. Bradee Chambers (editors), Trade, Environment, and the 
Millennium, New York: United Nations University Press, 2002, p. 132, Daniel Esty. ‘Comment’, on Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye. ‘The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy’ 
in Rodger B. Porter et al. (editors), Efficiency, Equity and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the 
Millennium, Washington, D. C.: Brooking Institution Press, 2001, p. 302. 
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deficit exists because the intergovernmental nature of the WTO determines that only 
governments are required to sit at the negotiating table. Doubts have also been raised 
over just who these NGOs represent and what legitimate right they have to observe or 
participate at the WTO.15 Fuelling this debate, many developing states have 
expressed suspicion at allowing NGOs access to the WTO on the grounds that it is 
inviting another force from the developed world to set the trading agenda. The elites 
of the WTO have consistently argued that negotiations between state elites are as 
democratic as the WTO can be.16 Debate on the participation of NGOs, the 
legitimacy of the WTO and the impact of its trade polices has continued to rage in 
both public and academic circles. 
 
1.2 The Research Question 
It is now eleven years since the WTO was created, and seven years since the debate 
over the WTO’s legitimacy and accountability was first brought into the public 
domain by the events of Seattle. Having outlined the subject and nature of the 
problem, this thesis specifically addresses the question of to what extent the alter-
globalization movement has successfully altered the policy and processes of the 
WTO towards the principles of social justice and public accountability between 1999 
and 2005. In answering this question it will be possible to determine whether the 
alter-globalization movement has begun altering the principles and practices of the 
current world order. 
 
                                                 
15 Kent Jones. ‘The WTO Core Agreements, Non-Trade Issues and Institutional Integrity’, in World Trade Review, 
Vol. 1, No. 3, 2002, p. 265. 
16 The World Trade Organization Consultative Report. The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional 
Challenges in the New Millennium. January 2005. 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.htm
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1.3 Methodology 
Traditional International Relations (IR) theories do not provide a very helpful 
framework to study the relationship between the alter-globalization movement and the 
WTO. The state-centric limitations of these theories can neither account for the 
influence of international organizations nor corporations, NGOs and social 
movements functioning within transnational networks. In contrast, this thesis asserts 
that the historical materialism of Robert W. Cox provides an insightful conceptual 
framework to understand the dynamic changes within the global political economy in 
which these inter-state and non-state actors are situated.17 Cox, drawing from Antonio 
Gramsci, applies the concepts of hegemony, counter-hegemony, organic intellectuals, 
and trasformismo to international organizations, but also developed his own concepts 
of nebuleuse and ‘new multilateralism’ to provide a unique analysis of the current 
world order. Coupled to this critical analysis is a plan of action to democratically 
transform international institutions and develop a 'new multilateralism' based on the 
interests of the less powerful civil society groups promoting “greater social equality, 
greater diffusion of power among countries and social groups, protection of the 
biosphere, moderation and non-violence in dealing with conflict, and mutual 
                                                 
17 Robert W. Cox. ‘The Idea of International Labor Regulation’ (1953), in Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, 
Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. p. 41-48, Robert W. Cox (editor). 
International Organizations: World Politics, London: MacMillan and Co, 1969, Robert W. Cox with Harold K. 
Jackson (editors), The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organizations, London: Yale, 
1973, Robert W. Cox with Harold K. Jackson. ‘Decision-making’ (1977), in Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. 
Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 349-375, Robert W. Cox. 
‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, Millennium: Vol. 10, No.2, 
1981, p. 126-155, Robert W. Cox. ‘Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay on Method’ 
(1983), in Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996, p. 124-143, Cox, R. W. ‘Realism, Positivism and Historicism’ (1987), in Robert W. Cox and Timothy 
J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 49-59, Robert W. Cox. 
Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History, Chichester: Columbia University 
Press, 1987, Robert W. Cox. ‘Multilateralism and the World Order’, in Review of International Studies, Vol. 18, 
1992, p. 161-180, Robert W. Cox. ‘Global Perestroika’ (1992), in Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, 
Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 296-316, Robert W. Cox. 
‘Towards a Posthegemonic Conception of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of ‘Ibn Khaldun’’ (1992), in 
Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996, p. 144-173, Robert W. Cox. Multilateralism and the United Nations System: Final Report, United Nations 
University Press, March, 1996, Robert W. Cox. (editor), The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and 
World Order, Basingstoke: MacMillian Press LTD, 1997, Robert W. Cox. with Michael G. Schechter. The 
Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on Power, Morals and Civilization, London: Routledge, 
2002, and Robert W. Cox. ‘Beyond Empire and Terror: Critical Reflections on the Political Economy of World 
Order’, in New Political Economy, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 2004, p.307–324. 
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recognition of civilizations”.18 This ‘new multilateralism’ is deemed to be inherently 
democratic from the ‘bottom-up’ because it overcomes state-centric multilateralism 
and is based upon the interests of civil society groups, which respect the diversity of 
cultural differences. Cox distances himself from deterministic Marxist doctrine by 
stating that although new social forces will emerge from a new mode of production to 
contest the hegemony and propose alternative principles for the organisation of 
society, they form part of a non-determined dialectical process. Consequently, he 
asserts that there is no historically determined teleological end, but he does make the 
normative claim that ‘new multilateralism’ ought to become a reality.  
 
Finally, and central to this thesis, Cox stresses that when hegemony is constructed 
(the configuration of material capabilities, ideas and institutions by dominant social 
forces in production, the state and world order) it is resilient and can absorb demands 
for change through the process of ‘reform from above’ or trasformismo.19 Thereby 
agents that demand change, gain public support and undermine the legitimacy of an 
international organizations are invited to become accredited and engage with a forum 
of the institution in order to legitimise its policies and procedures to the public. At the 
heart of this concept of trasformismo is the assertion that such social reform is 
initiated by political elites for the sole purpose of forestalling popular political 
mobilization and thereby disabling the potential for democratic transformation. By 
controlling access to decision-making bodies political elites act as gatekeepers – 
determining who can participate, on what terms and by what means. In many ways 
trasformismo reflects the ‘structural power’ of corporate social forces within 
international organization because they are able to set the framework in which 
                                                 
18 Robert W. Cox (editor). The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order, Basingstoke: 
MacMillian Press LTD, 1997, p. xvii. 
19 Robert W. Cox. ‘Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay on Method’ (1983), in Robert W. 
Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair. Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 130-
131 and 139. 
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negotiations will take place and control policy outcomes.20 It is for these reasons that 
the Coxian theoretical framework is applied in this thesis. 
 
In chapter two it will be argued that through their control of the institutions of 
production within the prevailing states, a dominant transnational corporate class 
emerged within national and international organizations during the 1980s and built 
consensus on the policies for the coordination of the global economy (nebuleuse). 
Chapters three and four illustrate that the WTO performs the central functions of 
hegemony in the current nebuleuse, as it coordinates, legitimises, enforces and 
provides surveillance measures to ensure that national policies are consistent with the 
demands of a transnational model of production for this transnational elite. This 
analysis also identifies the structural power of corporate social forces to set the 
framework for policy outcomes through determining who can participate and on what 
terms. Attention will also be drawn to the manner in which the WTO promotes a 
specific ontology to build consent for transnational capitalism, such as the equality to 
be gained from regulating international trade through the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB). Through the examples of the Uruguay Round of negotiations (1986 –
1994) and the Cancun Ministerial Conference (2003), in chapter four, the 
contradictions of the WTO will be highlighted.  
 
Chapter five constructs a four-stage continuum of the ideological positions within the 
counter-hegemonic forces to identify an alter-globalisation movement, which seeks to 
reform international organizations in a manner that is similar to the Coxian ‘new 
multilateralism’. The thesis divides the alter-globalization movement into two 
constituent parts: social movements and NGOs. Those NGOs with an alter-
globalization perspective are termed Alter-NGOs. The distinction is drawn because 
social movements are organised around informal and loose networks which employ 
                                                 
20 Susan Strange. States and Markets: Power in the World Economy, London: Pinter Publisher, 1988. 
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unconventional methods of political participation, such as mass demonstrations, to 
shape public consciousness and place pressure on political elites21: whilst NGOs are 
formally organised and engage with political institutions through formal channels. 
Although there are official channels of access to the WTO, three unofficial strategies 
are identified to be employed by the alter-globalization movement to influence the 
policies and processes: demonstrations on the street, assisting developing states 
during negotiations, and submitting amicus briefs to the WTO’s dispute settlement 
body.  
 
In resisting the strategies of the alter-globalization movement chapters five and six 
draw attention to the policy of trasformismo, which has been pursued by the political 
elites of the nebuleuse. Through trasformismo, it is argued the alter-globalization 
movement has been coopted, distorted and prevented from changing the policy 
outcomes or structure of the WTO. Chapter five demonstrates that the language of the 
protesters has been coopted into elite rhetoric to justify the WTO and neoliberal 
globalization in general. Chapter six draws attention to the complexity of the NGO 
debate, not least through highlighting the argument that professional NGOs are 
causing a ‘globalization from the middle-classes’ and deradicalizing the demands of 
grassroots movements. The chapter also illustrates that the advocacy work of Alter-
NGOs has involved providing assistance to developing states before and during 
negotiations by offering knowledge, expertise and resources; in addition Alter-NGOs 
have made attempts to utilise the legal provision of Amicus curiae at the WTO’s DSB. 
In both of these cases cooptation is evident. The impact of the alter-globalization 
movement on the WTO will be assessed in the conclusion. 
 
To understand the history, structure, decision-making process and ideology of the 
WTO, both primary and secondary sources are consulted, such as the WTO’s 
                                                 
21 For an overview of social movement theory, see Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani. Social Movements: An 
Introduction, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, (1999) 2004. 
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charter,22 literature published by the WTO Secretariat23, and the work of prominent 
international trade lawyers and economists published in international law journals.24 
The availability, through the Internet, of a large number of official WTO documents 
on dispute resolution and related General Council Minutes of Meetings, as well as 
public statements, have also been consulted. Since the dominant members within the 
WTO are the EC and US, public statements released by these two actors on relations 
with both the WTO and NGOs have been utilised. Similarly, documents and public 
statements of both activists and NGOs of the alter-globalization movement have been 
referred to throughout the thesis. 
 
A limited number of meetings and interviews were also conducted with the actors 
involved in the research. Directly after the collapse of the WTO’s Cancun Ministerial 
Conference, in October 2003, I visited the Department of Trade and Industry, London, 
to participate in a ‘question and answer’ session with the then EC Commissioner for 
Trade, Pascal Lamy, on why the negotiations failed. In November 2003, the then EC 
Deputy Commissioner for Trade, Mathew Baldwin, was interviewed at the European 
Union Commission, Brussels, on the causes of the Cancun breakdown. Five 
interviews also took place with officials from the WTO Secretariat in March 2004 at 
the WTO, Geneva.  
 
Finally, ten interviews were conducted in Washington D.C. in May/June 2004. These 
interviews involved: Jim Rubin and William Clatanoff (present and former United 
States Trade Representative); Betsy White (US. Department of Labour); Steve 
                                                 
22 See the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994. 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf
23 World Trade Organization. Understanding the WTO (3rd Edition), Geneva: World Trade Organization 
Information and Media Division, 2003. 
24 For example Richard Blackhurst. ‘The Capacity of the WTO to Fulfil its Mandate,’ in Anne. O. Krueger 
(editor), The WTO as an International Organization, London: The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 1998, 
Bernard M. Hoekman and Michel M. Kostecki. The Political Economy of the World Trading System: From GATT 
to WTO, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, Bernard M. Hoekman and Michel M. Kostecki. The Political 
Economy of the World Trading System: The WTO and Beyond, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001, John H. Jackson. Restructuring the GATT System, (Royal Institute of International Affairs), London: Pinter 
Publishers Ltd., 1990.  
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Wolfson (US Environmental Policy Advisor); David Donnes (US Department of 
Interior); John Cavanagh (Director of the NGO International Policy Studies); Thea 
Lea (Assistant Director of International Economics of the American Federation of 
Labour-Congress of Industrial Organization, (AFL-CIO)); Dan McGrew and David 
Hunter (President and former President of the advocacy NGO the Centre for 
International Environmental Law (CIEL)); and Carl Pier (the NGO Human Rights 
Watch). The interviews were designed to provide an impression and first-hand 
experience of the relationship between the WTO, its members and the alter-
globalization movement. Since all the interviewees have had direct contact with the 
WTO and some aspect of the alter-globalization movement, parts of these interviews 
have been quoted as primary sources to support specific arguments. 
 
1.4 Measuring the Success of the Alter-Globalization Movement 
There are difficulties in measuring the degree to which the alter-globalization 
movement campaigns have altered or influenced the policy and process of the WTO. 
Social movement theorists have long recognised this difficulty in measuring the 
success of social movements within the borders of the state. Edwin Amenta and Neal 
Caren state that “conceptually speaking, scholars have to address the meaning of 
success or influence for challengers that make state related claims”.25 William 
Gamson offers two categories of success when determining whether a social 
movement’s goals or claims have been realised and accepted. He argues that 
acceptance means that a social movement is recognised as being a legitimate 
representative of a constituency by the target of the collective action, and through this 
recognition the relationship between the challenging organisation and the groups it 
attempts to influence is altered.26 Some basic acknowledgement that the challenger is 
                                                 
25 Edwin Amenta and Neal Caren. ‘The Legislative, Organizational, and Beneficiary Consequences of State-
Orientated Challengers’, in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (editors), The Blackwell 
Companion to Social Movements, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, p. 262. 
26 William Gamson. The Strategy of Social Protest (2nd Edition), Belmount, CA: Wadsworth, 1990.  
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a legitimate representative of a specific group is a starting point, but determining what 
is meant by the relationship being altered is somewhat vague. Amenta and Caren also 
draw attention to the problems with using recognition as a measurement of success. 
Firstly, they explain that it is possible for a social movement to be neither recognised 
nor have its stated programme realised, and for its constituents to still gain some 
benefits. More critically, they acknowledge that recognition may lead to just that, and 
no more than recognition. 27 
 
In contrast Alison Van Rooy draws attention to the manner in which social 
movements and NGOs are able to establish incremental changes to political 
institutions through even limited access to institutions. The reason for these assertions 
is that even limited access can allow NGOs to promote their new ideas to a wider 
audience, and in doing so change 
 
the ‘frames’ by which the public and decision-makers understand global 
issues. The realm of self-evident thought: it is the perimeter around our 
conscious thinking that we no longer questioning. Human rights have been 
framed in the 20th century as self-evident and universal … the biggest 
advocacy battles are won when an idea becomes self-evident.28 
 
In addition she points out that through frame changing NGOs are now seen as 
legitimate participants in international institutions. Therefore it is important for social 
movements and NGOs to “take advantage of a partly opened door, seeking to open it 
further”.29  
 
                                                 
27 Edwin Amenta and Neal Caren. ‘The Legislative, Organizational, and Beneficiary Consequences of State-
Orientated Challengers’, in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (editors), The Blackwell 
Companion to Social Movements, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, p. 262. 
28 Alison Van Rooy. The Global Legitimacy Game: Civil Society, Globalization, and Protest, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave/MacMillan, 2004, p. 22. 
29 Alison Van Rooy. The Global Legitimacy Game: Civil Society, Globalization, and Protest, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave/MacMillan, 2004, p. 29. 
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Jackie Smith, however, stresses that even though social movements and NGOs are 
recognised as legitimate representatives of groups and issues, on gaining access to 
international organisations, NGOs have become coopted by these institutions 
(CONGO’s). In doing so the NGOs may have access to policy forums and discussions 
but are unable to actually influence the program on the political agenda. Indeed she 
points out: 
 
many activists argue that the limited access provided to international 
arenas reflects an attempt by states to coopt movement organisations 
and to channel movement pressure in directions that limit its capacity 
for achieving fundamental social change. And the fact that states 
govern the rules of NGO access to international institutions means that 
the more radical critics are kept outside of this institutional arena.30  
 
Jonathon Fox and David Brown have also documented how this process of coopting 
has neutered the influence of NGOs accredited to the World Bank.31 In more recent 
years a wide number of NGOs have also complained of being excluded from the 
World Bank and that accreditation is merely part of a public relations exercise.32 
Detailing the growth of NGOs becoming involved in government projects, Kendall 
W. Stiles explains how many NGOs are now in competition with one another to gain 
access to government funding, and how this competition has brought cooption and 
pressure to remove radical traits.33 Recognition is therefore important, but it is not a 
reliable indication of actual influence or success. Indeed as Cox points out a policy of 
                                                 
30 Jackie Smith. ‘Transnational Processes and Movements’, in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter 
Kriesi (editors), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, p. 316. 
31 Jonathon Fox and David Brown (editors), The Struggle For Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs, and 
Grassroots Movements, London: The MIT Press, 1998. 
32 Civil Society Members of the World Bank-Civil Society Joint Facilitation Committee. A Call for Participatory 
Decision Making: Discussion Paper on World Bank-Civil Society Engagement, Draft for Public Comment,  
14 April 2005. 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/int/bwi/2005/0414wbengage.pdf
33 Kendall W. Stiles. ‘Grassroots Empowerment: States, Non-States and Global Policy Formulation’, in Richard A. 
Higgott, Geoffrey R. D. Underhill and Andreas Bieler (editors), Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global 
System, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 32-47. 
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trasformismo is designed to secure public legitimacy and to pacify political opponents 
by bringing them into political institutions, but preventing these opponents from 
actually changing policies. 
 
Thankfully, Paul Burstein et al add more substance to the factors that enable some 
form of measurement of a social movement’s success and influence. This can be 
determined by (1) the degree to which a social movement gets its programme on the 
political agenda, (2) the degree to which it influences the programme’s passage into 
policy, or helps to ensure its enforcement, and (3) the degree to which the legislation 
has the intended effects.34 Consequently, in order to measure the extent to which the 
alter-globalization movement has altered or influenced the policies and processes of 
the WTO, this thesis will use the four criteria of (1) recognition of the alter-
globalization movement as the legitimate representative of a constituency, (2) the 
degree to which the alter-globalization movement has been able to place its 
programme for reform on the political agenda of the WTO, (3) the input that the 
Alter-NGOs of the alter-globalization movement have in the passage of these reforms 
into actual WTO policy, or in helping to ensure the enforcement of that policy, and 
(4) the degree to which the policies of the alter-globalization movement achieve the 
intended outcome for which they campaigned. Through applying this model to the 
relationship between the alter-globalization movement and the WTO it will be 
possible to discern whether ‘new multilateralism’ is becoming a reality within the 
WTO and to what extent the values and principle of the alter-globalization movement 
are influencing the WTO’s policies and procedures. 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Paul Burstein et al. ‘The Success of Political Movements: A Bargaining Perspective’, in J. C Jenkins and B 
Klandermans (editors), The Politics of Social Protest: A Comparative Perspective on States and Social 
Movements, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995. 
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1.5 Contribution to Knowledge and Literature Review 
In recent years a number of writers have claimed to different degrees that we must 
“recognise that ‘global social movements’ are now altering either agendas for social 
change or political engagement”.35 This thesis aims to contribute to the existing 
literature on global governance, global social movements and the WTO by addressing 
the validity of this statement through a Coxian analysis of the WTO. Since the 1980s 
a Coxian approach to world order has been adopted by a number of authors under the 
label of a new neo-Gramscian School.36 John A. Agnew and Stuart Corbridge37, 
Enrico Augelli and Craig N. Murphy38, Henk Overbeek39, and Mark Rupert are 
among those attributed to this neo-Gramscian School.40 Andreas Bieler and Adam 
David Morton are prominent amongst those advocating a Coxian approach because of 
their theoretical rigor and empirical work on neoliberal hegemony in European 
integration and Mexico, respectively.41 Frederick H. Gareau does apply the Coxian 
concept of hegemony when discussing the creation and structure of the WTO, but 
only in terms of US corporate hegemony and not transnational corporate hegemony 
                                                 
35 Robin Cohen and Shirin M. Rai. ‘Global Social Movements: Towards a Cosmopolitan Politics’, in Robin Cohen 
and Shirin M. Rai (editors), Global Social Movements, London, The Athlone Press, 2000, p. 1. Also see Stephen 
Gill. ‘Towards a Postmodern Prince? The Battle in Seattle: A Moment in the New Politics of Globalization’, in 
Millennium Vol. 29, No 1, 2000, p. 131-140, Mary Kaldor. ‘Civilising’ Globalization? The Implications for the 
‘Battle in Seattle’, in Millennium Vol. 29, No 1, 2000, 105-114, and Robert O’Brien et al. Contesting Global 
Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000. 
36 See Peter Burnham. ‘Neo-Gramscian Hegemony and the International Order’, in Capital and Class, Vol. 41, 
1991, p. 73-93; and Mark Rupert. Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global 
Power, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
37 John A. Agnew and Stuart Corbridge. Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political 
Economy, London: Routledge, 1995. 
38 Enrico Augelli and Craig N. Murphy. ‘Gramsci and International Relations: A General Perspective and Example 
of US Policy Towards the Third World’ in Stephen Gill (editor), Gramsci, Historical Materialism and 
International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 1227-147; and Craig N. Murphy. 
International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance Since 1850, Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1994. 
39 Henk Overbeek (editor). Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The Rise of Transnational 
Neoliberalsim in the 1980s, London: Routledge, 1993. 
40 Mark Rupert. Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
41 Andreas Bieler. Globalization and Enlargement of the European Union: Austrian and Swedish Social Forces in 
the Struggle Over Membership, London: Routledge, 2000; Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton (editors), 
Social Forces in the Making Of the New Europe: The Restructuring of European Social Relations in the Global 
Political Economy, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001; Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton. ‘The Gordian Knot of 
Agency-Structure in International Relations; A Neo-Gramscian Perspective’, in European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2001, p. 5-35; Adam David Morton. ‘Structural Change and Neoliberalsim in Mexico: 
‘Passive Revolution’ in the Global Economy’, in Andreas Bieler et al. Global Restructuring, State, Capital and 
Labour: Contesting Neo-Gramsci Perspectives, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006, p. 111-132. 
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within the nebuleuse.42 Although Robert O’Brien et al applied a Coxian theoretic 
framework to the WTO in 2000, it was heavily diluted with a level of liberal pluralism 
that weakened the very critical edge that is sought from a Coxian analysis. Focusing 
exclusively on NGOs, these writers sought to measure the influence of these non-state 
actors and used the term ‘complex multilateralism’ to illustrate their 
acknowledgement of the many non-state actors involved in influencing state-centric 
multilateralism.43 A more critical Coxian analysis of the WTO is therefore warranted, 
not only because it is five years since O’Brien et al’s research was published, but also 
because O’Brien et al’s framework omitted the most important aspects of Cox’s 
theoretical framework, such as the Coxian definition of hegemony, nebuleuse, 
structural power, and especially trasformismo. 
 
 
 
Applying Coxian historical materialism to the relationship between the WTO and the 
alter-globalization movement establishes this thesis’s original contribution to 
knowledge. To the best of my knowledge no other academic has detailed the WTO’s 
creation, ideology, decision-making process, and engagement with social movements 
and NGOs through a consummate Coxian framework. In doing so the thesis informs 
existing literature engaged in debating and advocating global democracy.44 It does so 
                                                 
42 Frederick H. Gareau. The United Nations and Other International Institutions: A Critical Analysis, Chicago: 
Burnham Inc., Publishers, 2002. 
43 Robert O’Brien et al. Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social 
Movements, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
44 David Held. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, Richard Falk. One Humane Governance: Towards a New Global 
Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge/Polity Press, 1995, Andrew Linklater. The Transformation of Political 
Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 
Anthony McGrew. ‘Models of Transnational Democracy’, in David Held and Anthony McGrew (editors), The 
Global Transformation Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate (2nd Edition), Cambridge: Polity 
Press/Blackwell Publishers, 2002, p. 250-513, David Held. ‘Cosmopolitan Democracy’, in David Held and 
Anthony McGrew (editors), The Global Transformation Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate (2nd 
Edition), Cambridge: Polity Press/Blackwell Publishers, 2002, p. 514-529, Robert A. Dahl. ‘Can International 
Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View’, in David Held and Anthony McGrew (editors), The Global 
Transformation Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate (2nd Edition), Cambridge: Polity 
Press/Blackwell Publishers, 2002, p. 530-541, and David Held. Global Covenant: The Social Democratic 
Alternative to the Washington Consensus, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004. 
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by detailing the reaction of the WTO members and the WTO Secretariat to the critical 
publicity received through mass public demonstrations by social movements outside 
its Ministerial Conferences, and its headquarters in Geneva. The thesis also details the 
response of the WTO members to the campaigns by advocacy Alter-NGOs through 
cooperation with the developing counties during negotiations, and the submission of 
amicus briefs to the dispute settlement body. In analysing these three different 
strategies, and the corresponding response of trasformismo, the thesis provides a 
valuable analysis on the obstacles faced by those seeking to create global democracy 
and a legitimate caution to all NGOs and social movements engaged in campaigns to 
reform the current world order. 
 
In recent years the literature from a number of academic disciplines has emerged 
specifically addressing the creation of the WTO, and its relationship with the labour 
movement and NGOs. Rorden Wilkinson has provided valuable insights into the 
manner in which the WTO has avoided official engagement and status for organised 
labour and core labour standards.45 In discussing the role of NGOs in the WTO, 
particularly notable is the work of international trade lawyers Daniel Esty46 and Steve 
Chornivitz47, who are both advocates of observer status for NGOs, but not 
participation. Prior to Seattle, Marc Williams detailed the manner in which the people 
most affected by the WTO’s decisions were prevented from participating in the 
dispute settlement body.48 Building on this, Jan Aart Scholte, Robert O’Brien and 
Marc Williams not only provide an invaluable overview of the pros and cons of NGO 
participation at the WTO, they also identify the manner in which business was 
                                                 
45 Rorden Wilkinson. ‘Peripheralizing Labour: the ILO, WTO, and the Completion of the Bretton Woods Project’, 
in Jeffrey Harrod and Robert O’Brien (editors), Global Unions: Theory and Strategies of Organised Labour in the 
Global Political Economy, London: Routledge, 2002. Also see Steve Huges and Rorden Wilkinson. ‘International 
Labour Standards and World Trade: No Role for the World Trade Organization?’, in New Political Economy, Vol. 
3, No. 3, 1998, p. 375–390. 
46 Daniel C. Esty. ‘Environmental Governance at the WTO: Outreach to Civil Society’, in Gary P. Sampson and 
W. Bradee Chambers (editors), Trade, Environment, and the Millennium, New York: United Nations University 
Press, 2002. 
47 Steve Charnovitz. ‘WTO Cosmopolitics’, in International Law and Politics, Vol. 34, 2002, p. 324. 
48 Marc Williams. ‘The World Trade Organization, Social Movements and Democracy’, in Annie Taylor and 
Caroline Thomas (editors), Global Trade and Global Social Issues, London: Routledge, 1999. 
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favoured over NGOs regarding access and lobbying at WTO negotiations.49 To 
varying degrees, all of these writers present arguments for some reform of the WTO 
to allow NGOs to overcome the democratic deficit that has appeared at the WTO, and 
the absence of core labour rights or environmental safeguards. Each of these authors 
provides valuable research on the WTO’s resistance to NGO participation, but none 
offers an account that explains WTO engagement in terms of trasformismo. In 
addition the many sections of the alter-globalization movement (especially the 
demonstrators on the street), and its engagement with the WTO are not engaged. 
 
The defining of the alter-globalization movement is important for future research 
because it provides important distinctions between the many ideological positions and 
strategies held by the protesters. This thesis seeks to bring acknowledgement that the 
voices of the protesters on the street are as important as the work of advocacy NGOs 
working behind the scenes in bringing change to the WTO. Arguably, one of the first 
stages of bringing about peaceful revolutionary change is raising the consciousness of 
the demos. Mass public demonstrations and communication are two of the means in 
which to raise public awareness. Both academics and the media when describing the 
protesters have employed the idiom ‘anti-globalization movement’. This catch-all 
‘anti’ label, however, has become unhelpful for an analysis of global social 
movements as it allows the many different positions held by the activists to be 
perverted for specific political ends. For example, both Philippe Legrain’s50 and 
Michael Moore’s51 misleading criticisms of protest under the label ‘anti-globalization 
movement’, focus on the violence and extreme politics of a small number to detract 
from any of the valid political issues that the protesters raise. Consequently, it is easy 
to dismiss all protesters as violent, ideological delinquents.  
                                                 
49 Jan Aart Scholte, Robert O’Brien and Marc Williams. The WTO and Civil Society, CSGR Working Paper No. 
14/98, 1998, also see Robert O’Brien. ‘The Various Paths to Minimum Global Labour Standards’, in Jeffrey 
Harrod and Robert O’Brien (editors), Global Unions: Theory and Strategies of Organised Labour in the Global 
Political Economy, London: Routledge, 2002. 
50 Philippe Legrain. Open World: The Truth About Globalization, London: Abacus, 2002. 
51 Michael Moore. A World Without Walls: Freedom, Development, Free Trade and Global Governance, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
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 A small number of academics have sought to categorise and define the factors specific 
to this transnational protest. Barry K. Gills has contributed to the literature on global 
social movements by focusing on “globalized resistance” in response to global 
political power, whilst also examining prospects for the success of this resistance.52 
Catherine Eschle reminds us that the very fact that academics have engaged in this 
form of study ensures that scholars are participating in the process of constructing53 
an entity called the ‘anti-globalization’ movement.54 Eschle also points out that the 
term anti-globalization does not necessarily capture the many different goals and 
objectives of the protesters. Indeed it is clear that global neoliberal corporate 
hegemony is resisted, but other forms of global governance are deemed to be 
desirable. For example Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri define the popular 
movements resisting global corporate hegemony backed by military might - Empire – 
with their concept of “the multitude”. Essentially Hardt and Negri depict the 
emergence of “a new proletariat” attacking the centre of the Empire, seizing control 
“over linguistic sense and meaning and network of communications” and the means 
of production in their efforts to create a new global constitution reflecting “absolute 
democracy in action”.55 Vicki Birchfield and Annette Freyberg-Inan use the term 
‘anti-globalization’ movement to describe the protesters’ position against  neoliberal 
globalization, but also argue that the protesters ought to be seen as a counter-
hegemonic force armed with ‘organic intellectuals’.56 The assertion that these protests 
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are motivated by anti-capitalist agendas has also been proposed by a number of other 
authors.57 Mary Kaldor, Helmut Anheier and Marlies Glasius argued that these 
protests during “the 1990s were a period of consolidation of global civil society, a 
period in which a solid infrastructure was established, based on a broad shift in 
cultural and social values, especially in developed economies”.58 Each of these 
authors draws attention to the civil society groups that are resisting corporate 
hegemony, but not the many different ideological positions that are held by counter-
hegemonic forces. 
 
Activists themselves, however, have explicitly distanced themselves from the term 
‘anti-globalization movement’.59 Again dropping the ‘anti-globalization’ label, social 
movement theorists have focused on transnational social movements, and have been 
instrumental in providing essential concepts for understanding the nature of social 
movements and their transnational development of campaigns and repertories to 
contest global policies.60 Consequently, this thesis rejects the analytical value of the 
term ‘anti-globalization movement’ because it is a political tool used by elites and the 
media to generate fear and mistrust of social movements. To bring clarity to the 
analysis of global social movements the thesis therefore provides a more 
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comprehensive continuum of the many positions held by national and transnational 
social movements and NGOs, in order to draw a distinction between a reforming 
alter-globalization movement and those who wish to de-globalize and return to 
national or local communities. Jan Aart Scholte, Robert O’Brien and Marc Williams 
have argued that civil society groups can be split into three categories: conformers, 
reformers, and radicals.61 In more recent years, however, Scholte has employed a 
more illuminating categorisation, which gets to the heart of the conflicting goals - 
distinguishing between de-globalist and alter-globalist movements.62 In doing so he 
clearly draws attention to the conflicting objectives of either pulling down the 
institutions of global governance and advocating a return to local and national 
decision-making; or reforming/transforming existing global institutions so that they 
embrace new principles and ideals. What is clear from the alter-globalist agenda is 
that resistance to the current form of neoliberal globalization and corporate hegemony 
does not rule out that other forms of global governance that establish ‘new 
multilateralism’ are both desirable and possible.  
 
The relationship between social movements and NGOs that have engaged with global 
governance in the past has been well documented in the literature discussing the 
influence of transnational civil society networks promoting human rights and 
environmental protection.63 Mary Kaldor has been keen to see the events of Seattle as 
the ‘coming out party’ of global civil society64, and has described NGOs as “tamed 
social movements… institutionalised and professional”.65 The ability of NGOs 
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working within the system to maintain a radical agenda for change similar to those on 
the street, however, is questioned. Writers such as Kendall W. Stiles66 and Jackie 
Smith67 have raised concerns over the danger of advocacy NGOs being coopted into 
the system they contest as they struggle to gain access to state finance. The emergence 
of ‘cheque book activism’ and professional activists raises further questions over the 
integrity and accountability of NGOs. Van Rooy also raises questions over the input 
that NGOs can have when they are high on rhetoric and low on detailed research.68 
The problems of social movements and NGOs working together to reform the WTO 
have also been well documented, especially regarding the old labour movement and 
the new alter-globalization movement.69  
 
Although there are difficulties in the cohesion of the alter-globalization movement, 
transnational advocacy networks still provide the framework around which 
demonstrators and advocacy NGOs engage with the WTO. A number of legal 
scholars have detailed the manner in which NGO advocacy networks have attempted 
to access the WTO DSB through the submission of amicus briefs.70 These articles 
have illustrated the pros and cons of allowing NGO participation in the WTO’s DSB. 
Most notably C. L. Lim has argued that the WTO is an intergovernmental 
organisation, and its members will prevent access to advocacy networks in order to 
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maintain predictability in the rules of the WTO.71 Jonathan Graubart, however, has 
illustrated that activists and NGOs have made attempts at “‘legalising’ political 
mobilisation while also ‘politicising’ the transnational legal process to achieve their 
aims” within the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA).72 This work on NAFTA 
offers an important insight into the manner in which social movements and NGOs can 
successfully cooperate to push international organisations to engage with public 
normative debates, which can force international legal systems into the uncomfortable 
position of publicly justifying why corporate interests dominate and why 
human/labour rights and environmental concerns should not figure in their 
deliberations. The WTO’s dispute settlement body might still hold open a way for the 
alter-globalization movement to access the decision-making of the WTO, if public 
demonstrations can be linked specifically with the campaigns of advocacy NGOs 
submitting amicus briefs to the WTO. More critically such developments may be no 
more than a policy of trasformismo to distort and coopt demands for just change.  
 
Through applying a comprehensive Coxian analysis and demonstrating that the alter-
globalization movement is a collection of social forces and NGOs pursuing ‘new 
multilateralism’, this thesis reinforces the need to conceptualise world politics in 
terms of global political economy.73 The research will also yield valuable insight into 
the political opportunities which exist within the WTO’s structures, and how 
successfully these have been utilised by the alter-globalization movement. The thesis 
demonstrates that although mass public demonstrations can create critical public 
awareness of the policies and processes of international organisations, the more 
plentiful resources at the disposal of political elites and corporations can also 
manipulate public opinion (trasformismo).  
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Chapter Two 
            
 
A Coxian Perspective on Change and Continuity in Multilateralism 
 
The “truth” of philosophy lies in its fit with the configuration of social forces 
that shape history – a shared mental framework, or intersubjectivity, constitutes 
the objectivity of an epoch. This must mean that “truth” changes with the 
movement of history.74 
 
2.1 Introduction: Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this chapter is to establish a theoretical approach for understanding the 
multilateralism of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Integral to any theorising 
about the WTO is the identification of three important factors pertaining to this 
institution. First, through its constitution, literature and press releases, the WTO is 
responsible for propagating an ontology globally. This ontology legitimises the 
creation of national free market economies on the grounds that it is the only policy 
capable of achieving competition, efficiency, development, prosperity, peace and 
sustainable development. The construction of this ideational framework is responsible 
for legitimising particular power relations, which privilege the activities of 
corporations and set the limits to what is deemed possible for actors who attempt to 
engage with the WTO. Secondly, in doing so the WTO exhibits the characteristics of 
supraterritoriality because as an institution it has a degree of autonomy to exercise 
power above the state. Finally, a competent theory of the WTO would need to be able 
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to account for the many actors that are engaged in activities - directly and indirectly - 
to influence the WTO’s policies and processes. It is now widely accepted that 
throughout the 20th century corporations, social movements and Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) have built extensive transnational relations, and are competing 
to place their interests at the fore of member state and WTO policies. Therefore a 
coherent theoretical framework needs to provide a social theory of the global political 
economy to demonstrate how states generate specific trade policies, and how states 
and non-state actors influence, but are also influenced by the policies of the WTO.  
 
In this chapter, it will be argued that the historical materialism offered by Robert W. 
Cox provides the concepts and analytical tools for an insightful understanding of the 
global political economy. Over more than fifty years of publishing a rich body of 
Coxian literature has been established, which has developed a distinct critical 
perspective on international organization, and the demand for ‘new multilateralism’.75 
At its core Cox has identified the relationship between social forces, material 
capabilities, and ideologies, which are embedded in institutions, and illustrated the 
reciprocal relationships between social forces, forms of states and world orders. Cox’s 
appliance of historical materialism to the international organizations of world order in 
general - and the United Nations (UN) specifically - provides a framework to 
understand the multilateralism of the WTO. The chapter will argue that the vast 
majority of theorising on multilateralism and international organizations has been 
state-centric and has not been able to capture all three of the factors of the WTO 
outlined above. Although the social constructivism of John G. Ruggie76 and 
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Alexander Wendt77 includes the ideational attributes of multilateralism, they both 
provide yet another state centric analysis of multilateralism. In contrast, Robert 
O’Brien et al use the term ‘complex multilateralism’ to illustrate their 
acknowledgement of the many non-state actors involved in influencing 
multilateralism.78 Although O’Brien et al apply a diluted form of Coxian analysis to 
measure the influence of non-state actors at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
World Bank and WTO, it will be argued that this analysis, omits the most important 
aspects of Cox’s theoretical framework, such as the Coxian definition of hegemony, 
nebuleuse, structural power, trasformismo, counter-hegemony and organic 
intellectuals. In doing so it will be argued that the theoretical account provided by 
O’Brien et al neglects the conceptual framework for understanding the resilience of 
hegemony to absorb, but not act on demands for just change, which are central in 
understanding change and continuity at the WTO. The chapter will begin with a 
critical analysis of Cox’s theoretic framework, before engaging with other theoretic 
approaches.  
 
2.2 Robert W. Cox – A Conceptual Framework 
Throughout his work Cox has endeavoured to draw attention to the manner in which 
politics, economics and ideas are institutionalised at the local, national, international 
and transnational level. International institutions are of primary importance because 
they provide a ‘governance without government’, which establishes policies that 
shape both the forms of states and the social relations of much of the world. Ingrained 
in Cox’s analysis is the view that multilateralism is a reflection of the dynamics of the 
capitalist world economy. Since all human societies produce material goods in order 
to survive, and the organization of production within a society is integral to defining 
the form of social relations, Cox asserts that “Production generates the capacity to 
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exercise power, but power determines the manner in which production takes place”.79 
In his later work Cox expanded his study of production to include the “production of 
institutions, laws, morality and ideas”.80 Thereby, Cox draws attention to the manner 
in which political and economic power are intertwined and the exercise of both are 
integral to the production of the institutions, ideas and laws, which govern social 
relations within any given society – be it local, national, regional or global. The 
artificial separation of politics from economics is only possible in the abstract world 
of academia and not in the “seamless web of the real social world”.81  
 
Cox emphasises his historical scrutiny of the institutionalization of political, 
economic and intersubjective factors, by describing his approach as ‘historical 
materialist’. Cox distinguishes his own historical materialism from the mainstream 
‘problem-solving’ theory of International Relations (IR) theory, by explaining that his 
approach is an example of critical theory.82 Accepting the prevailing system of world 
power relations and the institutions, concepts and ideas, which underpin our 
understanding of reality, are all features of problem-solving theories. The purpose of 
problem-solving theory is to identify and overcome any issues that threaten the 
stability of existing power relations. Since the structures of power of status quo are 
uncritically accepted, ‘problem-solving’ theories can be described as “ahistorical”, but 
more importantly as conservative ideologies. By drawing attention to the conservative 
nature of uncritical theories, Cox demonstrates that “Theory is always for someone 
and for some purpose”, and that the process of theorising is political in itself because 
it sets limits to what change is perceived to be possible.83 Thereby when confronting a 
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‘problem-solving’ approach one is forced to ask, whose interests are being preserved 
by the dominance of this theory?  
 
In contrast to ‘problem-solving’ theory, Cox describes his historical materialism as 
‘critical theory’. This Coxian critical theory does not take social and political relations 
for granted but analyses their origin and how and whether they might be in the 
process of change.84 Therefore, Coxian theory is historical in nature, and seeks to 
identify and explain the source, consolidation and erosion of different ‘structures’ of 
power, which shape human life throughout different periods of time. In doing so Cox 
explains his historical materialism analysis as the  
 
ways in which international organization has contributed to particular 
structures of world order by reflecting and reinforcing dominant forms 
of state and pre-eminent social forces. Through this runs a practical 
interest in finding ways in which multilateralism may help construct 
alternative world orders more fully embodying normative 
commitments.85  
 
Clearly, a Coxian analysis of multilateralism identifies the social forces that both 
create and contest the oppressive power relations contained within the institutions of 
multilateralism. The challenging of the dominant ontologies and ideational 
frameworks perpetuated by international organizations are primary goals of social 
forces developing a project of emancipation. Before outlining Cox’s work on 
multilateralism at the UN, the basic tenets of his theory will be explained in this 
section.  
 
                                                 
84 Robert, W. Cox. ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, Millennium: 
Vol. 10, No.2, 1981, p. 129. 
85 Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair. Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996, p. xi. 
 31
A central theme of Cox’s work is the creation and development of ontologies.86 The 
reason for this is that ontologies are important for humanity because they encompass 
the intersubjective frameworks that prescribe purpose and meaning to the world. In 
terms of social relations, ontologies set mental parameters for the behaviour of actors 
by defining the rules for social interaction. This is achieved through advocating 
principles and norms concerning the proper political, economic, social, cultural, and 
environmental organization of society. Ontologies, therefore, justify the exercise of 
power to establish the organization and maintenance of a particular form of society on 
the grounds that it is acceptable and legitimate. Although different ontologies conflict 
on the nature of the ‘real’ world, an ontology becomes dominant and gains wider 
public acceptance when it is promoted through public institutions. By promoting the 
validity of an ontology these institutions also promote the reasons why a society 
should consent to specific power relations. Thereby, “What is subjective in 
understanding becomes objective through action” for individuals within society.87 It is 
the investigation of the social forces behind both the creation and contesting of 
dominant institutions and ontologies in production, the state and international 
organization, which have provided Cox with a research agenda.  
 
Cox’s historical materialist credentials are highlighted here because he identifies 
distinct historical structures, such that dominant institutions and ontologies are limited 
to a particular time and space. Fernand Braudel, Antonio Gramsci, Karl Marx, Karl 
Polanyi, Giambattista Vico, Georges Sorel, and Max Weber are all cited as significant 
influences on this Coxian historical materialist framework.88 Borrowing from 
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Braudel, Cox identifies the interaction of material capabilities, ideas (intersubjective 
frameworks) and institutions within an ‘historical structure’. An historical structure is 
defined as the “material character to an institution or consecrated pattern of human 
relationships [such as] systems of language, of law, of religion, of morals, of 
economic organization, of family, of social life”.89 For Cox historical structures are 
apparent at three levels - the organisation of production, forms of state and world 
orders each restraining and impacting on the other in a symbiotic relationship.90 From 
Vico, Cox develops the idea that social practices have changed through class struggle, 
and that human nature is not fixed, but is shaped and reshaped due to changing social 
relations throughout the course of history. Therefore to understand why a particular 
historical structure has continuity or is in the process of changing it is necessary to 
understand the opposing social forces and their material capabilities, specific to that 
historical structure. As Andreas Bieler points out by focusing on social forces within 
production, Cox is ultimately advocating that “social forces, engendered by the 
production process, as the most important collective actors…the concept of class is 
crucial”.91  
 
To explain class relations within a historical structure, Gramsci’s critical examination 
of the relationship between the state and civil society, and the concepts of hegemony, 
counter hegemony and the role of organic intellectuals are interwoven throughout 
Cox’s theorizing.92 Indeed Cox is often cited as an example of the Neo-Gramscian 
writers.93 As Gramsci deliberated on the manner in which the modern state was able 
to manufacture civil society’s consent for oppressive power relations, so Cox 
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deliberates on the many civil societies that consent to the policies of international 
organizations. It is therefore necessary to a present a quick sketch of Gramsci’s main 
ideas, which influenced Cox.  
 
Central is Gramsci’s argument that one of the most important characteristics of the 
dominance of any group is the struggle to assimilate and conquer ‘ideologically’ the 
intellects and ideas of the previous political and economic order. To accomplish this, 
a dominant class must be able 
 
to propagate itself throughout society …bringing about not only a 
unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral 
unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on 
corporate interest but on a universal plane, and thus creating the 
hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate 
groups.94  
 
Ultimately, Gramsci is drawing attention to the manner in which the employment of 
certain ideas is paramount in delivering consent from civil society. For example, 
consent was achieved by assimilating the dominant class’s interest into the state and 
law, and justifying this through an ideology: such that society is compelled “to 
conform" and adopt the dominant class’s ideas and practices. Collective 
intersubjective ideas are disseminated throughout society by the institutions of 
government, the church, the educational system, and the media to legitimise the rule 
of dominant social forces and bring compliance and consent from civil society. 
Gramsci used the term ‘historic bloc’ to describe a stable relationship between the 
institutionalised power of a class and the hegemony of its ideology.95 In essence 
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hegemony ensures the dominant class is able to pursue its interests effectively by 
“ideologically eliminating the possibility of alternative” from the consciousness of 
civil society. 
 
As Gramsci saw civil society as the terrain upon which power relations came to be 
established in capitalist societies, it was also within civil society that opposition 
(counter-hegemony) could be constructed. Counter-hegemonic forces call into 
question the material power and ontology of the dominant class.96 Gramsci believed 
that leadership of this counter-hegemonic struggle would come from the proletariat, 
but also allowed for oppressed people outside of this class to become part of this 
movement. Different strategies of resistance to hegemony, defined by Gramsci as a 
‘war of movements’ and a ‘war of position’, are deemed possible within different 
forms of states.97 As Christine B. N Chin and James H. Hitttelman point out the 
former is a “frontal assault on the state (labour strikes and even military action) 
whereas wars of position can be read as non-violent resistance, e.g. boycotts, that are 
designed to impede the everyday functions of the state. The objectives of both are to 
seize control of the state … in violent and non-violent confrontation with the state”.98  
 
Gramsci, however, argues that a war of movements is only possible in those states 
where the hegemony of the ruling classes has not been consolidated within civil 
society. It is here that the central role of the ‘organic intellectual’ is asserted.99 For 
example, Cox illuminates Gramsci’s argument by drawing attention to the established 
capitalist countries of Western Europe and the US where the ruling classes had 
established hegemony to such a degree that even the political parties of the workers 
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could rule without disrupting the capitalist system. The reasons for this were that civil 
society had accepted the ruling class’s ideology. Thereby the beliefs that capitalism 
was inevitable and alternative organizations of society were impossible were deeply 
ingrained within the consciousness of the population.100 Gramsci asserts that under 
these hegemonic conditions, a ‘war of movements’ was doomed to failure because it 
would find little support within a civil society.  
 
Instead, Gramsci argued that successful resistance within such an advanced capitalist 
state could only slowly emerge through ‘organic intellectuals’ challenging the 
dominance of the hegemonic intersubjectivity.101 Gramsci believes in a non-elitist 
form of intellectual. All individuals are intellectuals/philosophers because they 
attempt to make sense of the world in which they live. 'Traditional intellectuals' 
justify the existing system even by acting as 'neutral' voices of events. The 'organic 
intellectuals' are those that ask the critical questions of the existing structures of 
power, and desire to question and change the existing social system through 
challenging the hegemony. By pointing out to civil society the hypocrisy in the 
actions and ideology of the ruling classes, ‘organic intellectuals’ were deemed able to 
undermine the coherence of capitalist ideology in the consciousness of civil society. 
In doing so it would be possible to advocate the emancipation of society from 
oppression and exploitation through depicting an alternative organization of society. 
Thereby a counter-hegemonic force would have to win the argument within civil 
society first and create its own historic bloc, before attempting to challenge the 
hegemony of the state. Hegemonic elites, however, are able to pacify and divide 
counter-hegemonic movements through passive revolution or trasformismo. Reform 
from above is designed to absorb and coopt counter-hegemonic movements and ideas 
into the system of governance to illustrate their participation in governance structures 
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to a wider public, but preventing any access to power. Therefore trasformismo is a 
policy to legitimise the hegemonic structures of power through cooptation of counter-
hegemonic ideas into elite rhetoric so that they justify and do not challenge. 
Importantly, there is no pre-determined teleological end for this dialectic clash of 
hegemony and counter-hegemony. Gramsci asserted that this was why the clashing of 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces in Italy, Germany and Russia resulted in 
Fascism and Stalinist authoritarianism during the 1930s and not socialism. Therefore 
through struggle a new undetermined ontology would emerge. 
 
2.3 Coxian Hegemony and Nebuleuse in the Current World Order 
Similar to Gramsci, Cox argues that in each ‘historical structure’ hegemony is 
possible within production and the state when there is a fit between material 
capabilities, ideas and institutions.102 Cox, however, then takes Gramsci’s ideas 
further and proposes that if the dominant class is able to dominate production and 
create hegemony within a particular state, it is also possible for this state to create 
international organizations to perform a similar function of hegemony amongst 
weaker states. A hegemonic state could also use both coercion and consent to ensure 
compliance from other states by “making concessions that will secure the weak 
acquiescence in their leadership and if they can express their leadership in terms of 
universal or general interests, rather than serving their own particular interests”.103 
“Among the features of international organization which express its hegemonic role 
are the following: (1) the institutions embody the rules which facilitate the expansion 
of hegemonic world orders; (2) they are themselves the product of the hegemonic 
world order; (3) they ideologically legitimate norms of the world order; (4) they co-
opt the elites from peripheral countries; and (5) they absorb counter hegemonic 
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ideas”.104 As material capabilities, ideology and institutions are brought together at 
the international level, the dominant class is able to pursue its own interests through 
expanding its chosen mode of production into more societies. International 
organizations are therefore responsible for propagating an ontology, which justifies 
the implementation of international economic policies to ensure the creation of 
specific forms of states. In doing so, social forces, forms of state and world orders are 
intimately interconnected in a symbiotic relationship to sustain a new model of 
production. 
 
To demonstrate the existence of hegemony in world order, Cox identifies 1845-1875 
as a period of British hegemony, 1875-1945 as one in which hegemony was 
destabilized, 1945-1965 as a period of US hegemony, 1965 to 1975 as a period when 
US hegemony declined and was continued through collaboration with the major 
western powers. During the 1980s the instability in the global economy saw the 
globalization or transnationalization of production and global finance, which 
challenged the previous concerns of political elites within Keynesian national 
economics. The emergence of transnational production was a consequence of the 
development of transnational social forces pursuing transnational interests.105 Cox 
asserts that the hegemony that exists within the current world order is perpetuated and 
stabilized through international organizations, such as the Group of Seven (G7), the 
IMF, the UN, the World Bank and the WTO. Thereby international organizations 
perform a central role in the institutionalising of hegemony of transnational class. 
What this demonstrates is that  
 
distinct historical phases, with their historically specific ontologies, are 
not sealed off from one another as mutually incomprehensible or 
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mutually irrelevant constructs. Historical phases in our own current of 
civilization are produced, one following the other, in a process of 
contradiction. The contradictions and conflicts that arise within any 
established structure create the opportunity for its transformation to a 
new structure.106 
 
The contradiction between the development of material capabilities of social forces, 
and the dominant ontology projected by institutions in any era brings a clash of 
ontologies, which undermines the coherence of hegemon. Thereby a new historical 
structure begins to emerge reflecting the capabilities, ideas and institutions of new 
social forces. 
 
The current historical structure then has to be seen in the context of changing social 
forces. Stephen Gills, the young disciple of Cox, explains “the origins and the 
contradictions of our time are largely to be found in the great transformation that 
emerged in Britain about 200 years ago with ‘the emergence of a new social 
ontology’”.107 This ontology justified the coercion of society to impose relations of 
subordination and domination with the creation of liberal capitalist societies. As social 
forces have clashed throughout these two centuries, distinct historical structures have 
emerged and developed, such as the shift in historical structures advocating Fordism 
and Keynesianism in the post-World War II era, to transnational flexible production 
promoted in an era known as globalization or neoliberal economic globalization. As 
Grazia Ietto-Gillies points out: “No analysis of globalization can be complete without 
an understanding of the role played in it by transnational companies”.108 Mica Panic 
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draws attention to the obvious, but important fact that “TNCs have no sovereign 
power”.109 Consequently, a Coxian analysis of the current historical structure called 
‘globalization’ acknowledges the rise of dominant social forces within transnational 
production, which have used their superior material capabilities to become 
institutionalised within states and have also institutionalised their transnational 
interests and ideology within international organisations. These three factors are 
responsible for establishing the dominance of intersubjective frameworks within 
international organizations, which naturalise corporate-state elite cooperation, 
transforming the forms of states, and acceptance of a new transnational mode of 
production. 
 
Evidence of the institutionalization of corporate interests within the dominant states is 
plentiful. Donna Lee has demonstrated that the British Government of the late 1990s 
has been explicitly promoting corporate interests, such that “business interests have 
been formally integrated within the diplomatic system”.110 Lee highlights the degree 
to which government and corporate cooperation has developed stating that 
governments are “providing business with officially recognized influence in the 
planning, implementation, and evaluation of commercial diplomacy – public interest 
is increasingly conceptualised as a collective of private business interests”. Similarly, 
governments in Canada, Belgium and India have also mirrored this state promotion of 
corporate interests.111 A literature has also emerged, which illustrates the global 
economic crises of 1970 and 1974 provided the ‘enabling environment’, which 
brought a criticism of Keynesianism, and opened the way for a new transnational 
capitalist class to use their superior material capabilities to place business interests at 
the centre of government policies, grow in influence within international 
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organizations, which allowed corporations with transnational activities to enhance 
their interests globally.112 Most famously, the former Senior Vice President of the 
World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, acknowledged this argument. He stated that the World 
Bank and the IMF worked for the interests of specific social forces within the most 
powerful states: “The institutions are dominated not just by the wealthier industrial 
countries but by commercial and financial interests in those countries, and the policies 
of the institutions naturally reflect this”.113 
 
The ideational framework, which has justified this reorganization of the world, has 
been term ‘neoliberal economic globalization’. The main historical thrust of 
neoliberal economic globalization, Barry K. Gill explains, is: “to bring about a 
situation in which private capital and ‘the market’ alone determine the restructuring of 
economic, political and cultural life, making alternative values or institutions 
subordinate”.114 Importantly, Gill points out that to prevent the success of alternative 
policies involves “the political exclusion of dissident social forces from the arena of 
state policy-making”. Neoliberalism has also been defined in terms of sets of policies, 
practices and ideas that seek to promote and extend corporate power and market 
discipline. This promotion and extension takes both a territorial (the opening of 
previously closed economies) and sectoral (the commercialisation of previously non-
market activities) form.115 This definition overlaps with the term ‘globalization’ as it 
is often understood.116 Thus the term neoliberal globalization, which is the 
predominant role of financial capital, reflected in the drive to fully liberalise global 
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capital markets.117 The second is the determination to lock neoliberal policies and 
practices into trade agreements, investment treaties and legal frameworks, including 
through the WTO. As the latter characteristic implies, states and inter-state 
organizations play vital roles in the advancement of the neoliberal project, in 
particular in the institutionalization of neoliberal policies and practices.118 This 
ideology justified the reorganisation of society throughout the 1980s and 1990s in the 
developed OECD countries, and nearly all the states of the world were brought to 
accept these practices through the policies of international organisations. For example 
the IMF and World Bank ‘Structural Adjustment Programmes’ were used to enforce 
policies for reducing government regulation on the movement of capital and goods.119 
Consequently, the IMF, World Bank and WTO coerce and enforce the expansion of 
neoliberalism globally. 
 
What is of the utmost importance to grasp, and must be emphasized here, is that world 
hegemony is possible to construct, not just amongst states, but also in terms of a 
global civil society. As Cox asserts  
 
Hegemony at the international level is thus not merely an order among 
states. It is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of 
production which penetrates into all countries and links into other 
subordinate modes of production. It is also a complex of international 
relationships which connect the social classes of the different countries. 
World hegemony can be described as a social structure, an economic 
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structure; and a political structure…expressed in universal norms, 
institutions, and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour 
for states and for those forces of civil society that act across national 
boundaries, rules which support the dominant mode of production.120 
 
Consequently, at the core of this world hegemony Cox identifies the nebuleuse or the 
transnational networks of state elites, corporate interests and finance, which build 
consensus on the policies of global international organizations - creating “governance 
without government".121 Leslie Sklair has charted the rise of this transnational 
capitalist class over the last 20 years.122  
 
This nebuleuse ensures that the interests of transnational social forces are secured and 
legitimised through a neoliberal ideology propagated by states and international 
organizations, which depict the ‘true’ organization of political, economic, social, and 
cultural life globally. The language of the policies and the negotiations within these 
international organizations are defined by the nebuleuse in terms of the neoliberal 
ontology - deregulation, downsizing, efficiency, flexibility, restructuring, out-
sourcing. Since alternative ideas about the organization are drowned out, a particular 
model or form of state is promoted as the norm. The international press and media and 
resolutions of the international organizations all contribute to the propagation of this 
ontology. As more elites come to accept this neoliberal ideology it “tightens the 
transnational network that link policy making from country to country”.123 In doing so 
this transnational class is able to determine the norms of behaviour and the actions 
possible through world hegemony. Cox famously explains this process in terms of the 
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internationalization of the state where “national policies and practices have been 
adjusted to the exigencies of the world economy of international production”.124 
International organizations develop officially endorsed policy guidelines and these are 
translated into policy guidelines at the national level. Andrew Baker established 
empirical research to justify the concept of nebuleuse depicted by Cox during his 
study of the United Kingdom’s HM Treasury and the Bank of England.125 Although 
Baker takes issue with the idea that “state transformation begins with a process of 
international consensus formation, regarding the needs of the world economy”, he 
does nonetheless, accept that the UK is subject to the transnational social forces 
within the state (City) and the transnational social forces and ideas perpetuating the 
Washington Consensus or prevailing globalization discourses.  
 
As the configuration of social forces within a state changes, however, resistance to the 
policies from international organizations is possible. After consulting the reports from 
eight international organizations, primarily the World Economic Forum and WTO 
reports, Murphy also argued in 1999 the “global balance of ideological and social 
power” was placing pressure for the continuation of neoliberalism.126 However, 
Murphy also highlights that all of the reports draw attention to global inequalities and 
all advocate universal democratisation. In doing so, he asserts that the contradictions 
of neoliberalsim in the form of the anti-democratic nature of governance and the 
growing gross inequalities will leave open the political space for alternative visions of 
world order. Thereby, due to the oppressive and exploitative nature of the policies of 
this world order and the contradictions generated by the hegemony of this 
transnational class, it creates the environment for its own counter-hegemonic forces. 
In a very similar way to Gramsci, Cox, is very clear on the possibilities of 
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successfully challenging world hegemony. As officials from the exploited peripheral 
countries enter these international institutions with the goal of changing their policies 
from within, Cox points out that through trasformismo they are forced to work within 
the prevailing structures of the institutions. In working within these structures the 
individuals help to legitimise the hegemony, but are unable to bring about change, 
such that “Hegemony is like a pillow: it absorbs blows and sooner or later the would 
be assailant will find it comfortable to rest upon”.127 This was clearly illustrated in the 
attempts to establish a New Economic Order during throughout the 1970s by the 
developing country elites. Many now have come to accept the principles of market 
economics. 
 
Cox argues that the challenging of the hegemony of the nebuleuse will only be 
successful when a new historic bloc emerges from within national societies from the 
actions of ‘organic intellectuals’. From the many national historical blocs a counter-
nebuleuse can emerge to challenge the hegemony within international organizations. 
Cox also warned that the nebuleuse would engage in trasformismo or passive 
revolution initiated by political elites. Incremental change from above is motivated by 
the desire to absorb “potentially counterhegemonic ideas and makes these ideas 
consistent with hegemonic doctrine.128 The current trend for the institutions of the 
nebuleuse to develop procedures for Non-Governmental Organization to be officially 
accredited and determined suitable for engagement in some form of participation in 
decision-making could be seen as examples of trasformismo. Consequently, Cox 
asserts that it is “Only where representation in international institutions is firmly 
based upon an articulate social and political challenge to hegemony – upon a nascent 
historical bloc and counter hegemony – could participation within international 
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organizations pose a real threat”.129 Therefore the role of the ‘organic intellectual’ is 
still all important in challenging world hegemony because the argument from the 
counter-hegemonic force has to be won in a global civil society first before there are 
changes in the policies of states and the world order. 
 
Evidence of the emergence of a counter-hegemonic force challenging or abstaining 
from the hegemony is rife in the current world order. In recent years it has been 
widely accepted that there has been an ideological shift by political elites towards 
neoliberalism and their embracing of business interests is argued to have had a 
significant impact on levels of traditional political participation in Western Europe, 
the US and Latin America.130 As disengagement has taken place because of 
neoliberalism, new forms of political participation, protest and advocacy work have 
evolved. Boaventura de Sousa Santos defines the current form of counter-hegemonic 
globalization 
 
as the vast set of networks, initiatives, organizations, and movements 
that fight against the economic, social and political outcomes of 
hegemonic globalization, challenging the conceptions of world 
development under the latter, and proposes alternative conceptions … 
Counter-hegemonic globalization is focused on the struggle against 
social exclusion. Since social exclusion is always the product of unequal 
social relations, counter-hegemonic globalization is animated by a 
redistribute ethos in the broadest sense, involving the redistribution of 
material, social, political, cultural, and symbolic resources … counter-
hegemonic globalization unfolds as political and legal struggles guided 
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by the idea that hegemonic legal and political structures and practices 
can be challenged by alternative principles of law and politics … I 
distinguish two processes of counter-hegemonic globalization: global 
collective action through transnational networking of 
local/national/global linkages; and local or national struggles, whose 
success prompts reproduction in other locales or networking with 
parallel struggles elsewhere.131 
 
The counter-hegemonic forces that de Sousa Santos identifies can be seen in the 
emergence of transnational social movement protest at the meetings of economic and 
environmental international organizations is now commonplace.  
 
From the IMF riots of the 1970s and 1980s, the rebellion against the creation of North 
American Free Trade Agreement, the ‘Battle in Seattle’, Genoa and the meetings of 
the World Social Forums there is evidence that a real counter-hegemonic force has 
emerged. Joe Bandy and Jackie Smith illustrate that the number of Transnational 
Social Movement Organisations (TSMOs have increased from 183 in 1973, to 959 in 
2000.132 Although these TSMOs are primarily organised around the protection of 
human rights (26%), the environment (17%), peace (10%), women’s rights (9%), and 
development (10%), there are a growing number of TSMOs that bring all of these 
issues together under the one umbrella, such as global justice/peace/environment 
(11%), and self-determination/ethnic unity (2%).133 Literature from activists concurs 
with social movement theorists’ analysis of the causes of transnational protest. Naomi 
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Klein asserts that what unites these many national groups is the unleashing of TNCs 
on a global scale and the liberalisation trade policies by the IMF, World Bank and 
WTO.134 The negative effects of these corporate transnational activities and mode of 
production, coupled with the developments in communication technology, have been 
the catalyst for bringing about the transnational cooperation and organisation of social 
movements. Although there is great diversity in the aims and objectives of these many 
transnational social movements, it is clear that what they have in common is that they 
contest the global power relations and the ontology that justifies these power relations 
in the current historical structure. 
 
There has also been a shift in the growth in the number of INGOs in the 20th century. 
At the beginning of the 20th century there were just 176 INGOs, by 1996 there were 
38,243 INGOs135, and by 2001 there were to 48,000 INGOs worldwide.136 Mary 
Kaldor et al illustrate that in the ten years between 1990 and 2000, the same period 
that there has been a significant drop in party memberships and electoral turnout in 
Western Europe and the Americas, the world has seen a near 70% increase in INGO 
memberships.137 Almost a fifty per cent increase in the memberships of INGOs was 
evident throughout all regions of the world. The exceptions to this rise have been 
Central and Eastern Europe’s 340% increase in INGO membership, which must be 
seen in the light of these regions experiencing the end of communism and the ability 
to begin to establish free association with non-governmental organisations, and the 
East Asia and Pacific region’s 75% increase in INGO membership, which also 
recently experienced democratic reforms. Transnational mass membership of NGOs 
has emerged with Amnesty International having over 1 million members from over 
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140 countries; Friends of the Earth federation, which combines 5,000 local groups 
with a total of over 1 million members.138 One could argue that disaffection at one 
level of national political participation has encouraged new forms of political 
engagement at the global level. 
 
Therefore Cox’s historical materialism accounts for both the possibility of change and 
continuity in the multilateralism of the WTO because it focuses on the social forces 
that have emerged to create and challenge the current form of hegemony unique to 
this historical structure. Those transnational social forces with access to superior 
material capabilities in production have been able to gain access to the corridors of 
power within the dominant states, and also the policy process of international 
organizations. As Cox explains a nebuleuse has emerged within economic 
international organizations. Consequently, an ontology that justifies the reorganization 
of production, the forms of states, interstate and society-international organizations 
relations to allow transnational corporate interests to be pursued more efficiently has 
gained wider acceptance amongst political elites. This ontology depicts the 
institutionalisation of these transnational power relations as the only means to achieve 
collective prosperity, democracy, development, peace and sustainable development 
for the world. A counter-hegemonic force is also identified by Cox’s historical 
materialism, which challenges the power relations and ontology of the hegemony. In 
doing so Cox provides a framework for understanding the rationale behind the many 
state and non-state actors interaction and engagement within the WTO’s 
multilateralism. He also draws attention to the manner in which the WTO itself is 
built upon a specific ontology and power relations, which establish consent. Although 
a counter-hegemonic force has evolved more visibly in the last years of the 20th 
century, Cox demonstrates the difficultly in successfully challenging this ontology 
due to the inequality of material capabilities of these social forces. Transnational 
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social forces within the state have access to all the instruments of the state to 
propagate their own ontology, and ultimately have the final sanction of legitimately 
exercising violence in order to maintain their preferred political, economic, social, and 
cultural order – the iron fist of the military helps the invisible hand to prosper. 
Consent can also be manufactured through a policy of trasformismo, so that counter-
hegemonic forces are brought inside political organizations in order to pacify popular 
attempts to challenge the hegemony. Therefore, although Cox might advocate the 
democratisation of global power relations, he accepts that this clash of thesis and anti-
thesis will not have a predetermined conclusion. This is the essence of Cox’s 
insightful theoretical framework on change and continuity – hegemony is resilient and 
able to absorb demands for just change from counter-hegemonic forces, but in doing 
so it will also be subject to new development and new social forces. 
 
2.4 Criticisms of Cox 
Cox’s theory offers a political economy analysis of the state, international 
organizations and multilateralism. Announcing that you consider yourself to be a 
historical materialist also involves being categorised as a Marxist and on the periphery 
of mainstream IR theory. John Adam perhaps summed up the mainstream dismissive 
reaction towards Cox’s analysis when he wrote, “Do we need another quasi-Marxist 
review of labor history? Classes? Surplus…Hegemony? Even with admixtures from 
Karl Polanyi, Antonio Gramsci, and others, Cox never breaks away from a watery 
Marxism – and we have all seen this before”.139 Similarly trivializing, Chris Brown 
argues, “Cox, certainly, is a fairly conventional Marxist and his historical materialism 
while explicitly based on the rejection of positivist accounts of Marxism seems much 
closer to these sources than he is, perhaps aware of.”140 Others have taken issue with 
Cox’s focus on class relations, superstructure and false consciousness as being too 
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reductionist.141 Analysis of world order that focuses on the historical development of 
political economy is then an easy target to dismiss by the mainstream on the grounds 
that it is Marxist, thereby guilty of reducing all events to single causes, reifies class, is 
deterministic and ultimately represents a failed ideology. 
 
In his latest exposition of his theory, Cox explicitly rejects the Marxist label, if this 
label entails acceptance of economism or “vulgar Marxism, the economic 
determinism of ideas”.142 Cox’s theory does not insist that the process of history is 
guiding humanity to some pre-determined utopian world order. Cox may advocate 
emancipation from oppressive power relations and the co-existence of cultures in a 
pluralistic world, but he does not claim that this normative goal is inevitable. Rather 
Cox points out that “we are all Marxist now, given the demonstrated usefulness of 
many Marxists (or, perhaps better, Marxian) models for understanding social 
process”. In terms of reifying class, Cox illustrates that Marx defined class within a 
particular time and space, but the “essence of class is social domination and 
subordination. It can be expressed and experienced in the forms of gender, race, caste, 
status group and other identities, all of which converge into the relations of the 
production process…the question of class needs to be fundamentally rethought”.143 
Cox has developed his theory from a focus purely on class relations to expand his 
study of production to include the production of institutions, laws, morality and ideas. 
Indeed he points out that due to the current forces of hegemonic transnational capital 
and the increased heterogeneity experienced due to migration, the primacy of state 
orientated identities are challenged: “Where the sense of class remains strong today, it 
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may be more a cultural matter than something defined by property relations”. A new 
definition of class is deemed necessary to account for those forces that resist the 
current world order, but this would need to embrace the various identities of ethnicity, 
religion and gender to encompass these groups of resistance.144 Therefore Cox is not 
guilty of advocating a 19th or 20th century definition of class, but rather illustrates how 
dominant economic relations are responsible for oppressing ethnicity, religion and 
gender in the lives of diverse people. 
 
It is Cox’s application of social theory to the study of IR during the 1980s, which 
critical theorists celebrated because he challenged the dominant ontology and the 
status of accepted knowledge within the discipline of IR.145 Cox’s now well worn 
quote that “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose”146, and his 
distinction between ‘problems-solving’ and ‘critical theory’ are recognised for prising 
open the intellectual space that allowed the traditional IR epistemology and ontology 
monopolies (states, balance of power, national interest, security) to be interrogated.147 
IR theory had been guilty of pronouncing itself to be scientifically objective and 
independent of the other social sciences. John MacMillan and Andrew Linklater 
explain that Cox’s criticism introduced social theory to IR, and brought “a 
sophisticated challenge to the naïve empiricist view that a political neutral or innocent 
interpretation of external reality is possible”.148 This “critical turn in International 
Relations” came to be known as the ‘third debate’149 in IR theory and saw the 
Frankfurt School critical theory, social constructivists, post-structuralists and feminist 
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writers “highlight how images of ethnic identity, nation, national interests, 
community, state, international cooperation and global values help constitute power 
arrangements which favour some but disfavour others”.150 Thereby Cox’s focus on 
social theory has been significant for providing the springboard for critical theorists to 
articulate criticism and develop projects of emancipation from the dominant structures 
of power and knowledge that are concealed within institutions. These Marxist tools 
are still relevant to today’s theorising because they account for the forces behind 
social relations from a local to global level, and provide a critical assessment of the 
process of theorising itself. 
 
Cox’s is also criticised for misinterpreting Gramsci151 or as Catherine Eschle argues 
that Cox as a neoGramscian is guilty of tending towards a totalizing account of world 
social relations which circumscribes agency.152 The first criticism is perhaps a little 
pedantic, the latter misplaced. As Craig N. Murphy, points out it is not the 
interpretation of Gramsci that is important for international studies, it is the fact that 
many of the concepts and focus on historical analysis asserted by Gramsci “‘fit’ with 
some of the characteristics of the current age at a more ‘global’ level.153 Similarly, 
Richard Falk, congratulates Cox on his development of a theory that draws from 
Gramsci’s ideas and concepts to establish a theory that allows for agency within 
structures of power, and so goes beyond the static nature of world systems theory 
advocated by writers, such as Immanuel Wallerstein.154 As Robert O’Brien and Marc 
Williams point out the historical materialism advocated by Cox allows for agency 
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within structures: “We view the relationship as dynamic and do not privilege either 
structure on unit level variables. There is a danger in reifying structures on one hand, 
and reducing complex events to individual action on the other. In rejecting structural 
determinism and methodological individualism we seek to understand the way in 
which structures constrain action, and agency impacts on structural constrains”.155 As 
Cox points out  
 
The problem facing anyone who seeks to define the ‘problematic’ of 
the contemporary world is to draw upon and in so far as possible 
integrate modes of understanding from different sources so as to yield 
a result that both explains adequately and orients action…It is more 
useful to leave intellectual identities aside and address the question of 
what are the important things to focus upon.156  
 
As pointed out above one of the important things to focus upon in a Coxian analysis is 
the process of dialectics that ensures that hegemony creates its own counter-
hegemony and a non-deterministic change will result. Susan Strange once described 
Cox as “an eccentric in the best English sense of the word, a loner, a fugitive from 
intellectual camps of victory, both Marxist and liberal”.157 This is perhaps Cox’s 
achievement; he is able to draw from such a wide number of theorists to produce a 
distinct critical theory of the politics of world order, which identifies agency within 
structures of power. 
 
Susan Strange, however, also objected to Cox privileging power in production in 
accounting for changes in world order.158 In contrast, she identifies four separate but 
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inter-related structures that collectively bear down on international events, namely: 
“control over security, control over production, control over finance/credit, and 
control over knowledge”.159 For Strange, the exercise of ‘structural power’ is the 
determining factor for producing transformation in international relations. In contrast 
to relational power, which can be defined as ‘A having the power to make B do 
something that it would not have otherwise have done’, ‘structural power’ differs. 
Strange describes ‘structural power’ as: 
  
Conferring the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to 
shape the frameworks, with which each state relates to each other, 
relates to people, or relates to corporate enterprises. The relative power 
of each party in a relationship is more, or less, if one of the parties is 
also determining the surrounding structure of the relationship.160 
 
‘Structural power’ within production is important, but no more so than the other three 
structures in determining the changes that will occur in the international arena. This is 
an important insight because it draws attention to the way in which international 
institutions are not neutral forums for negotiation.  
 
It is worth noting that after criticising Cox for privileging production, Strange then 
acknowledges the sway of power exercised by those who control the production 
structure, which in many ways echoes Cox. This can be seen as she writes that: 
 
The class in a position to decide or to change the mode of production 
can use its ‘structural power’ over production to consolidate and 
defend its social and political power, establishing constitutions, setting 
up political institutions and laying down legal and administrative 
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processes and precedents that make it hard for others to challenge or 
upset …[S]tructural power over production geared to a world market 
becomes that of increasing cultural, linguistic and ideological 
influence.161 
 
This is not to claim that the other three structures of power are of no importance. On 
the contrary, they are equally as important as production. As illustrated earlier, 
however, the current mode of transnational production has been a significant factor in 
generating transnational protest and the power relations in credit, security, and 
knowledge that are linked to transnational production. Interestingly, Strange fails to 
discuss the role of ideology in linking and legitimising all four of the structural forces 
that she defines. The West, especially the US, continues to dominate as the world’s 
leading locus of military power. Similarly the West dominates control of finance, 
production and knowledge. As such all the structures of power are based upon a 
Western liberal ideology, which justifies Western practices and institutions. Therefore 
Strange and Cox have a great deal more in common, and the concept of structural 
power is essential in understanding the manner in which decision-making is designed 
to ensure specific outcomes. 
 
Post-structuralism, however, directs a very different criticism at Cox, and one that 
often tests the limits of comprehending the English language. The essence of the post-
structural criticisms runs as follows. On the one hand, Cox's assertion that 
"international political theory is not only about politics, it is political itself" is 
welcomed. On the other hand, his emancipation project is severely condemned. 
Implicit within Cox's belief that a 'counter-hegemonic structure' will evolve, is the 
premise that the dominant 'historical structure' is both exclusive and oppressive in 
nature. As such the 'counter-hegemonic structure' is generated by the oppressed, out 
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of an attempt to break free and gain emancipation. Since this emancipation is on a 
world scale, Cox is asserting a universal morality. The problem is that if Cox is 
correct in his assertion that all international political theory is non-neutral, then his 
own critical theory must be a subjective theory by the same analysis.162 If this is so, 
on what grounds can Cox claim to offer a universal theory for the emancipation of 
humanity when his theory is subjective, and not objective?163 For post-structuralists, 
Cox is merely privileging one perspective of Western modernity over all other moral 
views without justification. As such Cox is open to the same attack that he asserts a 
non-neutral theory of international politics, which attempts to change the world 
towards its own favoured political values.164 J. George and David Campbell argue that 
what is required of a theorist is to: "cast off the legacy of uncritical judgements and 
'isolated privileges' characteristic of western modern discourses and listen, seriously 
to marginalized voices, to different histories and cultural experiences".165  
 
This non-neutrality criticism that is pointed at Cox appears to have some weight. Cox 
deals with these criticisms himself and points out that the deconstruction of dominant 
ontologies should enhance not prevent our understanding of the present structures of 
power:  
 
Now postmodernists … [assert] every purported firm ground is to be 
doubted in the eyes of eternity. We are not however, working with the 
eyes of eternity but with a myopia particular to the late twentieth 
century…Our challenge is not to contribute to the construction of a 
universal and absolute knowledge, but to devise a fresh perspective 
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useful for framing and working on the problems of the present…To 
deconstruct the ontological constructs of the passing present is a first 
step towards a more pertinent but still relative knowledge. The task of 
clearing the ground should not become an obstacle to constructing a 
new perspective that can be useful even though it in turn will 
ultimately be open to critical revaluation166  
 
It is also necessary to reiterate that Cox is arguing that there is no teleological end 
point to the conflict between social forces. He may be in favour of the emancipation 
of dominated classes and people, but with his acknowledgement of non-deterministic 
dialectics their liberation is a forgone conclusion. It also has to be remembered that 
Cox’s theory later acknowledged the emerging counter-hegemonic movement as 
culturally diverse in its composition and not the vehicle of a single class interest.167 
Therefore, the Coxian theoretical framework is not guilty of painting all the protesters 
with a single coherent declared interest and morality. In fact the very opposite is true - 
what these groups do have in common is that they believe that neoliberal 
globalization is responsible for their grievances.168 
 
2.5 Mainstream Multilateralism and the ‘Dissident’ Coxian New Multilateralism. 
In establishing this Coxian theoretical perspective Cox acknowledges that he has set 
himself “Apart from the Mainstream” of international studies theorists.169 Dominant 
amongst the mainstream theories that have attempted to understand the development 
of international institutions and multilateralism have been the neo-Realist and the 
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neoliberal Institutionalists. Both of these theories fall under the definition of a 
‘problem-solving’ theory.170 In contrast to ‘problem-solving’ theory, Cox applies his 
own ‘critical theory’, in the form of historical materialism to the study of international 
organizations and multilateralism. This section will illustrate the distinction between 
mainstream IR theorists and Cox on the subject of multilateralism. What is significant 
is the manner in which Cox’s theorising has been ignored by the mainstream, 
regardless of his wealth of research and published contributions to the subject. 
 
For example, it is clear that a central influence in guiding Cox’s attention to his 
theoretic framework came from his time spent working and researching international 
organizations. For 25 years Cox worked uncomfortably at the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) because he came to realise that both the ILO and himself “had 
become an accessory to what I soon came to call ‘hegemony’…my work through the 
institute had implicitly promoted a perspective on labor and social policy that 
reflected the dominant social forces in the rich countries and in the world”.171 As an 
academic, Cox’s theorising of international organizations was further honed during 
two collaborative research projects. The first, during the 1960s, involved a 
comparative study of decision-making within eight international institutions. Working 
with Harold K. Jackson, Cox offered a critical analysis of decision-making in The 
Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organizations.172 The new 
Director General of the ILO would not allow this text to be published by an employee 
of the ILO, and so on 12 June 1972 Cox wrote his resignation letter. Turning to full 
time academic employment, Cox worked at Columbia University until 1976, and in 
1977 returned to Canada and York University. Taking advantage of his new academic 
freedom, in 1977, Cox drew from his experience to articulate that power in 
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production, social forces, ideology, and hegemony were essential factors in shaping 
decision-making in international organizations.173  
 
In the 1990s, as the “intellectual leader”,174 Cox was asked to contribute to a five-year 
research project for the United Nations University on the subject of ‘Multilateralism 
and the United Nations System’.175 From 1994 to 1999, this UN research programme 
established a rich body of literature on UN multilateralism in seven collected volumes 
of essays.176. Cox pointed out that to understand the problematic of UN 
multilateralism it was necessary to “link two dynamics: the dynamic of structural 
change in world order, and the dynamic of development of multilateral practices”.177 
Most notably amongst these were the decline of US hegemony, and the contesting of 
this hegemony by states and social movements.178 The hierarchical state-centric 
multilateralism of the UN, however, did not reflect these structural changes. Cox 
therefore asserted that multilateralism “will become an arena of conflict between the 
endeavours to buttress the freedom of movement of powerful homogenizing economic 
forces, and efforts to build a new structure of regulation protecting diversity and the 
less powerful”.179 Furthermore he asserted that the UN had the potential to transform 
and develop a 'new multilateralism' based on the interests of the less powerful civil 
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society groups promoting “greater social equality, greater diffusion of power among 
countries and social groups, protection of the biosphere, moderation and non-violence 
in dealing with conflict, and mutual recognition of civilizations”.180 This ‘new 
multilateralism’ was deemed to be inherently democratic from the ‘bottom-up’ 
because it was based upon the interests and culture of civil society groups, not just 
states. 
 
Mainstream IR theories on multilateralism were inadequate for understanding or 
incorporating the structural changes identified by Cox. Indeed the study of 
multilateralism and international organizations had been neglected. The only 
academic definition of multilateralism that existed - “the practice of coordinating 
national policies in groups of three or more states” - had been supplied by the 
neoliberal Institutionalist Robert O. Keohane in 1988.181 Dominated by Neo-Realist 
and Neoliberal Institutionalists, mainstream IR theory had focused instead on the 
cooperation of states within international regimes. In 1982, Stephen Krasner had laid 
down the framework for mainstream theorising about international regimes by 
arguing that the dominant state creates international regimes, which establish “sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around 
which actor expectations converge in a given issue area”.182 Regimes and 
international institutions were deemed to be constructs of the most powerful 
hegemonic states.183 Focusing purely on the material (mostly military) capabilities of 
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states this state-centric hegemony overlooked the sophistication of Coxian hegemony. 
The social forces – national and transnational – responsible for shaping 
institutionalising ideas in a state’s foreign policy and in international organizations to 
pursue their mode of production were all absent from these analyses. Change and 
continuity in world politics was reduced to hegemonic wars. 
 
By the early 1990s, the disagreement between Neo-Realist and Neo-liberalism (‘neo-
neo’ debate) seemed to have all but disappeared because it has been reduced to 
whether states pursue relative gains (Neo-Realist) or absolute gains (Neo-liberal) from 
interaction within international regimes and organisations.184 The existence of 
anarchy, the primacy of the state, sovereignty and national interest all seemed to be 
points of agreement not contention. On the one hand David Baldwin applauded this 
‘neo-neo’ debate on the grounds that the theories “engaged one another’s arguments 
directly, and resulted in a more focused, and productive debate”.185 On the other hand, 
the value of these theories was undermined because there was little actual 
disagreement between them. It appeared that mainstream IR theorising had reached its 
limits of understanding international regimes, whilst multilateralism and international 
organizations were ignored. As early as 1986, Martin J. Rouchester drew attention to 
the negative impact IR theorizing on regimes had for research on international 
organizations: “a steady disengagement of international scholars from the study of 
organizations, to the point that one must question whether such a field even exists any 
longer except in name”.186 
 
Acknowledging the lack of theorising on multilateralism John G. Ruggie addressed 
the subject, and asserted from the title of his 1993 edited volume that ‘Multilateralism 
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Matters’.187 Interestingly, although the title of Ruggie’s own chapter Multilateralism: 
The Anatomy of an Institution resembles Cox’s own 1972 title The Anatomy of 
Influence: Decision Making in International Organizations,188 there is no reference or 
engagement with any of Cox’s research. Rather Ruggie draws together both 
Keohane’s interstate definition and argument that cooperation functions on the 
expectation of “diffuse reciprocity”.189 This leads him to claim that multilateralism 
has a unique neutral character because it shapes actors interests towards collective 
goods, which establishes norms of behaviour for participating states. Two examples 
are proposed to give weight to this argument. The first of these is the norm of the 
“most-favoured-nation” (MFN) as established in the international trade agreements 
and “corresponding rules about reciprocal tariff reductions and application of 
safeguards, and collectively sanctioned procedures for implementing the rules”. 
Attention is drawn to the MFN principle in the Coden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860 and 
to the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as examples of neutrality 
within institutionalised multilateralism. The second norm he cites is that of “collective 
security”, which includes “the norms of a nonaggression, uniformed rules for the use 
of sanctions to deter or punish aggression, and collectively sanctioned procedures for 
implementing them”.190 The League of Nations and the United Nations, and 
specifically the US led coalition against the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1991, are held 
up as examples of collective security.  
 
Incorporating the manner in which states, international organizations and neutral 
norms interact, Ruggie defines multilateralism as  
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the practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or 
more states in accordance with certain principles of conduct; that is, 
principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, 
without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the 
strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence.191  
 
Interestingly, Ruggie further argues that the non-discriminatory nature of the 
multilateral institutions of today is a direct result of the non-discriminatory ideals that 
underpinned the US hegemony, which created these institutions in the post World 
War II era. Ultimately, multilateralism matters, argues Ruggie, because it develops 
intersubjective frameworks, which shape state perceptions towards the belief that 
acceptable state behaviour is linked to collective interests. In his later work Ruggie 
continues this discussion of states, international institutions and intersubjective 
frameworks within the context of an international society, and establishes his social 
constructivist credentials.192 Similarly, Alexander Wendt attempted to establish a 
social constructivist theory of interstate interaction by drawing attention to the norms 
and ideas created by states, which have the potential to guide state behaviour towards 
a number of possible normative frameworks.193 Picking up on the themes of the state 
as a unitary actor, collective interests and the input of social constructivists, Kenneth 
W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal also offered a similar analysis of international 
organizations at the beginning of the 21st century, but stressed the relative power of 
the states as a major contributing factor.194 All of these social constructivist theories 
are deficient because they begin with the state as the primary actor and then link 
norms to state behaviour without identifying the social forces that determine the 
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policies and norms of states and international organizations. As Benno Teschke and 
Christian Heine point out the “the central constructivist problem is that cognitive 
shifts have no apparent external referent…explaining changes in international 
economic regimes without economics and changes in international political regimes 
without politics”.195 
 
In contrast, Cox highlights the absurdity of defining multilateralism at the UN in 
terms of neutral principles. The five members of the UN Security Council, each of 
which is able to exercise the veto should a UN decision clash with their own interests, 
dominate the decision-making of the UN. Furthermore, the Security Council reflects a 
configuration of power that existed at the end of the Second World War, not the early 
1990s. He also points out that “The principle defect of the existing world order and 
the form of multilateralism associated with it is that is leading to ever-greater 
polarization of rich and poor, powerful and powerless, especially when one looks at 
global society”.196 Yet, the state-centric manner in which multilateralism is defined 
prevents the powerless from representing their interests within the UN because it does 
not allow for non-state actors. Thereby mainstream theorising on multilateralism is 
guilty of advocating a ‘problem-solving’ approach to the study of international 
institutions, which maintains the status quo and prevents the UN from addressing 
oppressive power relations. 
 
 
These sentiments are echoed throughout the edited volumes that emerged from the 
UN study on multilateralism. Michael G. Schechter, a key figure in the UN study 
reiterated Cox’s assertions, “the United Nations structure reflects, and perhaps 
magnifies, the power of the great powers of the Second World War. Thus those states 
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are privileged in the setting of the global agenda and in deciding which issues will be 
handled multilaterally and how”.197 Marie-Claude Smouts argued since the interests 
of the powerful were institutionalised with the UN it could not be meaningfully 
reformed and so “the UN should not be looked on to resolve the key dilemmas 
confronting the globe’s population on the eve of the 21st century”.198 Similarly, 
Abelardo Morales states that reform of the UN, the World Bank and IMF will never 
be radical because these bodies institutionalised the interests of a specific group who 
“are ill-suited to serve the interests of the South”.199 Stephen Gill went further and 
identified, not the states, but the capitalist transnational social forces involved in the 
G-7 nexus, which direct the global economy.200 This is the crux of Cox’s analysis of 
multilateralism within international economic organizations: “There is a dominate 
transnational class at the summit of the global economy, together with subordinate 
social groups linked to it who also benefit from the dominant position of the world 
economy”.201 Thereby a Coxian analysis of multilateralism within the economic 
international institutions argues that it has to be seen as part of the nebuleuse – a 
transnational network of corporate and financial social forces, which worked closely 
with the most powerful state elites, intellectuals and the media to pursue and 
legitimise their interests. Yet, Cox’s critical research has remained on the periphery of 
IR theory, and since mainstream state-centric IR theories ignore Cox it can be argued 
that they reinforce the legitimacy of the nebuleuse. 
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2.6 New Multilateralism and Complex Multilateralism within MEIs 
This Coxian approach to world order has been depicted as initiating a new neo-
Gramscian School, which ignited a study of hegemony.202 Prominent amongst Cox’s 
former students that have carried forward this Coxian framework, are Stephen Gill 
and Robert O’Brien.203 Gill has focused his attention on continuing to develop Coxian 
theory and language to describe the new ontologies of the world order, and new 
global social movements.204 In contrast O’Brien, has applied a form of Coxian 
analysis backed with empirical research drawn from his studies of multilateral 
economic institutions (MEIs), including the WTO.205 Since this chapter and thesis is 
dealing with the WTO, this section will therefore concentrate on the work of O’Brien 
and his analysis of the development of ‘complex multilateralism’ within the WTO. 
 
Undoubtedly, O’Brien’s work has been instrumental in understanding the ontologies, 
actors and institutions that have emerged within international trade. Interestingly, it is 
possible to discern a slow dilution of the application of a Coxian framework in his 
work from 1995, to the study of MEIs in 1997, and his subsequent research of the 
WTO in 1998 and 2000. The Coxian definitions of world hegemony in terms of 
nebuleuse, and the concept of counter-hegemony have all been significant in their 
absence from O’Brien’s research. Cox is cited as “giving sound advice and support” 
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to O’Brien’s research projects on the WTO through out the years. Yet, in Cox’s own 
work he has maintained that the concepts of nebuleuse (from 1992206 to 2002207) and 
counter-hegemony208 are central to understanding the current world order. Cooptation 
through trasformismo has been less evident in Cox’s work since it first appeared in 
1983, but is still evident in 2002 when he discusses ‘passive revolution’ and cautions 
of possible cooptation of social movements and NGOs by hegemony.209 
 
Perhaps the reason why these concepts are omitted is that O’Brien’s research on the 
WTO has involved collaborative effort with academics that do not share his Coxian 
perspectives.210 Most notably amongst his research partners on MEIs is Jan Aart 
Scholte, a prolific writer on globalization, global governance and global social 
movements. For Scholte the current world order or globalization can be understood 
through theorising from a socio-historical perspective, drawing from Realism and 
Liberalism (states and governance structures), Marxism (importance of capitalism), 
Constructivism (identity patterns), Post-Structuralism (the power of knowledge), and 
Feminism (the importance of gender relations).211 In applying this framework he 
emphasises shifts in five macro social structures: geography, production, governance, 
identity, and knowledge. This perspective also advocates the emancipatory potential 
to create a secure, equitable and democratic world order.212 Using the term 
supraterritorial, Scholte claims social relations have escaped the structures of the 
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territorial state, but refuses to cite social forces as the primary cause of this 
development.  
 
Consequently, Scholte argues that ‘neo-Gramscian’ writers using ‘historical 
materialism’ and ‘political economy’, such as Cox, are guilty of asserting that 
 
ideational aspects of social relations are treated as outcomes of, with no 
autonomy from, the mode of production. Yet it over simplifies matters to 
suggest that culture and psychology are reducible to political economy, 
that structures of identity and knowledge are wholly reducible to political 
economy, and entirely subordinate to, those of production and 
governance.213 
 
Therefore Scholte is dismissive of Cox for offering a simplistic perspective on world 
order. Yet, standing back from what seems to be the complexity of Scholte’s theory, it 
is possible to discern striking similarities with Cox. Both stress the role of social 
forces in production, states, institutions, ideas and knowledge in shaping outlooks and 
identities. What distinguishes the two is that a Coxian framework asserts that one of 
the most important forms of institutional power in shaping identities and projecting 
specific gender relations is that of capitalism established by dominant social forces in 
the global economy. Perhaps capitalism may not be the only force, but is a central and 
powerful institutionalised power because of the material and ideological capabilities 
at its disposal. Scholte, however, is not convinced and he implicitly disputes the 
existence of nebuleuse on the grounds that supraterritorial capitalist class bonds exist 
in the form of ‘global elite circles’, but their influence is overplayed: “Global 
managers do not have a single and tightly coordinated strategy of planetary rule”.214 It 
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is clear that there is much in common between a Coxian framework and Scholte, but 
the centrality of capitalist transnational social forces to generate policies within the 
state, and within international organizations is a point of conflict. Perhaps in response 
it could be argued that Scholte’s critical introduction to globalization is less than 
critical because it fails to identify agency and intention, but rather states that 
globalization is a product of many forces without giving enough attention to social 
forces.215  
 
Arguably, this disagreement can be seen to influence O’Brien’s research. For example 
in 1995, O’Brien argued, that the interaction of economic and political domains ought 
to be the central methodology in international relations, rather than being seen as a 
sub-discipline of IR.216 In 1997, O’Brien clearly applied a Coxian political economy 
analysis to the study of international trade.217 Indeed the opening chapter was divided 
into the headings of Globalization, Production, Finance, Social Forces, Ideas, 
Institutions, Resistance, and the State in order to establish a framework for 
understanding how subsidies had changed in the final decades of the 20th century. 
O’Brien’s central argument drew attention to the level of autonomy and enforcement 
that MEIs had acquired to regulate subsidies in international trade resulting in a 
fundamental change in traditional understandings of the state. At the core of this 
process of regulations were regional and international organizations, the European 
Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement and the GATT (WTO). He 
further points out the main attributes of these institutions: (1) responsibility for 
defining and labelling a government’s use of taxes to assist in the production of goods 
and services as subsidies; (2) defining of subsidies so broadly they included just about 
every function that government undertook from running a police force to providing 
                                                 
215 See Justin Rosenberg. The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations, 
London: Verso, 1994. 
216 Robert O’Brien. ‘International Political Economy and International Relations: Apprentice and Teacher?’, in 
John MacMillan and Andrew Linklater (editors), Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International 
Relations, London: Pinter Publishers, 1995, p. 89 – 106. 
217 Robert O’Brien. Subsidy Regulation and State Transformation in North America, the GATT and the EU, 
Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1997. 
 70
tax breaks for corporations; (3) power to determine the legality of state subsidies, and 
apply sanctions to ensure compliance with subsidy reducing treaties; and (4) 
propagating the ideas that subsidies distorting trade and undermined economic 
growth.  
 
Specifically, O’Brien states that these developments within international 
organizations are due to the emergence of transnational social forces within the global 
economy, and their demand for the regulation of state subsidies. Consequently, 
O’Brien argues that  
 
US hegemony is gone, regimes live on218…especially in the EU and 
WTO the trend has been for government leaders, backed by commercial 
interests, often representing a minority of the population, entering into 
international agreements to empower bureaucrats and lawyers to take 
decisions over the appropriateness of government expenditure. Once 
created, these agreements resemble constitutions in that they embody 
long term rules about the functioning of the society and the economy.219 
 
These developments were argued to have caused a significant change in the functions, 
and therefore our understanding, of state sovereignty. The reason for this was that as 
international organizations grew in power, and O’Brien directly quotes Cox, “national 
policies and practices have been adjusted to the exigencies of the world economy of 
international production”.220 Therefore O’Brien explicitly acknowledges the way in 
which MEIs have developed an ontology, which justifies state elites redefining state 
interests towards the priorities articulated by capitalist transnational social forces 
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embodied within international institutions. In all but name, O’Brien is articulating the 
concept of nebuleuse. He also discusses resistance to these polices, but not in terms of 
counter-hegemony. 
 
There is, however, no explicit or implicit reiteration of O’Brien’s theoretical 
framework as he, Scholte and Marc Williams joined forces in 1998 to look at the 
impact of civil society groups, mainly NGOs, on the WTO in 1998.221 In 2000, 
O’Brien, Scholte and Williams collaborated again, and added Anne Marie Goetz to 
their team to examine the extent to which social movements and NGOs had been 
brought into the policy and process of multilateralism at the end of the 20th century. 
These writers distinguish between Ruggie’s state-centric ‘traditional multilateralism’ 
and Cox’s normative description of democratised bottom-up ‘new multilateralism’. 
Using ‘new multilateralism’ as an ideal type they set out a research agenda to evaluate 
the influence of non-state actors in the decision-making and creation of norms within 
the IMF, World Bank and WTO. It is their conclusion that there has been “a move 
away from a multilateralism based primarily on the activities of states. Other groups 
of actors, whether they be private firms or social movements have a significant role in 
multilateralism. However, states remain key actors and it is not yet established to 
what degree or in what way they will cede decision-making authority”.222 Therefore 
they use the term ‘complex multilateralism’ to describe the shift from traditional 
multilateralism, but not the realization of Cox’s ‘new multilateralism’. 
 
Although these writers use Cox’s description of new multilateralism as an ideal type 
they omit some of the most import aspects of Cox’s theoretical framework in their 
analysis; namely the Coxian definition of hegemony in terms of nebuleuse, counter-
hegemonic forces, organic intellectuals and trasformismo. A watered down definition 
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of hegemony is advocated that stresses the manner in which institutions perpetuate 
dominant ideas about the world, but it does not identify the social forces that created 
the institutions and propagates these dominant ideas to pursue their own interests.223 
Transnational business is identified as the driving force behind globalization and its 
close relationship with political elites is acknowledged, but not that transnational 
social forces have been institutionalised in the form of nebuleuse.224 The structural 
power of these transnational social forces to set the agenda and policies for action, 
due to their influence in the framework of decision-making in MEIs – especially in 
the creation of the WTO policies and processes, is also absent. The ability of the 
hegemony to engage social movements and NGOs in a policy of cooptation through 
trasformismo are also not included. Furthermore, although these writers recognize that 
there is an explicit division between those wishing to preserve the state-centric elite 
form of traditional multilateralism in MEIs, and the social movements and NGOs that 
wish to democratise the MEIs in the form of ‘new multilateralism’, they contend that 
these positions are not consciously acknowledged by the defenders and transformers 
of established multilateralism.225 Consequently, the insights that could be revealed 
from a Coxian analysis are lost. 
 
For example, O’Brien et al conclude that although each MEI examined demonstrates 
different forms of engagement with global social movements and NGOs “this opening 
is often limited by a preference to maintain policy effectiveness and pre-empt a far-
reaching restructuring of multilateralism or transformation of the principles 
underlying existing policies.226 Of the three institutions it is argued the World Bank 
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had been the most engaging with non-state actors.227 Since the Coxian definition of 
hegemony, nebuleuse and trasformismo are negated, O’Brien et al become 
dangerously close to legitimising the World Bank’s neoliberal programme because 
they assert it has made moves towards the ideals of social justice, sustainable 
development and gender equality embodied within global social movements. For 
example, using the concept of hegemony in his insightful analysis of the World Bank, 
Michael Goldman, is able to illustrate the manner in which statements concerning the 
engagement of MEIs and social movements can lead to the legitimisation of 
neoliberal policies: 
 
the Bank’s greatest accomplishment has been to makes its worldview, its 
development framework, and its data sets the ones that people around 
the world chose above all others…now the world’s largest 
environmental organizations are the chief sponsors of World Bank 
energy, land colonization, and forestry projects…under the label of 
green-neoliberalism…[T]he World Bank was pushed into its greening 
phase by a transnational social movement the demand that it ‘reform or 
die’…the World Bank responded with fervour, ingenuity, and capital. 
Consequently, the Bank’s form of environmental knowledge production 
has rapidly become hegemonic, disarming and absorbing many of its 
critics, expanding its terrain of influence, and effectively enlarging the 
scope and power of its neoliberal agenda.228 
 
Since Goldman applies the concept of hegemony and implicitly recognises cooptation 
(trasformismo), he is able to explain how the World Bank can draw from the demands 
of the global green movement to weave their language through the rhetoric of World 
                                                 
227 Robert O’Brien et al. Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social 
Movements, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 18. 
228 Michael Goldman. Imperial Nature: The World Bank and the Struggle for Social Justice in the Age of 
Globalization, London: Yale University Press, 2005, p. 180. 
 74
Bank policies. In doing so, the World Bank deflects demands for just change and 
sustainable development by absorbing the demands into a newly modified ontology, 
which equates neoliberalism as the only path to sustainable development. Cox himself 
asserted that hegemony would “penetrate and coopt elements of popular movements. 
State subsidies to non-governmental organizations incline the latter’s objectives 
towards conformity with the established order and thus enhance the legitimacy of the 
prevailing order”.229 The neglect of the concepts of hegemony and nebuleuse 
therefore prevents an understanding of how MEIs can allow access and participation 
in decision-making to antagonistic groups without the institution having to change its 
policies. 
 
It also has to be remembered that O’Brien et al’s research was conducted prior to the 
massive demonstrations at Seattle in December 1999. This event clearly defined the 
positions of those that were attempting to preserve the traditional multilateralism 
within the WTO, and those outside as a movement attempting to democratise or 
decommission the multilateralism of the WTO. Indeed, political elites within the 
WTO have again and again demanded the preservation of state-centric multilateralism 
after the acceptance of amicus curiae to the WTO dispute settlement body after 
1997.230 Furthermore, political elites have articulated the term ‘anti-globalization’ 
movement and built an ideology around this term to discredit the challenge to the 
status quo by the protesters. At the same time NGOs have vigorously campaigned for 
the right to participate in decision-making and dispute settlement in a manner that 
reflected ‘new multilateralism’. Popular literature emerging for the World Social 
Forum also explicitly defined the movement against neoliberal globalization in terms 
of counter-hegemony.231 These world and regional Social Forums also provide the 
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platform for ‘organic intellectuals’ to meet and coordinate campaigns to bring the 
contradictions of world hegemony to their respective civil societies. The term alter-
globalization movement has also grown in popularity with social movements and 
NGOs since Seattle, which reflects a position to reform hegemony. Therefore both 
defenders and transformers of the WTO’s multilateralism are very conscious of the 
positions that they hold.  
 
In terms of access to the WTO O’Brien et al concluded that the WTO was an 
institution in its infancy, but was showing signs of making adjustment to open up 
information and decision-making to NGOs and social movements. It was 
acknowledged that this access was very limited and to pacify critics claiming that the 
WTO was closed to public scrutiny. It was also argued that this should not detract 
from the point “Even lip service to sustainable development changes the orientation of 
an organization. Moreover, it presents NGOs with a yardstick by which to measure 
performance”.232 As Goldman illustrates through applying the concepts of hegemony 
and cooptation, however, it is clear that transnational elite networks are more than 
capable of changing their rhetoric and an institution’s ontology to deflect demands for 
just change by just paying lip service, and convincing an uninformed public that 
demands for just change have been met. 
 
Indeed, since Seattle a policy of trasformismo has been evident as the language and 
demands of the protesters have been absorbed into the rhetoric of the “transnational 
networks of state elites, corporate interests and finance, which build consensus on the 
ideology and policies of global international organizations creating “governance 
without government" – the nebuleuse.233 This has clearly been the case at the WTO. 
After Seattle the WTO embarked on a public relations exercise to legitimise and 
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justify the existence of the WTO through the creation of an on-line Website. This 
website sets out not just to give information, but to propagate an ontology that 
naturalises free trade, sanctifies comparative advantage, depicts itself as an institution 
embracing sustainable development, primarily promoting the interest of the poorest 
countries through the Doha Development Round, and engaging with NGOs. In doing 
so the public at large is provided with a picture of a WTO that addressed all the issues 
presented by global social movements. Yet, neither the policies of the WTO nor the 
nebuleuse have changed, only the rhetoric. The transnational nebuleuse has the 
superior material capabilities at its disposal to ensure that its neoliberal ontology 
dominates all others at the moment. The only way to reveal this process is to apply the 
Coxian framework, which applies the concepts of hegemony, nebuleuse, counter-
hegemonic forces, organic intellectuals and trasformismo. In doing so, a more 
comprehensible understanding of the multilateralism of WTO can be established by 
applying a Coxian framework. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that a Coxian perspective provides the essential analytical 
tools for understanding change and continuity at the WTO through the political 
economy of Cox. It has been demonstrated that the vast majority of IR theorising on 
multilateralism and international organizations has been state-centric, which has 
resulted in a very limited understanding of the dynamics of international 
organizations. Although Cox has built a respectable body of research relating to 
international organization over the last fifty years, his work has remained ignored and 
on the fringes of mainstream IR theorizing. Yet, since the WTO is responsible for 
generating policies to ensure governments establish foreign corporate competition for 
the supply of goods and services and justifies these policies through a neoliberal 
ideology, it would seem pertinent to begin analysis of the WTO with the social forces 
of production. By focusing on the conflict between social forces within production, 
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the state and world order, the Coxian historical materialism can account for why 
national and international organizations have become interlinked and propagate 
specific ontologies about the world in different epochs. The identification of 
hegemony within historical structures, which brings together social forces, material 
capabilities, ideas and institutions, is central to viewing the WTO as a construct of 
dominant transnational social forces and a central institution of the nebuleuse. This 
analysis also identifies the structural power of dominant social forces to set the 
framework for guaranteeing specific policies and the forms of actions possible. 
Employing the concept of dialectics illustrates the contradictions of each historical 
structure creating its own counter-hegemony forces, which challenge the dominant 
ideology and social forces within institutions. Hegemony, nebuleuse, counter-
hegemonic forces, organic intellectuals and trasformismo enable this Coxian analysis 
to account for the competing ontologies, the functions of institutions, and the many 
actors involved within the power relations institutionalised within the WTO. In short 
Cox is able to account for both change and continuity in multilateralism at the WTO, 
and world order. 
 
Currently, the contradictions of the current world order are evident in the 
undemocratic nature of governance of MEIs and the gross inequalities in power and 
wealth that neoliberalism justifies. O’Brien et al have applied a diluted form of 
Coxian theory to the study of MEIs in a bid to identify the forces contesting 
neoliberalism. Specifically, these writers have used Cox’s ‘new multilateralism’ as an 
ideal type to define their own ‘complex multilateralism’. In doing so O’Brien et al 
were able to account for the many different non-state actors that were attempting to 
influence the policies of the WTO at the end of the 20th century. This analysis, 
however, omitted the most important aspects of Cox’s theoretical framework from 
their analysis, such as the Coxian definition of world hegemony, nebuleuse, structural 
power and counter-hegemony. It was argued that without the application of these 
concepts O’Brien et al were not able to account for the resilience of hegemony to 
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maintain its position through absorbing the demand for just change into the 
justification for the WTO’s neoliberal polices. This was clearly demonstrated by 
Goldman’s analysis of the World Bank and the environmental movement using the 
concept of hegemony. Consequently, this thesis will apply the concepts of hegemony, 
nebuleuse, counter-hegemony and trasformismo in order to evaluate the change and 
continuity the alter-globalization movement has caused at the WTO in the first five 
years of the 21st century. 
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Chapter Three 
            
The World Trade Organization in the Current Nebuleuse 
 
The external objective is to increase or secure access to another market…the 
internal objective is to shift the domestic balance of power so that export 
oriented liberalization forces have the upper hand. This is accomplished by 
encasing liberalizing strategies in an international agreement which makes 
the cost of backsliding exceedingly high…[requiring] the construction 
of…supranational institutions to govern the increasingly integrated liberal 
market. …legal and bureaucratic institutions are a useful mechanism for 
depoliticising disputes concerning the financial activities of states.234 
 
3.1 Introduction and Aims 
In Coxian terms the World Trade Organization (WTO) can be viewed as a hegemonic 
institution and part of the transnational and international networks of state and 
corporate representatives and intellectuals that have “worked towards the formation of 
a policy consensus for global capitalism” - the current nebuleuse.235 As Robert Cox 
points out “Among the features of international organization which express its 
hegemonic role are the following: (1) the institutions embody the rules which 
facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; (2) they are themselves the 
product of the hegemonic world order; (3) they ideologically legitimate norms of the 
world order; (4) they co-opt the elites from peripheral countries; and (5) they absorb 
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counter hegemonic ideas”.236 The purpose of this chapter is to argue that as a central 
hegemonic institution of the current nebuleuse the WTO embodies the rules and 
procedures that ensure the expansion of the current hegemonic world order, and these 
rules are a product of transnational corporate hegemony within the most powerful 
states (Chapter four will address points three, four and five). In doing so the WTO 
provides the enforcement and surveillance measures to protect and perpetuate a new 
model of production for transnational corporate social forces. Ultimately, what 
distinguishes the WTO from other international organisations of the current nebuleuse 
is that the dispute settlement system of the WTO has penalties to apply if members 
refuse to comply with WTO agreements. The binding nature of these international 
trade agreements and the WTO’s process of compulsory surveillance ensure that a 
particular form of state is constructed from membership of the WTO, which facilitates 
the interests of transnational corporations. As such, through the WTO, “national 
policies and practices have been adjusted to the exigencies of the world economy of 
international production”.237 Since corporate hegemony was paramount in the creation 
of the WTO, it will also be argued that the policies of the WTO are an example of 
corporate ‘structural power’, as identified by Susan Strange.238 Thereby policies 
reflecting transnational corporate interests are advantaged at the WTO because 
alternatives policies are not favoured within this WTO framework.  
 
In order to develop this argument, the centrality of the WTO in the nebuleuse will be 
established by explaining the functions and policies of the WTO. Specific attention 
will be given to the WTO’s dispute settlement and policy review system to illustrate 
that the WTO represents the teeth of the current nebuleuse. The chapter will then 
illustrate the dominant story of why the WTO was created in 1995, which depicts the 
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reasoning behind the creation of the WTO and the dispute settlement body in terms of 
the failures of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). This literature 
does not explicitly acknowledge the influence of transnational social forces in the 
making and maintenance of the WTO. Consequently, the next section will illustrate 
that powerful transnational social forces have established hegemony within OECD 
countries. This corporate hegemony was active during the creation of the WTO to 
ensure that the WTO opened new markets in services, protected intellectual property 
rights, and that corporate foreign direct investment (FDI) was free from conditions 
imposed by host national governments. The WTO’s dispute settlement system ensures 
that members of the WTO change domestic policies to reflect these policies. Each of 
these factors ensures that the WTO is in a strong position to develop specific 
society/state relations or ‘forms of state’ from its policies, which reflects the 
hegemony of transnational social forces. In the establishment of the WTO therefore, 
the hegemony of transnational corporate social forces are institutionalised. In 
demonstrating the process and policies of the WTO in this chapter it will then be 
possible to understand the criticisms of the WTO, and the manner in which the ‘alter-
globalization’ movement has attempted to influence the WTO in subsequent chapters. 
 
3.2 The WTO’s centrality in the Nebuleuse 
The centrality of the WTO in the trade and economic management of the current 
world order is well acknowledged. Indeed, the WTO’s Charter states that the purpose 
of the WTO is to provide the main global forum for its members to negotiate “the 
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and…the elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations”.239 Theodore H Cohn draws 
attention to the fact that the global trading regime involves a mosaic of interrelated 
trade institutions, such as the Group of Eight (G8), the Quadrilateral Group (US, EU, 
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Canada and Japan), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD). 
Yet he is clear that the WTO is “the key international organisation embedded in the 
global trade order”.240 Similarly, UN Professor of International Economic Governance 
Gary P. Sampson states that: “the WTO is undeniably a major player in the field of 
global governance, and its rules and processes will profoundly affect the future 
economic and political orientation of its members”.241  
 
The WTO may be the key global institution for governing international trade, but in 
order to ensure that there is one dominant form of international trade it cooperates 
closely with the IMF and World Bank. As Bernard M. Hoekman and Michel M. 
Kostecki argue the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO represent the three 
interdependent pillars of the international economic order.242 Indeed the WTO Charter 
clearly establishes an aim of the WTO to be the promotion of cooperation between 
these three institutions.243 Both IMF and World Bank loans are normally conditioned 
on the debtor restructuring its national economy towards domestic and international 
market principles. The management of the liberalisation of government barriers to 
international trade is the goal of the WTO. The connection is also more direct – the 
accession of countries such as Mexico and Morocco to the WTO was supported with 
World Bank lending. Similarly, Anne O. Krueger and Sarath Rajapatirana illustrate 
the link between these three institutions in their overview of the World Bank’s 
‘Structural Adjustment Loans’, ‘Trade Policy Adjustment Loans’ and ‘Sectoral 
Adjustment Loans’, which they conclude overlap and reinforce policies from the IMF 
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and the WTO.244 Receipt of World Bank loans are conditioned on the recipient 
country establishing domestic policies that create a specific form of state. The official 
policies of the nebuleuse then emerge from the ‘unholy trinity’ of the IMF, the World 
Bank and the WTO. Together these international organizations “impose a virtually 
synonymous set of neoliberal policies on countries the world over … actively 
cooperat[ing] to create a coherent, unifying policy position, increasingly centred on 
what they take to be their most convincing theme – Free trade”.245 The three of these 
international organizations are therefore instrumental in attempting to forge one 
dominant form of international trade and one form of state in the world order. 
 
Central as the WTO might be to the current form of ‘governance without 
government’, in comparison to its sister organizations it is an international 
organization in its infancy, and has fewer resources at its disposal. The WTO was 
brought to life in 1995, at the end of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) Uruguay Round of negotiations, where statesmen from 124 countries and the 
European Community (EC) signed the Final Agreement.246 By 2006 the WTO’s 
membership had swollen to encompass 149 states.247 Yet, in 2004, a total number of 
600 professional staff was employed by the WTO, whilst the IMF employed over 
2,700248 and the World Bank over 9,300.249 The WTO’s budget for 2004 was $135.71 
million250, the IMF’s was $785.5 million251 and the World Bank’s $940.4 million.252. 
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Staff salaries and related overheads account for more than 70% of expenditure of the 
WTO’s budget. The youth of this institution and absence of resources, however, are 
not an indication of a lack of purpose, coherence or authority. To the contrary the 
legal nature of the WTO, its purpose, functions and powers are explicitly detailed in 
its constitution or Charter. The 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization or WTO Charter explicitly details the Articles and Annexes for the 
WTO.253 The “legal personality” of the WTO is asserted in Article VIII of the 
Charter.254  
 
At the core of the Charter are sixteen Articles regulating the scope and functions of 
the WTO. Specifically, Article III of the Charter describes the WTO as having five 
functions: facilitating the implementation and operation of the Multilateral Trade 
Agreement; providing a forum for negotiations on already covered or new issues; 
administering the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism (TPRM); and finally, co-operating with the World Bank and the 
IMF to achieve “greater coherence on global economic policy-making”.255 The 
securing of WTO membership for any state is conditional (with only very limited 
exceptions) on accepting the legal rules set out in the Charter in their entirety: “the so-
called single undertaking”.256 The granting of ‘special and differential treatment’ 
(SDT) is reserved for the ‘least developed states’, which allows an extended time 
scale for the implementation of the agreements.257 Exceptions aside, continued 
membership is based on accepting and implementing the agreements, as Article XXVI 
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of the WTO Charter clearly states that ‘no reservations may be made in respect of any 
provision of this Agreement”.258 By ensuring that all members unconditionally accept 
those agreements, the final rulings of the DSB and the review of their domestic 
legislation through the TPRM, the WTO has became one of the three central 
economic institutions of the current nebuleuse. 
 
The policies that are enforced by the WTO are outlined in the four annexes of the 
Charter, which detail the substantive rights and obligations of the members.259 Each of 
these annexes is interlinked by both the ‘most-favoured-nation’ (MFN) principle, and 
the ‘National Treatment’ rule.260 The MFN principle has a long history in 
international trade and is described as the cornerstone of multilateral trade 
negotiations. It can be traced back to the landmark Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860, 
which led to the reduction of tariffs throughout Europe in the 19th century.261 It is 
claimed that the centrality of the MFN principle ensures that states do not 
discriminate between trading partners, by giving all trading partners status and 
concession as a most-favoured trading partner. This status is said to guarantee that 
when a member’s goods reach the border of another member’s territory they will be 
treated in the same way as every other member’s produce is. Non-discrimination is 
also pursued through the National Treatment rule, which requires that foreign goods 
that enter a market be subjected to the same tax and measures as domestic goods  
 
The annexes that set out the basic principles for trade and directly govern the trade 
policies of the members are established in the three parts that make up Annex 1. Part 
one is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994). This relates to the 
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trading of goods, agriculture, textiles and clothing. It also outlines the level of tariff 
reductions that each state has agreed. Such concessions are then listed in schedules 
and bound, meaning that governments agree not to increase tariffs above the level at 
which they are bound.262 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
makes up the second part of the first Annex. It governs the trading of services and 
access to service markets of members, such as construction, distribution, education, 
finance, transport, tourism and telecommunications. Finance and telecommunications 
have been the most liberalised of these service industries since the creation of the 
WTO.263 Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) are policies used by 
governments with a view to forcing foreign investors to attain certain performance 
standards, such as conditions that the foreign investor must use local produce or 
labour. The WTO disciplines impose conditions on the use of TRIMS and are outlined 
in annex 1a.264  
 
The final part of the first Annex is the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). It is unique in that it is the only WTO policy that is 
concerned with harmonising protection, rather than liberalisation, amongst members. 
Although multilateral negotiations on intellectual property (IP) can be traced back to 
the 19th century, their inclusion in the WTO’s agreements marks the first attempt to 
enforce intellectual property rights (IPR) on a multilateral basis.265 Through TRIPS, 
IPRs have been defined in terms of ideas, inventions and creative expression on which 
there is a public willingness to bestow the status of property. This covers industrial 
property, copyrights and neighbouring rights in the form of patents, trademarks and 
knowledge goods. The TRIPS agreement provides intellectual property owners with a 
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twenty-year monopoly right, and it: “binds signatory states, requires them to pass 
implementing domestic legislation, adopt enforcement measures, and face the threat 
of trade sanctions if they fail to comply with the TRIPS provisions”.266 The MFN 
principle is the first Article of the GATT 1994, Article II of GATS and Article IV of 
TRIPS. The National Treatment rule is also stated in Article III of GATT, Article 
XVII of GATS and Article III of TRIPS. 
 
3.3 The WTO’s DSB: The Teeth of the Nebuleuse 
The centrepiece of the WTO, however, is the international acceptance of the rule of 
law as the basis for resolving international trade disputes. As such, the creation of the 
DSU is perhaps the most important function of the WTO within the current Nebuleuse 
because it ensures that all members adhere to the Charter and trade agreements 
outlined above. Disputes arising from any WTO agreement are dealt with by the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which has the authority to establish panels, adopt 
panel reports, scrutinise the implementation of recommendations, and authorise 
retaliatory measures if necessary.267 The dispute settlement procedures can be 
appealed to whenever a member believes that an action by another member has 
“nullified or impaired” a concession that was negotiated previously (i.e. tariff 
binding), or breaks a WTO rule and by doing so “impairs the attainment” of an 
objective of the GATT. No party can block the establishment of a Panel.268 The 
Panels are like tribunals, normally consisting of three to five experts from different 
member states who are chosen in consultation with the countries in the dispute. There 
are five stages to the resolution of disputes, and strict time scales are given to each 
stage of dispute settlement. In all it should take no more than one year, or 15 months 
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if appealed, to deal with each dispute.269 The final stage of dispute settlement is based 
on members prompt compliance with the recommendations or rulings. If it is 
impracticable to comply immediately, the offending country is given a ‘reasonable 
period of time’ to do so. Failure to act within the set ‘reasonable period of time’ can 
result in the offending country entering into negotiations to determine a mutually 
acceptable compensation. If no satisfactory compensation is agreed upon, the 
complainant may request authorisation from the DSB to suspend concessions or 
obligations against the offending country (i.e. retaliation). This authorisation takes 
effect 30 days after the end of the ‘reasonable period of time’ has ended. It will 
usually be granted since under the WTO Charter a consensus of all members is 
required to refuse rulings of the DSB.270 Although the DSB has the authority to 
adjudicate during disputes, it should also be noted that Annex II of the DSU clearly 
states that: “recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the 
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements”.271  
 
By 2006, the WTO dispute settlement system had received 349 complaints from 
members.272 Of these complaints 27 TRIPS and 9 TRIMS disputes were brought 
before the DSB, the remaining 313 cases were for both GATT and GATS disputes.273 
In dealing with these disputes the DSB has illustrated that domestic legislation is 
subject to the agreements of the WTO. Thereby the WTO is in a powerful position to 
mould a specific form of society/state relations because its agreements ensure that all 
member states follow national policies, which promote foreign trade in goods and 
services, protect intellectual property rights and defend FDI from government 
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interference. Referral to the DSB, the rulings of the DSB or the threat of WTO 
sanctioned retaliatory measures from a member have all concurred to ensure that in 
most cases, but not all, the WTO is able to enforce GATT, GATS, TRIPS and 
TRIMS. The WTO is therefore able to ensure “national policies and practices have 
been adjusted to the exigencies of the world economy of international production”.274 
For example, US domestic law detailing the type of petrol that can be exported to the 
US came under WTO scrutiny in January 1995, as Venezuela complained to the DSB 
that the United States was applying rules that discriminated against gasoline imports 
and breached the GATT.275 Just over one year later the dispute Panel completed its 
final report in favour of Venezuela, which the US appealed. An Appellate Body was 
established upholding the panels report, and the DSB adopted the report one year and 
four months later. It then took six and half months for the US and Venezuela to agree 
on what course of action the US ought to take to comply with the GATT 
agreement.276  
 
A further example of the WTO being able to ensure domestic legislation complies 
with WTO agreements was seen during the dispute over US steel after tariffs were 
raised by nearly 30% in March 2002. Consequently, the EC, together with Japan, 
Korea, China, Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand and Brazil asked the WTO to 
determine if these tariffs were legal under WTO GATT agreements. On 14 May 2002, 
the EU notified the WTO that it reserved its rights to re-balance the adverse effect of 
the US steel safeguards. The EU subsequently adopted a re-balancing Regulation on 
13 June 2002, which listed $2,242 million of retaliatory tariffs to be placed on US 
exports into the EU.277 The WTO’s DSB ruled that these US steel tariffs were indeed 
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illegal.278 On the 4th December 2003 the US President was forced to withdraw the 
domestic laws created to impose tariffs on the import of foreign steel.279 Using these 
two examples of US domestic legislation being amended it is clear that even the most 
powerful states are subject to the DSB’s rulings. As Richard Blackhurst succinctly 
states: “There lies – if all else fails – multilateral authorised trade sanctions”.280  
 
The obligations of the WTO’s TRIPS agreements have also been enforced. Referral to 
the DSB and the threat of retaliation, through multilateral authorised trade sanctions, 
has been successful in compelling most member states to rewrite domestic laws or 
establish a legal framework for patent laws: especially in the patents of 
pharmaceuticals. For example, Pakistan was brought before the DSB in April 1996 
because the United States claimed that Pakistan violated TRIPS on the grounds that it 
had neither provision for patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural 
chemical products nor a system to permit the filing of applications for patents on these 
products. The US also argued that Pakistan did not have a system to grant exclusive 
marketing rights to such products.281 Ten months later both parties informed the DSB 
that they had reached a mutually agreed solution to the dispute and that the terms of 
the agreement were being finalized.282 Similarly, the EC requested consultations with 
India alleging the absence of Indian patent protection for pharmaceutical and 
agricultural chemical products, and the absence of formal systems that permitted the 
filing of patent applications of and provided exclusive marketing rights for such 
products.283 After a DSB Panel report agreed with these allegations,284 India 
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eventually reported that it had enacted the relevant legislation to meet the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB on 16 April 1999.285 Canada was also 
subject to similar allegations from the EC at the DSB in December 1997. The EU 
pointed out that Canadian domestic law was not compatible with its obligations under 
the TRIPS Agreement because of the inadequate provisions for the protection for 
pharmaceutical patents.286 By August 2000 Canada had asserted that it would 
implement the DSB’s recommendations and ensure domestic legislation complied 
with TRIPS.287 
 
Not all attempts to enforce the protection of patients under TRIPS have been 
successful. The disputes over patents for AIDS treatments have been dropped by 
claimants due to the public relations disasters they created. Perhaps the most famous 
example of such disputes, but one that never went to the DSB, was that between the 
US and the South African Medical Law enacted in 1997. This law allowed for the use 
of generic drugs to be used and compulsory licensing in the South African 
government’s fight against AIDS. Compulsory licensing enables a government to 
instruct a patent holder to license the right to use its patent to a company, government 
agency, or other party who could manufacture the drug for sale under a generic name 
and pay a royalty to the patent holder for each sale. The US government attempted to 
prevent this compulsory licensing and repeal the South African Medical Law from 
1997 to 2000. Perhaps realising the scale of negative public perception created by this 
public health dispute, the Clinton administration withdrew from taking South Africa 
to the DSB over the alleged illegal compulsory licensing. Pharmaceutical companies, 
however, filed a private lawsuit against the South African Medical Law on the 
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grounds that it violated the WTO’s TRIPS.288 This private law suit, however, was also 
withdrawn in April 2001. 
 
Brazil was also subject to a similar experience as it sought to provide affordable AIDS 
treatments for its people. It too found itself party to a TRIPS dispute at the WTO’s 
DSB in 2000 when first the US289 and then the EC290 requested consultation. The 
Brazilian government found that its domestic law, which allowed that if a patented 
product was not being manufactured in Brazil within three years of the issuance of the 
patent, the government may compel the patent owner to license a competitor, was 
contested by the US and EC on the grounds that it was illegal under TRIPS. On 19 
June 2001, the US informed the WTO that it had established a mutually satisfactory 
agreement with Brazil and was withdrawing its complaint.291 This saw both parties 
agree to discuss TRIPS and AIDS pharmaceuticals patents in bilateral negotiations.292 
Again this withdrawal from the DSB was widely seen as the only exit from a growing 
public relations disaster for the US. 
 
The WTO’s DSB has been used to enforce patents and copyrights in the EC and US. 
Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act was alleged to be illegal under TRIPS by the 
EC because it permitted, under certain circumstances, the playing of radio and 
television music in public places (such as bars, shops, restaurants etc.) without the 
payment of a royalty fee.293 On 9 November 2001, the arbitrator determined that the 
level of EC benefits, which were being nullified or impaired as a result of this US 
                                                 
288 Robert Block. ‘Big Drugs Firms Defend Right to Patents on AIDS Drugs in South African Court’, in Wall 
Street Journal, 6 March 2001. 
289 World Trade Organization. Brazil - Measures Affecting Patent Protection: Request for Consultations by the 
United States, WT/DS199/1, 8 June 2000. 
290 World Trade Organization. Brazil - Measures Affecting Patent Protection: Request for Consultations by the EC, 
WT/DS199/2, 20 June 2000. 
291 World Trade Organization. Brazil - Measures Affecting Patent Protection: Notification of Mutually Agreed 
Solution WT/DS199/4,19 July 2001.  
292 United States International Information Programme. ‘US and Brazil to Cooperate on HIV/AIDS and WTO 
Patents Dispute’, 29 June 2001. 
http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2003/Dec/31-569848.html
293 World Trade Organization. United States - Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act, Request for Consultations by 
the European Communities, WT/DS160/1, 4 February 1999. 
 93
domestic law, amounted to Euro 1,219,900 per year.294 On the grounds that the US 
had failed to change domestic law to conform with TRIPS within the agreed 
reasonable period of time, the EC requested authorisation from the DSB to suspend 
trade concessions and apply retaliation measures in January 2002. This was to take the 
form of levying a special fee from US nationals at the EC border on copyright 
goods.295 The threat of this retaliation by the EC was significant enough to place 
pressure on the US to begin changing domestic laws and seek cooperation with the 
EC. Consequently, the US informed the DSB of a mutually satisfactory temporary 
arrangement between the US and the EC on 23 June 2003.296 The US has also ensured 
that states from the EC enforce patents. For example in 1996, the US brought Portugal 
before the DSB because it asserted that Portugal’s Industrial Property Act was 
inconsistent with Portugal’s obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.297 A mutual 
agreement was found between the parties.298 Greece also found itself before the DSB 
as the US argued that it regularly broadcast copyrighted motion pictures without 
enforcing intellectual property rights.299 On 20 March 2001, the parties to the dispute 
notified a mutually satisfactory solution on the matter to the DSB.300 
 
The four TRIMS disputes brought before the DSB have all been successfully enforced 
by the WTO’s TRIMS agreements, with one exception. From the October to 
November of 1996, the EC, Japan and US requested consultations with Indonesia 
concerning Indonesia’s National Car Programme. All of these countries drew 
attention to the manner in which this National Car Programme was illegal under the 
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TRIMS agreement, GATTS and SCM. The DSB Panel found that Indonesia was in 
violation of Articles I and II: 2 of GATT 1994, Article 2 of the TRIMS Agreement, 
Article 5(c) of the SCM Agreement, but was not in violation of Article 28.2 of the 
SCM Agreement.301 By a communication dated 15 July 1999, Indonesia informed the 
DSB that it had issued a new automotive policy on 24 June 1999 (the 1999 
Automotive Policy), which effectively implemented the recommendations and rulings 
of the DSB in this matter.302 India also found that it was requested to appear before 
the DSB in October 1998, as the EC requested consultations with India concerning 
certain measures affecting the Indian automotive sector, which conflicted with both 
GATT and TRIMS. The US also made a similar request in 1999.303 After a DSB 
Panel and then Appellate Body upheld, reinforced the Panel’s finding for the EC and 
US allegations,304 India informed the DSB that it had fully complied with the 
recommendations of the DSB on 6 November 2002.305 Japan was also seen to request 
consultations with Canada in respect of measures being taken by Canada in the 
automotive industry in July 1998. After an Appellate Body found that Canada was in 
breach of its TRIMS agreements at the WTO,306 Canada stated that as of the 18 
February 2001 its domestic law would be compatible with the DSB’s 
recommendations. Finally, in May 2000, the US requested consultations with the 
Philippines in respect of certain measures in the Philippines’ Motor Vehicle 
Development Program (“MVDP”), which was in breach of GATT and TRIMS. A 
panel is still to be created for this dispute.307 
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The case of the US Foreign Sales Corporation Tax (FSC) brought before the WTO by 
the EC also illustrates that a member state’s domestic tax system is subject to WTO 
agreements. In doing so the WTO is able to get at the heart of a government’s 
domestic legislation and demand compliance with international policy-making. As 
Barbara Angus, of the US International Tax Council, points out: “Few things are as 
central to a country's sovereignty as the right to choose its own tax system”.308 The 
FSC dispute also demonstrates the lengths that governments will go to maintain 
subsidies for corporations and avoid WTO agreements. Over the course of nine years 
the US has changed the name of this tax subsidy twice in order to protect state 
funding from exporting corporations. The dispute began in 1997 when the EC 
requested that the WTO establish a Panel to examine the legality of FSC under the 
WTO’s Agreements.309 The Panel decision that emerged in 1999, argued the FSC was 
in fact a form of state subsidies and illegal under WTO agreements.310 Although the 
US disputed this Panel decision, a subsequent Appellate Body report agreed with the 
Panel’s decision and that the US must change its domestic law to conform to WTO 
agreements by the 1 November 2000.311  
 
On 15 November 2000, the President of the United States signed into law the FSC 
Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000 (the "ETI Act"). The ETI 
Act, however, was very quickly attacked by the EC for continuing the subsidisation of 
exporting corporations. By 2002 a further Appellate Body had declared that the US 
had failed to fully withdraw its prohibited subsidy scheme and failed to implement 
DSB recommendations and rulings in this dispute.312 In 2004, the DSB ruled that the 
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EC could impose trade sanctions worth $4 billion on US exports in retaliations for the 
US failure to comply with WTO rulings on FSC/ETI.313 On 22 October 2004, the 
United States enacted the "the American JOBS Creation Act of 2004" (the "JOBS 
Act") and the repeal of the ETI Act. This too, however, was deemed as inconsistent 
with the same provisions of the WTO Agreement as its predecessor legislation and 
failing to properly implement DSB rulings. As of September 2006 this dispute was 
still to be resolved. Over the course of the nine years the US government have 
undoubtedly devoted significant state financial and legal resources to fight this case 
on behalf of corporations with export portfolios. The EC has also been able to refuse 
to comply with the DSB’s ruling. Since 1997 the EC has refused to import GM crops 
and hormone enhanced beef from the US and Canada. It has preferred to suffer the 
trade sanctions authorised by the DSB from the US and Canada.314  
 
It also has to be acknowledged that the WTO not only provides a forum for members 
to bring disputes to be heard and enforced, it also demands that all members 
participate in reviews of their domestic laws by the WTO. The WTO’s Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism (TPRM) ensures that reviews are undertaken. The TPRM is not 
an arm of the DSB, and it is argued that its purpose is not to determine the legal 
compatibility of any particular member’s trade law or practices with the WTO 
disciplines. This is deemed to be for member states to discover and dispute at the 
DSB. Rather, as Sam Laird depicted, the TRPM is the “looking glass through which 
members examine each other’s trade policies and practices”.315 The creation of TRPM 
was intended to enable examination of the impact of trade policies and practices of 
members on the trading system; and to contribute to improving adherence to WTO 
rules through greater transparency. The Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) conducts 
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trade policy reviews, and each member is reviewed on a rotational basis. Each WTO 
Member is requested to submit periodic reports or ‘policy statements’ describing its 
trade policies. A member’s share of world trade determines the frequency of review. 
The rationale behind this is that the largest players have the greatest impact on world 
trade. The four largest players – the EU, the US, Japan and Canada – are reviewed by 
the General Council every two years. The next sixteen largest traders are subjected to 
reviews every four years. A longer periodicity may be established for the least-
developed countries.316 During the mission to the capital of the member under review 
by the TPRB, the Secretariat team will consult with private enterprise (Chamber of 
Manufacturers, Commerce etc). Private sector meetings are used to identify 
constraints placed upon the operations of firms in international trade. By 1998 the 
TPRB had conducted 109 reviews and offered recommendations for further 
deregulation.317 In addition to the TPRM, transparency is further promoted by the 
WTO, as it requires that all members publish all trade laws and regulations.318  
Thereby the membership of the WTO brings an obligation to ensure domestic 
legislation is compatible with WTO agreements, and the WTO has established a 
regime containing both surveillance and dispute settlement systems to identity and 
enforce non-compliance. 
 
The examples above have depicted the binding nature of WTO agreements. 
Regardless of these two examples of refusal to accept WTO agreements, on the whole 
it can be asserted that the WTO is able to enforce its agreements on its members – 
even on the most powerful members. What is also striking is the number and diversity 
of states that have come to accept WTO agreements and processes as the norm. 
Indeed, central to the argument that the WTO is an essential institution of the current 
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nebuleuse is the binding nature of WTO agreements and the acceptance of 
surveillance measures to ensure compliance, so that “national policies and practices 
have been adjusted to the exigencies of the world economy of international 
production”.319 Given these qualities it is clear why Hoekman and Kostecki declare 
that the WTO is an international organisation that “underscores the rule of law”.320 As 
a consequence of this focus on international law, Ernest-Ulrich Petersmann states: 
“the WTO agreements set out the basic rights and duties of its member countries and 
lay the legal foundation for a new international economic order for the twenty-first 
century”.321 These developments also provoke J. H. H. Weiler to state that the WTO 
represents a “legal paradigm shift” as the rule of law overcomes diplomacy and power 
politics because even the most powerful states are subject to the DSB.322 These 
statements need to be dwelled upon because they are central to the idea of the 
hegemony of the WTO, and the WTO as a central institution of the nebuleuse. If we 
consider that these WTO legal agreements enshrine the “rights and obligations” of 
member states, and that the WTO has the authority to enforce these rights and 
obligations, then it is clear that the WTO is vitally important in determining ‘domestic 
legislation that discriminated against foreign imports, such as taxes or subsidies for 
domestic producers (non-tariff protection measures)’. Membership of the WTO 
ensures that a specific form of state is encouraged to emerge from participation in the 
WTO’s brand of international trade. This form of state is constructed to accommodate 
the demands of corporate interests. It is for these reasons that the WTO must be 
considered to be one of the central pillars of the current nebuleuse. 
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3.4 A Lack of Critical Analysis in the Creation of the WTO 
Having established that the WTO has the authority to create binding trade agreements, 
it is pertinent to ask just whose interest such a powerful institution serves. Applying a 
Coxian historical materialist analysis to the WTO demands that attention be given to 
the dominant social forces that were at the fore of the dominant states during 
construction of this international institution. The application of such critical theory, 
however, has not dominated analysis of the WTO. In fact the literature that describes 
why the creation of the WTO was necessary predominantly focuses on the 
negotiations between states and the problems that were inherent to the WTO’s 
predecessor - the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which 
undermined the coherence of ‘governance without government’ in the post World 
War II era.323 The leading expert on international trade and architect of the WTO, 
John H. Jackson argues that, the GATT was doomed to failure because of ‘birth 
defects’ which caused it to be: “riddled with so many exceptions to its core principles 
that it was difficult at the time to be convinced of its potential effectiveness”. 324 Not 
least of these ‘birth defects’ was that the GATT was merely a trade agreement and 
therefore lacked the legal status which had been conferred on its sister economic 
international organisations the World Bank and the IMF.325 These failings were 
argued to be evident, regardless of the fact that the GATT was based upon the 
principles of “non-discrimination, reciprocity, market access and fair competition” 
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and advocated the policies of the ‘Most-Favoured-Nation’ (MFN), and ‘National 
Treatment’.326  
 
For example, as early as 1958 the United Nations Haberler Report identified that 
although the GATT had reduced tariffs at the borders, the policies of Western 
industrial nations had nullified any benefits for the developing nations.327 Rather, the 
emergence of government non-tariff protection policies, quotas, subsidies, tax breaks 
and guaranteed loans were used to allow Western domestic producers to keep their 
prices artificially low in contrast to foreign exporters and producers. Similarly, 
Michael Beenstock argues that by the 1970s, the economic expansion in parts of the 
Third World caused alarm in developing states and they employed ‘new 
protectionism’ to deter imports. This took the form of non-tariff protectionism 
targeted at specific countries or groups of countries and at specific commodities or 
groups of commodities328 - all of which was illegal under the GATT.  
 
By the 1980s the US had not only introduced non-tariff protection measures, it had 
coupled these with an ‘aggressive unilateralism’ to ensure access to foreign markets. 
Through the creation of Section 301 and Super 301 of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act, the US threatened to impose 100% tariffs on the goods of 
countries involved in unfair trade policies. Brazil, India, Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan became the focus of claims because their domestic “anti-monopoly policies, 
retail distribution systems, infrastructure spending, savings rates [and] workers rights” 
were all causing ‘unfair trading’ relations with the US.329 At the same time, Clayton 
Yeutter points out that developing states became so frustrated with the existing 
multilateral rules on agriculture that they formed the Cairns Group to exert pressure 
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for the liberalisation of agricultural and eventually a new international trade 
organisation.330 Therefore although the GATT had reduced tariffs it had been unable 
to address non-tariff protection or ‘aggressive unilateralism’. As Albert George 
Kenwood and Alan Leslie Lougheed argue: “the major trading countries pursued 
increasingly protectionist policies with total disregard for the principles set out in 
GATT”.331 The exercise of economic power was, then, an integral part of the dynamic 
of the multilateral trade regime which was illegal under the GATT agreements and 
principles, but the GATT was powerless to enforce its policies. Subsequently, the 
GATT could not effectively manage international trade because it was unable to 
enforce its agreements or bring satisfactory dispute settlement to its members.332 Thus 
the GATT was deemed to represent the “Bretton Woods Gap”.333  
 
Due to these ‘birth defects’, and the inability of the GATT to prevent transgression of 
its agreements it is argued that in September 1986 the ‘GATT system’ sponsored a 
ministerial meeting in Punta del Este in Uruguay which was designed to launch a new 
round of trade negotiations to address reform of the GATT. Four years after these 
negotiations got underway “Professor Jackson’s blueprint”334 for reform of the GATT 
was printed in Restructuring the GATT System.335 Jackson points out that the GATT 
was experiencing a growing mandate as negotiators wanted to shift GATT members’ 
obligations and rights from the reduction of tariffs at the borders to addressing 
domestic legislation that discriminated against foreign imports, such as taxes or 
subsidies for domestic producers (non-tariff protection measures). In order to carry 
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out these new functions Jackson argued that the GATT needed to be constitutionally 
reformed:  
 
The WTO Charter would not only provide the institutional structure for 
GATT and many other Agreements, but would perform the role of an 
institutional agreement for service trade Agreements and service sector 
Agreements. Likewise it would define the relationship of an intellectual 
property ‘code’.336  
 
This literature then goes on to portray the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiation 
(1986–1994), which culminated in The Agreements Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, as resulting in a conscious collective decision to give more authority to 
the dispute settlement body of the multilateral trade system to enforce trade 
agreements. The negotiations are also portrayed as creating agreement amongst the 
members to broaden the WTO’s role to include new trade issues of non-tariff 
protection, services and intellectual property rights. It is argued that these agreements 
met the interests of all the members. Developing countries’ interests were served 
because they received assurances that developed countries, specifically the EC and 
US, would be subject to the new trade rules and the judgement of the dispute 
settlement system. Thus developing countries would be assured access to the rich 
markets of the developed world without experiencing non-tariff protection. In return 
developed states would be assured that they would be able to liberalise and regulate 
the emerging markets in the service industry, and protect intellectual property rights 
for their ideas and technology.  
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3.5 Transnational Social Forces and Forms of States 
What is significant in its absence is that none of these leading trade lawyers account 
for the hegemony of transnational social forces in their depiction of the Uruguay 
negotiations that led up to the creation of the WTO and its above principles and 
policies.337 The creation of the WTO and its policies must be understood within the 
context of the rising hegemony of transnational social forces due to their superior 
material capabilities, and their ideas and interests becoming institutionalised within 
production, the dominant states and then international organizations. Specifically, the 
hegemony of transnational social forces has been effective in ensuring that a 
transnational model of production has been expanded and protected worldwide. In the 
following section it will be argued that transnational social forces emerged during the 
1980s and influenced OECD governments to create an international organization to 
protect and enhance their exporting interests – the WTO. This national hegemony of 
transnational corporate elites was instrumental in the creation of hegemony at the 
WTO. Thereby transnational social forces have established ‘structural power’ within 
the WTO so that the policies and process of this institution are constructed in such a 
way as to reflect the agendas of these social forces. ‘Structural power’ ensures only 
specific policies can be concluded from discussion because alternatives are not 
allowed within the framework in which discussions take place.338 
 
Although ‘transnational’ is defined as “any non-governmental actor from one country 
that has relations with any actor from another country or organisation”, a transnational 
corporation is “a company that has affiliates in a foreign country. The affiliation may 
be branches of the parent company, separate incorporated subsidiaries, or associates, 
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with large minority share holders”.339 Adding more detail to this definition Dunning 
states that TNCs are: 
 
enterprises which own or control value-added activities in two or more 
countries. The usual mode of ownership and control is by foreign direct 
investment, but TNCs may also engage in foreign production by means of 
cooperative alliances with foreign firms … TNCs operate two or more 
production units, and internalise the transactions between these units … at 
least one of these production units is located in a foreign country and the 
markets internalised are transnational rather than domestic.340  
 
Similarly, Hoogvelt uses the image of a TNC parent company coordinating a web of 
subsidiaries dispersed throughout the world, linked through the latest technology and 
employed on the basis of their economic competitiveness.341 Leslie Sklair illustrates 
that TNCs are “globalizing corporations … those consciously denationalising from 
their domestic origins in the course of developing genuinely global strategies of 
operation”.342 Even though these TNCs are legally registered in a particular state, the 
global ambitions of the corporations are not a reflection of a particular national 
interest. Sklair illustrates that the TNCs and their executives do not see the world of 
business in terms of pursuing some national interest, but in the accessing of markets 
throughout the globe for profits for shareholders, not governmental economic 
interests. What is clear from these definitions is that economic activities are now 
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coordinated throughout many territories of the globe, and not limited within the 
borders of any particular state.  
 
In the past a single ‘territorial based production’ was the norm (i.e. uninational). The 
location of the company, its assets, all stages of production and employment 
processes, were within the territory of one country, and protected and/or subsidised by 
the government of that territory.343 Given that advances in technology have 
accelerated the ability to communicate globally and instantaneously 
(telecommunications, satellite links and the World Wide Web), production of a 
particular good can also be global and transnational. Coupled to this is the decreasing 
cost of air transport, which allows corporations to produce different parts of a product 
in a number of territories throughout the world. By employing both these factors 
transnational production arises because the creation and selling of a good is dispersed 
throughout a number of countries, as well as: “procurement offices, materials 
processing installations, fabrication plants, finishing points, assembly lines, quality 
control operations, advertising and marketing bureaux, data processing offices, after-
sales services”.344 All the activities of production can be outsourced competitively and 
financed through FDI, such that TNCs are involved in “flexible networks of capacities 
in which the core firm keeps the design, marketing, Research and Development and 
financial functions, while production and distribution … are scattered over literally 
thousands of companies, both globally and domestically”.345 Through what is termed 
‘global sourcing’, corporations can draw materials, components, machinery, finance 
and services from almost anywhere in the world. Consequently, a corporation owns a 
number of foreign subsidiaries to perform different aspects of the production of a 
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good so that assets, ownership and control of production span many nation states.346 
Transnational corporations therefore have a developed a transnational mode of 
production. 
 
The head of Levis Strauss explains the reality of transnational production as follows: 
“our company buys denim in North Carolina, ships it to France where it is sown into 
jeans, lauders the jeans in Belgium, and markets them in Germany using TV 
commercials developed in England”.347 These TNCs are also able to move aspects of 
production quickly to secure lower costs and maximising profits. For example TNCs 
such as Nike opened or closed fifty-five factories in North America and East Asia 
within a five-year period in response to changes in relative costs of production. 
Transnational production has developed in the manufacturing of “textiles, garments, 
motor vehicles, leather goods, sports articles, toys, optical products, consumer 
electronics, semiconductors, aeroplanes, and construction equipment”.348 These goods 
are then sold to a global market of consumers.  
 
David Held et al, however, point out that restrictions on international trade have 
encouraged firms to locate and produce overseas, which involves intrafirm trade 
rather than trade between firms. Subsequently, the growth in transnational 
corporations and FDI has produced “the growing transnational organisation of 
production and distribution within and among firms instead of through markets”.349 
As a consequence, the benefits of intrafirm trade are significant for TNCs. Not only 
does intrafirm trade lower costs because it overcomes payment of tariffs, it also 
prevents the diffusion of corporate technology to potential foreign competitors. 
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Worldwide intrafirm trade in goods, services and technology accounts for 
approximately one-third of world trade.350 There has also been a steady increase in 
inter-firm agreements and partnerships relating to industries involved in the new core 
technologies, such as biotechnology, information technology and new materials. 
Ninety per cent of these inter-firm partnerships have been between the corporations of 
Europe, the US and Japan.351 
 
The parent companies of TNCs primarily emerge from Europe, the US and Japan. 
TNCs dominate the five major business sectors: consumer goods and services, 
financial services, heavy industry, infrastructure, and electronics.352 The number of 
TNCs for the fourteen main developed countries in the years 1968 and 1969 was       
7, 276.353 In terms of non-financial TNCs, in the “last years of the 20th century the 
total number of TNCs was 63,459 whilst the number of foreign affiliations located in 
another country is 689,520”.354 In 1998 some 93 of the top 100 TNCs had their 
headquarters in Japan, North America or the EU.355 These TNCs accounted for 25% 
of world production and 70% of world trade.356 By 2004, there were over 70,000 non-
financial TNCs with some 690,000 foreign affiliations.357 The top 100 TNCs 
remained concentrated in the developed world: 25 from the US and 50 from the 
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EU.358 By 2003, the top 100 TNC employed over 7.2 million people in foreign 
countries.  
 
Worldwide states have developed domestic policies to accommodate these TNCs. The 
expansion of transnational production and intrafirm trade has been facilitated by 
changes in the regulatory environment of virtually all countries. In the period 1991 to 
1999, 94 per cent of 1,035 changes made to the laws governing FDI created a more 
favourable environment for FDI.359 Corporate cooperation with governments has 
allowed massive mergers and acquisitions (M&As) between corporations in different 
countries, which has created colossal transnational corporations such as: Daimler-
Chrysler, Chase-J.P. Morgan, McKinsey-Envision, UBS-Paine Weber, Celltech-
Medeva, SKB-Glaxo, AOL-Time Warner, Piftz-Warner Lambert, Nestle-Purina, 
Deutsche-Telekom-Voice Stream and GE-Honeywell. The value of completed cross-
border M&As rose from less than $100 billion in 1987 to $720 billion in 1999. In 
1999 there were 17,000 M&As between domestic firms.360 The reason for these 
mergers, as Randall Schuler and Susan Jackson explain, is that corporations believe: 
“companies today need to be fast growing, efficient, profitable, flexible, adaptable, 
future-ready, and have a dominant market position. Without these qualities, firms 
believe that it is virtually impossible to survive in today’s global market”.361 A 
consequence of these mergers is that corporations now exist with access to colossal 
resources that dwarf many national states.  
 
Many national policies have also changed in order to accommodate these TNCs. In 
2004, both the number of national policy measures affecting FDI and TNCs that were 
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introduced and the number of economies involved in the process increased. A total of 
271 new measures were adopted by 102 economies.  
 
the vast majority (87%) of regulatory changes tended to make 
conditions favourable for foreign corporations to enter and operate. 
Most of these measures implied further liberalization of investment 
regimes; 95 involved new promotional efforts (including various 
types of incentives) and 37 greater investment protection. In terms of 
regional distribution, Asia and Oceania accounted for 30% of the 
new measures, followed by the transition economies (22%), Africa 
(21%), developed countries (14%) and Latin America and Caribbean 
(13%) … significant reductions in corporate income taxes were 
noted in many countries.362 
 
Thus corporations emanating from the EU, Japan and the US are responsible for much 
of the transnational investment and production throughout the world. As governments, 
throughout the world have accepted this shift towards a cooperative relationship with 
corporations foreign corporate affiliations have grown and states have sought to make 
themselves attractive to corporate interests. 
 
These corporations therefore play a significant role in the economic development of 
the countries in which they have foreign affiliations. The UNCTD specifically advises 
developing economies towards “providing better services and gearing their assets to 
TNCs’ needs” to attract inward investment even though the “private interests of TNCs 
can diverge from the social interest of the host economy”.363 It is acknowledged that 
these TNCs have a major impact on not only the global economy, but also the policies 
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of states: “in today’s globalizing economy, TNCs are not only the main instruments 
by which national economies are economically interlinked, but their internal division 
of labour influences the manner in which particular countries participate in the 
international division of labour”.364 As Mica Panic points out the strategies of TNCs 
evolve around “two broad objectives: protection of the existing markets and entry into 
new markets with the aim of achieving as large a share there as possible”.365 Neither 
of these policies can be realised without the support of the major governments, and 
the institutionalisation of these interests within international organizations. Using the 
latest technology and the cooperation of dominant governments in the EC and US, 
these corporations have established hegemony and integrated nearly the whole world 
into a single global economy, which determines the division of labour between 
countries and ensures that development is dominated by the objectives of the global 
market.366 Consequently, a neoliberal ideology has been embraced globally by 
political elites, which has enhanced the transnational activities of TNCs by 
implementing a transnational mode of production. Together these two factors have 
integrated many parts of the world into a web of production and investment centred 
round the needs of transnational corporations. This has come to be known as 
neoliberal globalization, which is directed by the nebuleuse.  
 
The stable ground for the foundations of this new transnational historic structure and 
nebuleuse was laid by the national hegemony of corporate social forces within the 
most powerful states during the 1980s. Henk Overbeek and Kees Van Der Pijl argue 
that the “transnational neoliberal revolution” that took place in the 1980s cannot be 
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solely attributed to the economic crisis or dip in the normal business cycle of the 
1970s.367 “Developments in social relations, the composition of the historical bloc, 
and its concept of control, the role of the state, and the international order” must all be 
considered.368 This economic crisis, however, did open the way for distrust in the 
Keynesian economic planning of governments. Intellectuals, including a number of 
Nobel Prize-Winners for Economics nurtured within the Chicago School, had 
vigorously condemned Keynsianism and campaigned for the freedom of corporate 
interests to flow with market demands. These included Fredrick Von Hayek369 and 
Milton Friedman370 who together helped to resuscitate and reformulate the ideas of 
Adam Smith (1776)371, Richard Cobden (1836)372 and David Ricardo (1817) under 
the banner of neoliberalism for the late 20th century.373 Individualism, freedom of 
choice, the market society, laissez-faire, and minimal government were all 
propagated. Thomas J Biersteker, however, points out that: “The mere presence of the 
ideas by themselves was not sufficient to bring about the dramatic policy change of 
the 1980s. The ideas needed an enabling environment (the major shock, the perceived 
failure of the past, domestic articulation, and international institutional backing) to 
have major effects”.374 The global recession that afflicted the economies of the 
advanced industrial world between 1970 and 1974 provided this ‘enabling 
environment’ and disillusion with Keynesian planning.  
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By the early 1980s state leaders, initially in Chile, New Zealand, United Kingdom 
(UK) and the US, were advocating market supremacy in the national economy and 
international trade. The UK’s Prime Minister of this era, Margaret Thatcher, was one 
of the pioneering political elite who vigorously advocated free market capitalism and 
international free trade as outlined by Hayek and Friedman’s neoliberalism. Indeed, 
Thatcher and her Senior Civil Servant Sir Keith Joseph are credited with influencing 
“the agenda for a good part of the rest of the world”.375 One of the major policies of 
this ideological shift towards the superiority of the market was the privatisation of 
state assets. For example coal, steel, gas, telecommunications, electricity, water, 
railways, airlines, nuclear power and shipbuilding were auctioned off to private 
companies at below market prices in the UK.376 The role of the state was reduced in 
regulating capital flows and it became the norm for states to promote “increased 
export dependence and flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) relative to domestic 
investment”.377 The election of Ronald Reagan as US president during the 1980s also 
ushered in a concerted and highly successful effort to radically reorganise American 
society towards the needs of business and “to create a global economy that was more 
responsive to US corporate interests.”378 Importantly, these economic reforms 
explicitly promoted and justified a governmental shift from “confrontation to 
cooperation” with corporate social forces.379 Taking together the political and 
economic developments in both the UK and US illustrates the manner in which a 
neoliberal ideology emerged, which revolved around a hegemonic relationship 
between corporations and governments to enhance and protect the needs of 
corporations. Kees Van Der Pijl states “an unreconstructed liberal faction in the 
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capitalist class was able to restore full sovereignty to private capital”.380 This new 
corporate hegemony that emerged in the 1970s brought together and institutionalised 
transnational elites, political elites and intellectuals, at the state level and within 
international organizations, to generate consensus on global economic policies– the 
nebuleuse.  
 
3.6 The Transnational Historical Structure in the Creation of WTO Policies 
The emergence of this transnational corporate historical structure has ensured that 
international trade policies provide a favourable national and global environment for a 
transnational model of production and investment. This corporate hegemony within 
the dominant states was responsible for bringing new trade issues into the political 
arena, such as access to foreign services markets and the protection of foreign 
investment and intellectual property rights. In this section it will be argued that TNCs 
hegemony played a significant role in the creation of WTO agreements to expand and 
protect their interests globally. Corporations created pressure for a new international 
trade organisation and TNCs coordinated transnationally working with the most 
powerful governments to negotiate international agreements. Thereby the structural 
power of TNCs is interwoven within the agreements of the WTO. 
 
Corporate hegemony within the EC and US has been critical in the creation of 
international agreements for foreign investment, and intellectual property rights 
within the WTO. The agreement finalising the establishment of the WTO emerged 
from the GATT Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations 1986-94. The USCID, 
working in conjunction with other business umbrella organisations such as the US 
Business Roundtable (BR), played a significant part in lobbying the GATT Uruguay 
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Round for favourable investment laws.381 Although FDI was not part of the explicit 
negotiations in the Uruguay Round, a number of agreements covered by the Final Act 
are directly relevant to FDI and TNCs, namely the General Agreement on Trade and 
Services (GATS), the General Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). Paz Estrella Tolentino explains, “these Agreements have the objective of 
binding the GATT members to facilitate growth in trade and FDI (the latter confined 
to services) by specifying the responsibilities of countries to foreign investors”.382 As 
illustrated above these agreements are at the very core of the WTO policies and 
illustrate the success of transnational corporate hegemony to gain dominance not only 
within the dominant states, but also over global economic policy through dominance 
of the international organizations.  
 
For example the WTO agreements on GATS and TRIMS clearly enhance and protect 
the transnational model of production favoured by TNCs involved in trade in services 
and investment, which predominantly emanate from the EC, US and Japan. As stated 
above, the GATS is the second part of the first Annex. It governs the trading of 
services and access to service markets of members, such as construction, distribution, 
education, finance, transport, tourism and telecommunications. Finance and 
telecommunication have been the most liberalised of these service industries since the 
creation of the WTO.383 Since TNCs predominantly emanate from the EC, Japan and 
US and dominate the world’s share of service providers, the protection of FDI in 
services was important for OECD corporations. For example, by 2001 trade in 
services made up 60% of OECD GNP, and trade in services grew faster than trade in 
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merchandise throughout the end of the 20th century.384 By 2003-2004 this trend 
continued with corporations from the developed world accounting for nearly 80% of 
all the world’s FDI in services.385 The GATS agreement therefore is important for 
TNCs involved in services. Similarly, The WTO’s TRIMS agreements challenge 
government policies that impose conditions on private foreign investment, such as the 
requirement of foreign investors to use local materials and suppliers when doing 
business. Thereby a transnational model of production is protected as TNCs can 
globally source for the cheapest resources and labour without government 
interference. The current WTO Agreements can still be seen to be instrumental in 
liberalising national controls for the freedom of TNC activity. As demonstrated 
above, the WTO’s DSB has consistently enforced GATS and TRIMS on WTO 
members. 
 
The creation of TRIPS, however, is perhaps one of the best examples of TNCs 
hegemony emerging from the dominant states and being institutionalised at the global 
level. TNCs collaborated with one another transnationally and through hegemony and 
the EC, Japanese and US governments have delivered international agreement that 
protects their intellectual property rights from competition emerging from the 
developing world. TRIPS specifically ensures that TNCs are able to patent and protect 
intellectual property rights, and governments which are members of the WTO have a 
responsibility to uphold these intellectual property rights. As illustrated above the 
WTO’s DSB has ensured that member states, such as Canada, India, Pakistan, the EC 
and US, have established the domestic legal framework to protect corporate 
intellectual property rights and patents – especially for pharmaceuticals patents.  
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Although, not using the term corporate hegemony, Susan K. Sell has been 
instrumental in illustrating that TRIPS “is a case of particular MNCs wanting, and 
getting, their kind of international regulation of intellectual property rights.386 Sell 
explains the corporate influence throughout the creation of TRIPS in great detail. In 
1984, the United States Trade Representatives (USTR) requested private sector input 
on including Intellectual Property (IP) in the upcoming GATT Round. John Opel the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of IBM commissioned economist Jacque Gorlin to 
draft a paper for the USTR outlining a trade based approach for IP. This became the 
multilateral strategy that all corporations pursued in IP. Edmund Pratt, CEO of Pfizer 
Pharmaceutical was the Business Roundtable’s leader in 1988 when trade and 
intellectual property dominated the US agenda. He was selected to be advisor to the 
US Official Delegation at the Uruguay Round in his capacity as Chairman of ACTN, 
and yet the GATT had no official standing for the private sector.387 According to Sell, 
this US sponsored proposal: 
 
closely mirrors the expressed wishes of the twelve CEOs who 
spearheaded this effort … these CEOs formed the ad hoc Intellectual 
Property Committee (IPC) in March 1986, just prior to the Punta del 
Este meeting that launched the Uruguay Round. In 1986 the members of 
the IPC were: Bristol-Myer, CBS, Du Pont; General Electric; General 
Motors; Hewlett-Packard; IBM; Johnson & Johnson; Merck; Monsanto; 
and Pfizer. These companies represent a broad spectrum of US 
intellectual property interests, including chemical, computer, 
entertainment, pharmaceutical and software.388  
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 The International Trade Commission played a significant part in providing the US 
government with information about the failure of foreign countries to apply IP, and 
the subsequent losses incurred by the corporations. This was used in trade 
negotiations to illustrate how much US corporations were losing. The government had 
to rely on the expertise of IP lawyers, typically corporate counsel to translate the 
complexities into political discourse and make clear the connection between IP and 
international trade.  
 
The important aspect of the creation of this agreement is that it demonstrates TNC 
hegemony was able to generate the substantive norms for international property 
protection for all governments and have these agreements enforced by the WTO. In 
1986 the IPC met with the Confederation of British Industries, the IBI in Germany, 
the French Patronat, and through them with the Union of Industrial and Employers’ 
Confederation of Europe (UNICE). UNICE is the official representative of European 
business and industry in European institutions and is composed of thirty-three 
member federations from twenty-two countries. In July 1986 the IPC went to Japan 
and met with the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations. “The IPC 
convinced the European and Japanese counterparts of the merits of a trade based 
approach by emphasising their shared experience and common plight … who agreed 
to work on it and pledged to present these views to their respective governments in 
time for the launch of Uruguay Round”.389 Lobbying government is not hegemony, 
and perhaps Sell is understating the level of influence of corporations institutionalised 
within these dominant states. For example, expressing satisfaction with the final 1994 
TRIPS agreement Gorlin, advisor to the IPC, said that IPC got 95% of what it wanted. 
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Pfizer Chairman, Emeritus Edmund J. Pratt was also jubilant about the creation of 
TRIPS and during a speech to the US Council for International Business states,  
 
The IPC helped to convince US officials that we should take a tough 
stance on intellectual property issues, and that led to trade-related 
intellectual property rights being included on the GATT agenda when 
negotiations began in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 1986 … The current 
GATT victory, which established provisions for intellectual property 
protection, resulting in part from the hard-fought efforts of the US 
government and US business, including Pfizer, over the past three 
decades. We’ve been in from the beginning, taking a leadership 
role.390 
 
This leadership role of corporations is more than just a policy of lobbying 
governments and that these governments are neutral between competing conceptions 
of foreign policy. Rather this leadership of the dominant governments is significant in 
terms of corporate hegemony. It is perhaps more insightful to view chemical, 
computer, entertainment, software, but specifically pharmaceutical corporations as 
being able to use TNCs hegemony in order to create the TRIPS agreement during the 
creation of the WTO. As illustrated above the WTO DSB has been employed to 
ensure the pharmaceutical patents are enforced amongst the members of the WTO. 
Corporate hegemony and structural power is therefore evident within the WTO. 
 
Andrew Walter contests corporate hegemony on the grounds that corporations were 
unsuccessful in acquiring the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). The MAI 
was an international economic agreement designed to limit the power of governments 
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to restrict and regulate FDI within the OECD, which would have later been extended 
to countries outside the OECD.391 By signing up to the MAI, governments would 
have: agreed to open up virtually all sectors of their economies to FDI; allowed 
corporations to sue governments if they impose regulations and performance criteria 
on FDI; and therefore allowed foreign capital significant leverage over national 
policies.392 Walter does state, however, “US international business organisations have 
formulated clear preferences relating to international investment rules, in part because 
they have been in a position to influence government policy and negotiation strategies 
in the US and elsewhere in the OECD”.393 For example, in an effort to persuade 
foreign government to support policies for transnational corporate investment 
interests, an Investment Committee from the US Council for International Business 
(USCID) led a delegation to Japan to lobby for support of the MAI. Similarly 
Elizabeth Smythe argues that multinational capital was significant in initiating the 
MAI negotiations, and the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) to the 
OECD made great efforts to advise the OECD to accept MAI. Executives of some of 
the largest multinational corporations based in the member states of the OECD 
occupied the chair and policy committees of BIAC.394 The MAI was never signed at 
the 1995 negotiations, which Walters argues undermines the existence of corporate 
hegemony. Failure with the MAI, however, also has to be seen in the context of 
achieving corporate structural power within the WTO during the same period – the 
most powerful economic international organization within the current nebuleuse. MAI 
is perhaps of less importance because within the OECD it required a gradual 
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acceptance and the signatures of the developing world over a longer period of time. In 
contrast the WTO’s ‘single undertaking’ clause ensured that all members accepted 
TRIPS as a condition for being a member of the WTO, and the WTO has the authority 
to apply surveillance and enforcement measures on FDI. In doing so, corporate 
hegemony went global in one afternoon of signatures at the WTO in 1994. Paul Hirst 
and Graham Thompson foresee that the WTO will attempt to use the development of 
TRIMS to place MAI back on the international political agenda.395 
 
Corporate structural power is clearly evident within the WTO. In doing so TNCs have 
been able manipulate the WTO to gain the rules that they favour to pursue their 
interests. It was highlighted above that TNCs originate from the Europe and the US, 
and these corporations dominate the five major business sectors: consumer goods and 
services, financial services, heavy industry, infrastructure, and electronics.396 Sell has 
also demonstrated that companies representing chemical, computer, entertainment, 
pharmaceutical and software were at the core of the WTO negotiations that created 
the WTO agreements, specifically TRIMS and TRIPS.397 With the creation of the 
WTO, Linda Weiss has also illustrated that the WTO’s policies may claim to prevent 
subsidies from national governments by making them illegal under WTO agreements, 
but in actual fact there are provisions to actually encourage subsidies to the high tech 
and knowledge based corporations.398 Weiss specifically focuses her attention on the 
manner in which WTO’s TRIMS and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCMs) 
have been designed to ensure that subsidies from the core states to corporations are 
still legitimate under the WTO. On the one hand, TRIMS impinges on government 
policy autonomy by prohibiting host governments from imposing any obligations on 
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foreign investment companies. Similarly, SCMs declare that WTO members renounce 
import controls and measures favouring domestic producers – especially subsidies.399 
On the other hand, however, since 2000 a number of subsidies have been determined 
to be permissible.  
 
Importantly these legal subsidies are aimed specifically at high tech and knowledge 
based corporations, which have transnational operations. The SCM rules allow 
governments to continue to offer substantial support subsidies for techno-industrial 
innovation and upgrading, which 
 
also include the financing of venture capital funds, the provision of 
state-developed technologies and innovations spun off to the private 
sector from government research labs (e.g. the US National Institute of 
Health which spins off key intellectual property to US pharmaceutical 
companies), public procurement of private goods and services, and 
standard setting and subsidization of end-users demand for particular 
technologies aimed at market expansion at home and abroad.400  
 
Given the manner in which these WTO policies allow states to maintain large 
subsidies in the high tech and knowledge based industry, the argument concerning 
corporate structural power within the WTO cannot be dismissed as conspiratorial. 
Corporate hegemony has been evident in the creation of the WTO, and world 
corporate hegemony appears to be evident through the policies of the WTO. 
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Although Weiss acknowledges that corporations are being subsidised her analysis is 
too state-centric and avoids explaining these developments through the concept of 
hegemony. For example, Weiss argues that with the creation of the WTO 
 
the rich nations as a group … have carved out a multilateral order 
which best suits their current developmental trajectory, one that, on the 
one hand, diminishes space for promoting the more labour – and 
capital-intensive industries critical to their climb up the development 
ladder and, on the other hand, increased the space for sponsoring the 
technology – or knowledge-intensive industries that are now deemed 
critical to securing national prosperity.401  
 
Interestingly, Weiss asserts that these policies at the WTO were unintentional and that 
they illustrate that states are not constrained by the rules of the WTO. She also 
acknowledges the provisions under the WTO to allow subsidies for high tech and 
‘knowledge based industries’ fits with the current form of development endorsed by 
the developed states of the OECD. She also notes that this development model 
promoted by the WTO actually impinges on the progress of developing states because 
they are involved in production.402  
 
Weiss, however, is overlooking the transnational and international networks of state 
and corporate representatives and intellectuals that have “worked towards the 
formation of a policy consensus for global capitalism” at the WTO. Perhaps what 
needs to be stressed is the link between the dominant corporate social forces within 
these OECD countries and the subsidies “exempted from the WTO’s ‘prohibited’ list” 
are by design and not unintentional as Weiss assumes. The corporations from the triad 
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of the EC, US and Japan have consistently dominated the world’s high tech and 
knowledge based industries, and are institutionalised within the dominant states and 
the WTO. The subsidies that are deemed to be permissible at the WTO reflect 
corporate hegemony. For example, in 2002 global R&D expenditure reached $6.77 
billion. It was highly concentrated, as 91% of this expenditure is in the developed  
countries of the world.403 This is also the location of the top 100 TNCs in the world. 
Between 1996 and 2002, the growth in R&D expenditure in the US was twice as high 
as the world average. Britain and the Canada also demonstrated high levels of 
investment in this period. Similarly China was seen to increase spending in FDI in 
R&D by 20% in this period. The World Development Report points out TNCs 
continue to be key players in R&D because they account for half of global R&D 
expenditures, and at least two-thirds of business R&D expenditures (estimated at $450 
billion). Over 80% of the 700 largest R&D spending firms come from only five 
countries: the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and France. In 
2003, over half of the spending from these firms was concentrated in the sectors of IT 
hardware, automotive and pharmaceuticals/biotechnologies.404 In 2002 Pfizer spent    
$6,504 million on R&D. There is obviously a strong link between the transnational 
corporate social forces and government spending on R&D and the policies of the 
WTO. This is because of the hegemony of corporate social forces within the dominant 
governments, and the WTO. As illustrated above the WTO is central to ensuring its 
members’ national policies reflect the form of state that is necessary to enhance 
corporate interests. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the WTO is a central hegemonic institution of the current 
nebuleuse, which enforces the rules and procedures that ensure the expansion for 
transnational corporate hegemony throughout the world. It has also illustrated that the 
rules and procedures of the WTO are a product of the transnational social forces 
emerging from the most powerful states and developing transnational and 
international networks of state and corporate representatives and intellectuals have, 
“worked towards the formation of a policy consensus for global capitalism”.405 The 
corporate hegemony protects and promotes a transnational model of production and 
the interests of transnational social forces. This analysis, however, is absent from the 
dominant stories of why the WTO was created. To establish this argument attention 
was drawn to the manner in which the WTO has constructed both enforcement and 
surveillance regimes to ensure that its policies are carried out. Through detailing the 
core agreements of the WTO’s charter it was established that the policies promoted 
the deregulation of national borders to promote entry of goods and services from 
foreign corporations, but also the protection of corporate investment and intellectual 
property rights of these corporations in foreign countries. Through examples of 
GATTS, GATS, TRIMS and TRIPS enforcement it was clear that on the whole, but 
not in every case, “national policies and practices have been adjusted to the exigencies 
of the world economy of international production”.406 Undoubtedly, these policies 
reflect the interests of transnational corporations and the transnational model of 
production they employ to prosper. Indeed, it was argued that the rise of transnational 
corporate social forces after the economic crisis of the 1970s and their consolidation 
during the late 1980s in the UK and US, were responsible for establishing hegemony 
at the national level within a number of countries. In the creation of the WTO itself 
corporate hegemony was present and active to ensure that the WTO reflected its 
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interests globally. Thereby, the nature of the WTO’s agreements, the dispute 
settlement and the surveillance regime of the WTO combine to ensure that a specific 
form of state emerges in the current world order, which is not hostile to corporate 
interests.  
 
 126
Chapter Four 
            
The Contradiction of the World Trade Organization  
 
States willy-nilly became more effectively accountable to a nebuleuse 
personified as the global economy; and they were constrained to mystify this 
external accountability in the eyes and ears of their own publics though the 
new vocabulary of globalization, interdependence, and competitiveness.407 
 
4.1 Introduction and Aims 
It is clear that through its constitution, literature and press releases, the WTO 
propagates the superiority of neoliberal economic policies throughout the world. The 
construction of this ideational framework serves to legitimise the WTO’s legal 
framework for international trade and the establishment of enforcement and 
surveillance mechanisms to ensure compliance with WTO agreements. In doing so 
this ideology justifies the WTO’s ability to forge a form of state, which favours 
particular state/society power relations on the grounds that it is the only means of 
achieving competition, efficiency, development, prosperity, peace and sustainable 
development. Through performing this function the WTO ensures that the form of 
state that emerges from WTO membership is compatible with a transnational model 
of production and the protection of transnational corporate interests through the allure 
of attaining collective goods. The principle of non-discrimination is also used to 
justify participation in the decision-making and dispute settlement of the WTO on the 
grounds that all members are treated as equals. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to apply a Coxian analysis to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in order to identify the contradictions in the ideology that 
legitimise the policies and procedures of this central hegemonic institution of the 
current nebuleuse.408 In addition it will be argued that the WTO has experienced 
strong resistance to the cooption of elites from the developing world through 
transnational corporate interests making concessions that “secure the weak 
acquiescence in their leadership” and by expressing their “leadership in terms of 
universal or general interests, rather than serving their own particular interests”.409 
Since corporate hegemony was paramount in the creation of the WTO, however, 
corporate ‘structural power’,410 is embedded within the procedures of the WTO 
ensuring transnational corporate interests are advantaged because alternatives policies 
are not favoured within this WTO framework. There lies the contradiction engrained 
with the WTO - the realisation of collective goods from WTO’s membership will 
always be subject to the demands of corporate hegemony. 
 
To develop this argument, the chapter will first illustrate the manner in which both a 
neoliberal ideology and the legalisation of global trade have together been employed 
by legal scholars, the WTO’s Charter,411 and the WTO’s Secretariat to legitimise the 
policies and process of the WTO. Thereby, the nebuleuse, transnational and 
international networks of state and corporate representatives and intellectuals, have 
worked towards the formation of an ideology, which justifies the WTO’s policy and 
processes.412 This neoliberal ideology specifically legitimises the WTO’s ability to 
exercise power and enforce certain, but not all, deregulation policies on the grounds 
that it enhances the mutual benefits of employment, stability, peace, predictability, 
                                                 
408 Robert W. Cox. ‘Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay on Method’ (1983), in Robert W. 
Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 138. 
409 Robert, W. Cox. ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, in 
Millennium: Vol. 10, No.2, 1981, p. 137.  
410 Susan Strange. States and Markets: Power in the World Economy, London: Pinter Publisher, 1988, p. 26. 
411 The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 1994 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf
412 Robert W. Cox with Michael G. Schechter. The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on 
Power, Morals and Civilization, London: Routledge, 2002. p. 33-34. 
 128
prosperity and sustainable development. The chapter will then describe how the 
legalisation of the WTO’s international trading system is argued to ensure the ‘rights 
and obligations’ of each member, so that all members are ‘equal before the law’. 
These provisions are proposed as safeguards preventing the strong states from 
dominating the weak. The Charter specifically affirms that the process, policies and 
agreements of the WTO are designed to promote non-discrimination, especially in 
decision-making and the dispute settlement process. Finally, through the examples of 
the Uruguay Round of negotiations (1986 –1994) and the Cancun Ministerial 
Conference (2003), the chapter will demonstrate that corporate hegemony has been 
promoted through the WTO at the expense of the interests of any other group. It will 
also illustrate that the creation of the Doha Development Agenda was an attempt to 
acquire the agreement of the developing world to accept the leadership of the 
hegemonic states, but these have yet to be realised. Thereby this chapter will highlight 
the contradictions that undermine the WTO’s ideology.  
 
4.2 WTO Ideology – The Rule of Law and 19th Century Liberalism 
As Robert W. Cox asserts, central to the creation of state and world order hegemony 
is the institutionalisation of an ideology, which justifies the application of a model of 
production for the interests of dominant social forces. This ideology propagates the 
claim that the policies of an institution represent the collective interest of all 
members.413 Since the 1980s, transnational social forces have emerged to create 
hegemony within the EC and US, and used a neoliberal ideology to justify the 
reorganization of society for corporate interests. Indeed, such is the success of 
hegemony in these states that the language of neoliberalism - privatisation, 
liberalization, deregulation, and downsizing - has not been limited to elite rhetoric: it 
has become the discourse used for describing and understanding the world for the 
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masses. Throughout the final decades of the 20th century corporate hegemony within 
the EC and US has been responsible for institutionalising corporate hegemony at the 
global level. Transnational social forces played a dominant role in the creation of the 
WTO in an attempt to ensure the application of a transnational model of production, 
and the protection of transnational investment and intellectual property rights 
throughout the world.414 This has been supported by an associated rhetoric of 
globalization [the market is more reliable than governments and growth comes from 
business not government intervention]. Neoliberalism has become the accepted policy 
guide, which limits government ‘management’ of the economy to allow the market to 
function freely. Consequently, governments or the ruling party are able to claim that it 
is not their policies which have caused economic hardship, but the problems of 
‘market adjustment’.415 In this section it will be illustrated how this transnational 
model of production is justified by the Secretariat of the WTO through the language 
of market adjustment, deregulation, downsizing, efficiency, flexibility and 
restructuring. In doing so it will be argued the Secretariat is not a neutral agency 
promoting the collective good of all members, but rather it is responsible for 
naturalizing the interests of corporate hegemony throughout the world.  
 
The WTO’s Secretariat and Charter argue that the Secretariat functions on the 
principle of non-discrimination and neutrality between assertions of national interests. 
This is argued because the Secretariat is composed of constantly changing civil 
servants and is employed to carry out the administration of the WTO. Article VI of 
the Charter makes provision for the WTO to create a Secretariat, headed by a Director 
General (DG). The Secretariat, and members’ relations with the Secretariat, are 
explicitly directed to maintain a neutral character in paragraph 4 of Article VI:  
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The responsibilities of the Director-General and of the staff of the 
Secretariat shall be exclusively international in character.  In the 
discharge of their duties, the Director-General and the staff of the 
Secretariat shall not seek or accept instructions from any government 
or any other authority external to the WTO. They shall refrain from 
any action which might adversely reflect on their position as 
international officials. The members of the WTO shall respect the 
international character of the responsibilities of the Director-General 
and of the staff of the Secretariat and shall not seek to influence them 
in the discharge of their duties.416  
 
The neutral character of the Secretariat is argued to be maintained because the staff 
are not appointed by governments but are hired as international civil servants to work 
for the WTO Secretariat. The duties of the Secretariat include providing technical and 
logistical support, such as organising meetings of governing bodies and preparing 
background documentation requested by delegations. The Secretariat also assists the 
dispute-settlement process, provides legal services when requested to do so, and 
publishes studies and trade policy reports. It has also been responsible for setting up 
the WTO website, distributing news of current events at the WTO, and publishing 
literature explaining and defending the WTO. The Secretariat is also very keen to give 
interviews to the media and academia to promote the WTO in a positive light.417  
 
Through consensus, the WTO’s General Council has the task of selecting the DG 
from a list of candidates. Hoekman and Kostecki describe the DG as “the guardian of 
the collective interest of the member States ‘acting as’ a broker – not a decision-
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maker – in many situations, which reinforce[s] this assertion of non-discrimination.418 
Since the creation of the WTO in 1995 there have been four DGs, Renato Reggiero 
(1995-99), Michael Moore (1999-2002), Dr. Supachai Panichpakdi (2002-2005) and 
Pascal Lamy (2005-2009). The normal term for a DG is four years, but the General 
Council was split during “the rancorous 1999 leadership contest”.419 The debate over 
selection revolved around the appointment of yet another Western candidate, rather 
than a nominee from the developing world. In the end, it was agreed that Moore and 
Panichpakdi should hold a three-year term each.420 It could be claimed that this 
illustrates that the WTO is applying the principle of non-discrimination and ensuring 
neutrality.  
 
The neutrality of the Secretariat, however, is limited to the promotion of a neoliberal 
ideology, which justifies the creation of a transnational model of production, and the 
protection of transnational investment and intellectual property rights under the 
banner of free trade. The collective benefits to be reaped from both the deregulation 
of national barriers to trade and their legal enforcement are clearly stated in the 
WTO’s Secretariat’s press releases, speeches and publications. For example, on the 
eve of the creation of the WTO, Andras Szepesi outlined the possibility of equity 
amongst the contracting parties from the deregulation of national economies:  
 
as we enter the WTO phase … increasing market access opportunities 
and efficient rules for undistorted competition go hand in hand. It is 
only predictability and stability in trade and economic relations that 
                                                 
418 Bernard M. Hoekman and Michel M. Kostecki. The Political Economy of the World Trading System: From 
GATT to WTO, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 39. 
419 Bridges. Pascal Lamy Set to Become Next WTO Director-General, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 9, 
Number 17, 18 May 2005. 
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-05-18/story1.htm
420 World Trade Organization. WTO Member Governments Agree On Director-General Succession, 22 July 1999. 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres99_e/pr131_e.htm
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can provide everyone with a meaningful share of the world trade 
cake.421 
 
Six years later at the 50th Anniversary of Multilateral Trading the then Director 
General of the WTO Renato Ruggiero and Secretariat Alexander Swobada again 
reiterated these sentiments. In his opening speech Swobada insisted that “Trade, and 
trade liberalisation, are of mutual benefit to all trading partners”.422 Ruggiero, the 
Director General explicitly outlined these mutual benefits by declaring: 
 
The multilateral trading system of today will be more important than 
ever to … build a much more equitable world … to take advantage of 
the equaliser potential of the new borderless technologies to permit the 
least developed countries to accelerate dramatically their human and 
economic development … 
 
Trade Agreements are after all not an end in themselves – they are a 
valuable means to important ends such as alleviating poverty and 
malnutrition, widening the circles of development, sharing technological 
process, sustaining the health of our planet, and advancing the cause of 
peace.423 
 
Again on the 20 April 2005, the WTO’s Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi 
emphasised the WTO’s contribution to world peace and development. In his 
introductory remarks to the WTO Public Symposium, he said that: 
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423 Renato Ruggiero. Opening Remarks At The 50th Anniversary Symposium In The WTO Secretariat ‘From 
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the WTO has extended the rule of law into the international trade realm 
and has contributed significantly to keeping peaceful and stable trading 
relations between WTO members … [T]rade is not the answer to all 
the world's problems, but it can make a powerful contribution to 
international efforts for development.424 
 
These speeches by the WTO’s elites illustrate that the justification for liberalisation is 
that it provides a panacea for many of the world’s ills. These WTO elites claim that 
membership and application of WTO policies will cause member states to experience 
a cure for economic stagnation, under-development, poverty and war. Hoekman and 
Kostecki argue that such speeches are responsible for creating a mandate for the WTO 
which it can only “fail to live up to”.425 
 
If Hoekman and Kostecki are correct and these claims are mere hyperbole from an 
excited and optimistic Secretariat, it would seem that a more accurate picture of the 
real aims and objectives of the WTO should be evident in the WTO’s legal Charter. 
The preamble to this agreement states that, by signing up to the Charter, signatories 
are: 
 
Recognising that their relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of 
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing 
volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the 
production of trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal 
use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of 
                                                 
424 Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi. “WTO After Ten Years: Global Problems and Multilateral Solutions”, 
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sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the 
environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner 
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of 
economic development … [and] 
 
Recognising further that there is need for positive efforts designed to 
ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed 
among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade 
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.426 
 
It is only the absence of the specific goal of peace that distinguishes the objectives of 
the WTO Charter from those expressed by the Secretariat. On all other counts the 
WTO’s Charter justifies the use of multilateral trade rules to reduce government 
barriers to trade for the realisation of development, employment, equity, prosperity, 
peace and sustainable development.  
 
It is also important to recognise that the Secretariat is propagating the realisation of 
universal goals from WTO agreements, with the exception of sustainable 
development, which has been the standard cry of all free traders since the 17th 
century. This is apparent in the work of Adam Smith427 and Richard Cobden428, and in 
David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage429; the freeing of trade from 
government intervention is portrayed as a panacea for the world’s ills. In the late 19th 
century Ricardo stated: 
 
                                                 
426 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Preamble, 1994. 
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Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally 
devotes its capital and labour to such employments as are most 
beneficial to each. This pursuit of individual advantage is admirably 
connected with the universal good of the whole … it distributes labour 
most effectively and most economically: while increasing the general 
mass of production, it diffuses general benefits, and binds together, by 
one common interest and discourse, the universal society of nations 
throughout the civilised world.430 
 
We can see parallels between Ricardo’s position and today’s justification for 
deregulation of government control of trade in terms of the attainment of a universal 
prosperity and peace advocated by the WTO’s Secretariat. Indeed, during my own 
visit to the Secretariat I was advised to take home and study In Defence of Global 
Capitalism431 as a well thumbed edition was waved in front of me.432 
 
In fact the WTO’s publication Understanding the WTO continues to use Ricardo’s 
theory of comparative advantage to defend the deregulation of national controls for 
international trade.433 It states that this theory is “the single most powerful insight into 
economics” and rests on “commercial common sense”. This is because:  
 
‘comparative advantage’ states that countries prosper first by taking 
advantage of their assets in order to concentrate on what they can 
produce best, and then by trading these products for products that other 
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countries produce best … [serving to] sharpen competition, motivate 
innovation and breed success. 434  
 
The publication further depicts a bleak picture for those states that do not embrace 
liberal trading policies: “Protectionism ultimately leads to bloated, inefficient 
producers supplying consumers with outdated, unattractive products. In the end 
factories close and jobs are lost despite the protection and the subsidies”.435 
Consequently, the liberal ideology of the 19th century is still being used to justify the 
opening of markets to foreign competition in the 21st century. Taken together the 
multilateral nature of negotiations for trade agreements that deregulate national 
barriers to trade are argued to promote employment, peace, predictability, prosperity, 
stability and sustainable development. Indeed these arguments provide the ideological 
backbone for that justification of the implementation of WTO trade agreements and 
the continued existence of the WTO. To repeat, this neoliberal ideology has been 
dominant within the states of the EC and the US since the 1980s and has been used to 
justify the emergence of corporate hegemony. Thereby the corporate hegemony 
within these states has now established its ideology and policies within the WTO. 
 
4.3 Sovereign Equality at the WTO 
This section will seek to illustrate that the WTO’s Charter specifically states that the 
principles of non-discrimination and equity amongst members informs the whole 
structure and process of negotiations at the WTO. Non-discrimination amongst 
members begins with accession to the WTO. For example, it is stated that the rules 
governing the organisation of the WTO were not arbitrarily created, but were the 
product of multilateral negotiations, which established a legal document to which all 
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members are accountable. As Article XXVI of the WTO Charter clearly states ‘no 
reservations may be made in respect of any provision of this Agreement”.436 Thereby 
the securing of WTO membership for any state is conditional (with only very limited 
exceptions) on accepting the legal rules set out in the Charter in their entirety: “the so-
called single undertaking”.437  
 
Non-discrimination amongst members in the form of sovereign equality is stressed 
within WTO decision-making. Sovereign equality is required for all WTO members 
to participate fully in decision-making. This concept purports to “formally negate 
status, offer equal representation and voting powers in international organisations, and 
to take decisions by consensus or unanimity of the members”.438 It also necessitates 
that “in all plenary meetings … diplomats fully respect the right of any member state 
to: attend; intervene; make motions; take initiatives (raise an issue); introduce, 
withdraw, or reintroduce a proposal (a legal text for decisions) or amendment; and 
block the consensus or unanimous support required for action”.439 It is important to 
acknowledge in any discussion of WTO decision-making that Article III of the 
Charter specifically stipulates that it is only the governments of member states that 
can propose, negotiate and sign the WTO agreements.440 Thereby the WTO Charter 
emphasises the intergovernmental nature of the WTO, and that corporations or Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are not officially able to sit at the negotiation 
table. The structure of the WTO is clearly set out in Article IV and states that 
representatives of all the member governments will have the opportunity to be 
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involved in the many different councils and committees that make up the WTO. It is 
therefore argued that: “the WTO is run by its member governments. All major 
decisions are made by the membership as a whole … [it is] a member driven, 
consensus-based organisation”.441 The emphasis on consensus decision-making 
amongst governments is intended to ensure sovereign equality in decision-making.  
 
At the pinnacle of the structure are Ministerial Conferences, which comprise the 
ministerial representatives of all the members. Article IV states that Ministerial 
Conferences will meet at least once every two years. To date there have been six 
Ministerial Conferences: Singapore (1996), Geneva (1998), Seattle (1999), Doha 
(2001), Cancun (2003) and Hong Kong (2005). At these Ministerial Conferences core 
changes to the WTO structure and policies are presented for negotiation. At Singapore 
it was decided that the trade agreements of the WTO should be increased to cover the 
issues of investment, competition, transparency in government procurement and trade 
facilitation. These have come to be known as the ‘Singapore Issues’ and represent the 
core interest of corporate hegemony.442 In contrast at the fourth Ministerial 
Conference at Doha it was declared that the interests of the developing world were at 
the core of the all WTO negotiations: 
 
The majority of WTO members are developing countries. We seek to 
place their needs and interests at the heart of the Work Programme 
adopted in this Declaration. Recalling the Preamble to the Marrakesh 
Agreement, we shall continue to make positive efforts designed to ensure 
that developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, 
secure a share in the growth of world trade commensurate with the needs 
of their economic development. In this context, enhanced market access, 
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balanced rules, and well targeted, sustainably financed technical assistance 
and capacity-building programmes have important roles to play.443  
 
The entire package of negotiations has officially been called the ‘Doha Development 
Agenda’. There are 21 subjects for negotiation that emerged from the ‘Doha 
Development Agenda’, and all are still under negotiation after failing to be agreed by 
the members by their July 2005 deadline. The WTO’s Ministerial Conferences are 
therefore the central decision-making arenas for determining the essential issues to be 
promoted by the WTO agreements. With the establishment of the ‘Doha Development 
Agenda’ the Ministerial Conference appears to have legitimised itself on the grounds 
that it seeks to promote the interests of the poorest states. 
 
Since all members are represented at these Ministerial Conferences, they alone are 
deemed to have the authority to take decisions on all matters relating to the WTO 
Charter (this will be described below). Outside of the meetings of the Ministerial 
Conference the General Council is responsible for carrying out the functions of the 
WTO. It is for this reason that Richard Blackhurst asserts that “between meetings of 
the Ministerial Conference … the main governing body is the General Council”.444 
The General Council comprises representatives of all the members. From these 
representatives the General Council constructs bodies to carry out the provisions 
stated in each of the Annexes: the Dispute Settlement Body and the Trade Policy 
Review Body. Three further subsidiary councils operate under the WTO’s General 
Council: the Council for Trade in Goods; the Council for Trade in Services; and the 
Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. From each of these 
councils emanate a number of working groups. Separate committees also exist to deal 
primarily with the interests of the least developed states, such as the Committee on 
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Trade and Development. Committees also exist on Trade and Environment, Budget, 
Finance and Administration, and Balance of Payment restrictions. All of these 
committees report to the WTO’s Ministerial Conferences. 
 
It is the procedures of decision-making, however, that are at the heart of the argument 
that the WTO promotes non-discrimination and inclusion. Article IX of the WTO’s 
Charter states that the decisions made at the Ministerial Conference or General 
Council must be agreed through consensus. In the footnote provided to Article IX 
consensus is defined as follows: “The body concerned shall be deemed to have 
decided by consensus on a matter submitted for its consideration, if no member 
present at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed 
decision”.445 The pros and cons of WTO consensus decision-making have been 
asserted. On the one hand, Hoekman and Kostecki state that consensus decision-
making processes are a useful device to ensure that small states have “greater 
negotiating leverage – especially if they are able to form coalitions – in the informal 
consultations and bargaining that precede decision-making. In creating a coalition 
states are able to create a strong bargaining position.”446 On the other hand, Jeffrey J 
Schott argues that a consensus system of decision-making can reinforce conservative 
tendencies in the system because a proposal for change can be adopted only if 
unopposed by a blocking majority.447 To operate efficiently in the future, he argues, 
the WTO will need to develop an ‘executive board’ similar to those of the IMF and 
World Bank. Representatives of corporate hegemony in the EC and US have also 
made this type of criticism of consensus decision-making at the WTO. For example 
after the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003, the trade 
representatives of both the EC, Pascal Lamy, and US, Robert Zolleck, condemned the 
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system of decision-making at the WTO for resembling a “medieval organisation”,448 
which had become a “forum for the politics of protest”449, not cooperation. 
Consequently, consensus decision-making is then condemned by the representatives 
of corporate hegemony for slowing down the process of implementing policies for the 
efficiency of transnational production and corporate interests globally through the 
WTO.  
 
Although provision has also been made for when a consensus decision cannot be 
reached on the basis of one-member-one vote450, this has not been used to ensure that 
transnational interests are forced upon the membership. The reason for this is that the 
legitimacy of the WTO’s decision-making process rests on the principle of voluntary 
consensus and the all members are formally able to participate in all levels of WTO 
decision-making. As Blackhurst points out that there is nothing in the WTO’s 
decision-making that corresponds to the executives of the IMF or World Bank.451 The 
IMF and World Bank have weighted voting (relative to each country’s contribution to 
the two organisations’ capital funds), whilst WTO members base their most important 
decisions on the principle of consensus. The WTO is also different from the United 
Nations’ main decision-making body, the Security Council, because at the WTO no 
country has an official veto power. Therefore, the WTO is argued to be 
distinguishable from the other international organisations within the current world 
order on the grounds that all members have the opportunity to be represented 
throughout the many councils and committees. Sampson states that it is the focus on 
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these non-discriminatory multilateral rules which provides the real attraction for both 
large and small governments to join the WTO. He argues that all governments see:  
 
adherence to multilateral rules – rather than political or commercial 
power – to be in their national interests. Rules bring predictability and 
stability to the world trading system and, although rule-based governed 
trade may not guarantee peace, it does remove a potent source of 
conflict.452  
 
As such, it is argued that the collective negotiation of trade rules by all members, 
based on consensus, enables all states to pursue their national interests. As stated 
above the WTO’s Secretariat argues that the decisions that emerge from these 
negotiations ensure the neutrality of the rules that govern international trade thereby 
bringing stability and predictability, and providing a cornerstone for establishing 
peace amongst nations. There are many ways to skin a chicken, and ensuring the 
application of transnational interests in WTO decision-making has been pursued 
through channels that undermine this consensus decision-making. This will be 
illustrated in below. 
 
4.4 Non-Discrimination in the WTO Charter  
This section will seek to illustrate that the WTO’s Charter specifically states that non-
discrimination and equity are the principles that guide the agreements made at the 
WTO. The legal complexities of the WTO are found in the 29 agreements and 
understandings listed in the four Annexes of the Charter.453 These Annexes detail the 
substantive rights and obligations of the members. The annexes that set out the basic 
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principles for trade and directly govern the trade policies of the members are 
established in the three parts that make up Annex 1, which includes the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994), The General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), and the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS).454 Taken together, these first three parts of Annex I are described as the 
‘Multilateral Trade Agreements’.455 
 
Hoekman and Kostecki argue that these Multilateral Trade Agreements are based on 
the principles of “non-discrimination, reciprocity, market access and fair 
competition”.456 Governments negotiate under these principles when removing trade 
barriers, such as tariffs and subsidies for domestic producers or exporters. Primarily 
the tools that are used to promote non-discrimination are the ‘most-favoured-nation’ 
(MFN) principle, and the ‘National Treatment’ rule.457 The MFN principle has a long 
history in international trade and is described as the cornerstone of multilateral trade 
negotiations. It can be traced back to the landmark Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860, 
which led to the reduction of tariffs throughout Europe in the 19th century.458 It is 
claimed that the centrality of the MFN principle ensures that states do not 
discriminate between trading partners, by giving all trading partners status and 
concession as a most-favoured trading partner. This status is said to guarantee that 
when a member’s goods reach the border of another member’s territory they will be 
treated in the same way as every other member’s produce is. The MFN principle is the 
first Article of the GATT 1994, Article II of GATS and Article IV of TRIPS. Non-
discrimination is also pursued through the National Treatment rule, which requires 
that foreign goods that enter a market be subjected to the same tax and measures as 
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domestic goods. The National Treatment rule can be found in Article III of GATT, 
Article XVII of GATS and Article III of TRIPS.  
 
It is argued that reciprocity ensures “trade liberalisation occurs on a quid pro quo 
basis” and an exchange of market access between members. For example, a reciprocal 
trade negotiation between government A and government B would require that a 
commitment to market access or the reduction of tariffs on a product by government 
A is conditional on the measured exchange of similar access and tariff reductions by 
government B. Through this it is argued that the “convergence in the levels of 
protection is gradual”.459 Such concessions are then listed in schedules and bound. 
This means that a country agreeing to a concession cannot raise tariffs above the 
agreed levels without negotiating compensation for the affected parties. Reciprocity is 
claimed to create ‘fair competition’ in international trade because it ensures it occurs 
on a quid pro quo basis. The MFN principle then ensures that all members are also 
afforded the same reduction in protection on the given product or service. Together 
these principles are argued to promote market access because they require the 
negotiation of the mutual reduction of trade barriers to national markets.  
 
The following two Annexes move on from a focus on the details of the principles and 
schedules of international trade agreements, to cover the enforcement of the 
agreements by the WTO. Annex II (Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing Dispute Settlement) provides the procedures for the WTO to resolve trade 
disputes amongst its members, while Annex III (Trade Policy Review Mechanism) 
obligates each member to be transparent in trade policy.460 Finally, Annex IV 
(Plurilateral Trade Agreement) contains codes from the previous trade negotiations at 
the GATT Tokyo Round on civil aircraft and government procurement, which were 
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not negotiated to encompass all members of the WTO. Since the Plurilateral Trade 
Agreement does not have a multilateral dimension it is not important to this 
discussion. In contrast, both Annexes II and III continue to appear to apply the 
principle of non-discrimination.   
 
4.5 Enforcement – Equality Before the Law 
The most important function of the WTO has been the creation of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) to ensure that all members adhere to the Charter and 
trade agreements. As the WTO Secretariat acknowledges; “Dispute settlement is the 
central pillar of the multilateral trading system, and the WTO’s unique contribution to 
the stability of the global economy. Without a means of settling disputes, the rules-
based system would be less effective because the rules could not be enforced”.461 John 
H. Jackson, leading international expert on international trade institutions462, explains 
just how important the DSU is for international trade: 
 
It is also clear that the strength of the WTO dispute settlement system 
depends on a world perception that it is fair and even handed. And that 
perception, in turn, depends on the ability of all members of the WTO to 
have essential access to the dispute settlement process, even if they lack 
the resources to do so on their own basis.463  
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The effective resolution of trade disputes is not only imperative for the smooth 
functioning of the trading system, it also needs to be seen to treat all members equally 
and not be arbitrarily discriminatory to have any legitimacy amongst its members. 
The WTO has established a unified dispute-settlement mechanism, and the same 
procedures are used for settling disputes across all issues of trade in goods, trade in 
services and intellectual property.464 The WTO Secretariat usually suggests the names 
of three potential panellists to the parties in the dispute. Panellists are expected to 
serve in their individual capacities, and not subject to any government’s instruction. In 
2002, WTO members created the Advisory Centre for WTO Law, which has a small 
legal staff to assist developing countries. In a system similar to that used for domestic 
Legal Aid, the cost of using the Centre’s legal staff is calculated in relation to the 
wealth of the country seeking aid.465 Arguably, this development represents a step 
towards preventing discrimination in the use of the DSB because it ensures that all 
members have access to the necessary resources to file for a panel.  
 
What is clear is that all members are argued to be treated and judged equally before 
the panels and Appellate Bodies in respect of the WTO agreements that they have 
signed. J. H. H. Weiler articulates why this is particularly significant for international 
trade, and international relations as a discipline itself, by stating that: 
 
the new DSU makes legal resolution more attractive to members 
because it can, for example, equalise egregious disparities of power 
that exist at the negotiating table. At the negotiating table, Venezuela 
is Venezuela and the United States is the United States. The name of 
the game is power. At the Bar of Law it is an altogether different 
                                                 
464 The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex II, Article II, 1994. 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf
465 John H. Jackson. ‘Perceptions about the WTO Trade Institution’, in World Trade Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2002, 
p. 112-113. 
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paradigm, or at least it is meant to be so. All are equal before the 
law.466  
 
Consequently, he argues, the legalisation of international trade has repercussions for 
the traditional dynamics of diplomacy through power politics because “politicians, 
even of powerful states, are forced to ask their lawyers “is it legal?” before embarking 
on a course of action”.467 Therefore the DSU is argued to have established non-
discrimination within the WTO because it is based upon the principle that all 
members are ‘equal before the law’. More importantly, the WTO Charter gives the 
Appellate Panels of the DSU the power to sanction the withdrawal of trading 
privileges as set in the WTO agreements for those members who refuse to adhere to 
Panels’ final reports and decisions. As Richard Blackhurst succinctly states: “There 
lies – if all else fails – multilateral authorised trade sanctions”.468 The Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism (TPRM) ensures that all members are adhering to WTO 
agreements.469 Together these mechanisms ensure that once agreements are negotiated 
under the principles of non-discrimination they are also applied and enforced in a 
non-discriminatory manner. It would appear that all members are equal before the 
DSB, and all are reviewed equally under the TPRM. 
 
 
                                                 
466 J. H. H. Weiler. ‘The Rules of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on WTO Dispute Settlement’, 
in Rodger B. Porter et al (editors), Efficiency, Equity and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the 
Millennium, Washington, D. C.: Brooking Institution Press, 2001, p. 339. 
467 J. H. H. Weiler. ‘The Rules of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on WTO Dispute Settlement’, 
in Rodger B. Porter et al (editors), Efficiency, Equity and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the 
Millennium, Washington, D. C.: Brooking Institution Press, 2001, p. 340. 
468 Richard Blackhurst. ‘The Capacity of the WTO to Fulfil Its Mandate,’ in Anne. O. Krueger (editor), The WTO 
as an International Organization, London: The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 1998, p. 32. 
469 Roderick Abbott. ‘GATT and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism: Further Reflections on Earlier Reflections’, 
in Journal of World Trade, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 117-119. 
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4.6 Uruguay Negotiations: The Undermining of Sovereign Equality and Non-
Discrimination 
There is clear evidence, however, that sovereign equality, non-discrimination and 
equality before the law are more vocally advocated by the Secretariat than they are 
applied to the WTO’s policies and procedures. For example, it is argued that the WTO 
did not emerge from the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations as a result of inter-state 
negotiations based upon the principles of sovereign equality and non-discrimination, 
but was subject to the coercion of corporate hegemony of the EC and US. Richard H. 
Steinberg points out that the relative size of each state’s market allows states with the 
largest markets to wield the strongest bargaining power, the reason for this being that: 
 
Larger national economies have better internal trade possibilities than 
smaller national economies. A given volume of trade liberalisation offers 
proportionately more welfare and net employment gains to smaller 
countries than to larger ones. The political implication is that a given 
volume of liberalisation offers proportionally less domestic benefits to the 
government delivering it in the larger countries.470  
 
Due to this, smaller states are able to offer less in trade negotiations, and the threat of 
trade closure is more damaging to a smaller economy than to a larger one. As such 
using market size as a measure of a state’s trade bargaining power, this illustrates how 
the corporate hegemony within the EU and US has had a greater influence on trade 
negotiations within the WTO. Even China and India with their vast domestic markets 
rely upon access to the wealthy consumer market of the EC and US to sell consumer 
goods for the corporations that they represent. 
 
 
                                                 
470 Richard H. Steinberg. ‘In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the 
GATT/WTO’, in International Organizations, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2002, p. 347. 
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Corporate hegemony within the EC and US has been able to manipulate the building 
of world hegemony through promising access to wealthy domestic markets for foreign 
corporations. Although the EU and US account for only 11.76% of the world’s 
population, their current combined GDP comprises nearly half the world’s GDP.471 
Business and corporations emanating from the EC472 and US473 are responsible for 
nearly 40% of all retained merchandise imports throughout the globe. These factors 
confer an immense level of trade bargaining power to these actors, especially when 
they cooperate to influence multilateral trade negotiations. The inequalities are stark 
when it is considered that membership of the WTO has swollen to 148 states, and 
two-thirds are developing countries.474 Thirty-two are recognised as ‘least developed 
countries’ (LDCs).475 Research conducted in 2000 on the world’s 73 poorest countries 
shows that 49 of these states were members of the WTO, and a further 11 were 
awaiting membership.476 Each of these states is responsible for less than 0.05% of the 
world’s imports of goods and services,477 and has a GDP that is a fraction of those of 
the EC and US.478 Many of these countries also have considerable loans owed to the 
World Bank.479 These substantial inequalities have a significant impact on the 
procedures of the WTO and the principle of non-discrimination. Consequently, the 
WTO might be a key global institution, but it is the corporate hegemony represented 
                                                 
471 World GDP in 2004 was $ 55, 500 trillion, the US had the highest share of GDP at $ 11, 750 trillion and EU $ 
11, 650 trillion. See CIA Fact Book.          
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html
472 The European Union is the world's largest trader of goods, accounting for 19.1% of global merchandise exports 
and imports. The European Union is also the world's largest trader of commercial services, with 24.3% of world 
trade in services. See 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/gentools/faqs_en.htm#wto
473 US share of world merchandise imports was 18.5 per cent in 2000 
http://www.un.int/unitar/trade_campus/statistics_2000.htm
474 World Trade Organization. Understanding the WTO (3rd Edition), Geneva: World Trade Organization 
Information and Media Division, 2003, p. 93. 
475 United Nations definition. Understanding the WTO. ‘Least Developed Countries’, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm
476 Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian. ‘The WTO and the Poorest Countries: The Stark Reality’, in World 
Trade Review Vol. 3, No. 3, 2004, p. 386. 
477 Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian. ‘The WTO and the Poorest Countries: The Stark Reality’, in World 
Trade Review Vol. 3, No. 3, 2004, p. 386. 
478 In 2004 countries such as Senegal and Mozambique have GDP’s between $ 18,360 and $ 23,380 trillion, whilst 
the GDP of Guinea-Bissau is $ 1,008 million. See CIA Fact Book. 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html
479 Senegal owed the World Bank $ 2.6 Billion, Mozambique $ 2.94 billion, and Guinea-Bissau $ 309. 8 million. 
See World Bank. Countries and Regions. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/0,,pagePK:180619~theSitePK:136917,00.html
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by the EC and the United States (aided by the other members of the Quadrilateral 
Group or Quad - Canada and Japan480) that has institutionalised corporate interests 
and a transnational model of production within the WTO. Thereby this corporate 
hegemony within the most powerful states has been able to use its superior wealth and 
knowledge as a means to push weaker states into agreements from whose negotiations 
they were absent, or that they don’t understand (see below). As a consequence more 
states of the world are being drawn into accepting a neoliberal ideology, and 
agreements that project and protect the interests of transnational corporations. It ought 
to be noted that the UN World Investment Report now has a section on the top 50 
TNCs operating out of the developing world,481 thereby illustrating the extent to 
which corporate hegemony is expanding throughout the globe due to WTO policies. 
 
Steinberg for example illustrates that although the EC and US bitterly disagreed on 
access to agricultural markets (oil seed markets) in 1992-93, they cooperated to use 
both the strategies of exit and the obligation of the ‘single undertaking’ to ensure that 
they gained the WTO that they wanted from the Uruguay Round. Initially at the 
negotiations Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India and Yugoslavia had blocked consensus 
on the agenda for WTO negotiation because it introduced new trading issues of 
intellectual property rights, investment measures, and services (GATS, TRIPS, and 
TRIMS),482 but did not include the issues of agricultural and textile access that they 
wanted. As Cohen points out the developing states were “excluded from the inner 
circle of discussions, prenegotiations and negotiations”.483 Foreign direct investment 
(FDI), growth in the service industry and intellectual property rights were key issues 
                                                 
480. The ’Quad’ was created in 1982 because it was felt that the G7’s mandate for global economic governance was 
to too wide to focus specifically on international trade. In contrast the ‘Quad’s’ purpose is to set the agenda for 
international trade negotiations. See Theodore H Cohn. Governing Global Trade: International Institutions in 
Conflict and Convergence, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2002. p. 123-160. 
481 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. World Investment Report 2005:Transnational 
Corporations and the Internationalization of Research and Development, Geneva: United Nations, 2005, p. 15-17. 
482 Richard H. Steinberg. ‘In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the 
GATT/WTO’, in International Organizations, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2002, p. 359. 
483 Theodore H Cohn. Governing Global Trade: International Institutions in Conflict and Convergence, Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2002. p. 123-160. 
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for the corporate hegemony prevalent in the EC and US. Developed OECD countries 
dominated the world’s share of service providers and required continual and further 
guaranteed access to foreign markets to continue to grow. For example at the 
beginning of the 1990s 50% of the world’s total FDI was in the service industry.484 By 
2001 trade in services made up 60% of OECD GNP, and trade in services grew faster 
than trade in merchandise throughout the end of the 20th century.485 Corporate 
hegemony was also evident within the developed industrialised economies that 
exported high technology goods and services who expressed concern that their 
comparative advantage had been eroded through counterfeiting and illegal 
reproduction of technology. Therefore TRIPS was also important for the creation of 
world corporate hegemony but not the interests of the corporations from the 
developing states. The threat from developing states to subvert or gain exemption 
from these GATS, TRIPS and TRIMS at the Uruguay Round of Talks was detrimental 
to the creation of corporate world hegemony at the WTO.  
 
The corporate hegemony of the EC and US avoided the initial impasse through the  
Punte del Este declaration of 1986, which established a consensus on the negotiating 
agenda because it incorporated agricultural issues from the developing world. By 
1993, however, when the market access package was presented for agreement it was 
met with hostility and protest because it only reflected the input of the Quad and G7, 
without any input from the rest of the GATT members. In 1993 Peter Sutherland took 
over as the new outspoken and proactive Director General of the GATT. On the day 
he took office, Sutherland accused the developing world of slowing up the Uruguay 
Round, and demanded that they step up to the needs of the multilateral trade 
organization. Steinberg’s core argument here is that the EC and US negotiators 
ensured that the Uruguay Round was closed with the signing of the Agreement 
                                                 
484 Bernard M. Hoekman and Michel M. Kostecki. The Political Economy of the World Trading System: From 
GATT to WTO, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 128. 
485 Bernard M. Hoekman and Michel M. Kostecki. The Political Economy of the World Trading System: From 
GATT to WTO, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 127. 
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Establishing the WTO. This agreement contained the compulsory, so-called, ‘single 
undertaking’ clause and made acceptance of GATS, TRIPS and TRIMS obligatory 
and binding on all who signed.486 This document also ended the GATT 1947 by 
establishing the new, legally distinct GATT 1994 within the WTO.487 This allowed 
the EC and US to withdraw from the GATT 1947, and relinquish all trading 
agreements and obligations under this treaty with the developing states. This was a 
monumental action because it ensured that continued multilateral access to EU and 
US markets for foreign corporations was conditional on joining the WTO. In doing so 
the corporate hegemony of the EC and US were able to create the WTO containing 
their preferred and enforceable agreements. The developing world could either accept 
GATS, TRIPS and TRIMS within the terms of the ‘single undertaking’, or negotiate 
access to EC and US markets bilaterally.  
 
Sylvia Ostry argues that Uruguay represented a ‘Grand Bargain’, which turned out to 
be a “Bum Deal” for everyone but the Quad.488 She argues that the developing states 
accepted the ‘Grand Bargain’ without a real comprehension of the implications it 
would have. The very sectors of agriculture and textiles that the developing world 
wanted to access were sidelined in the final agreement. Agriculture was still 
substantially restricted because of the Peace Clause, which ensured that agriculture 
was left out of WTO negotiations and dispute settlement until the end of 2004. As 
Ostry points out, the new issues of GATS, TRIPS and TRIMS were not concerned 
with border controls but the reorganisation of domestic laws on trade, health, safety, 
and the restructuring of domestic institutions. Therefore: “The trading system was 
transformed from the negative regulation of the GATT – what governments must not 
                                                 
486 The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article II, Section II, 1994. 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf
487 The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article II, Section IV, 1994. 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf
488 Sylvia Ostry. The Post Doha Trading System, Paper for Pre-G8 Academic Conference, Glasgow University, 
June 29-30, 2005. p. 1. 
 153
do to positive regulation – what governments must do”.489 All of this is costly to 
implement, but expertise can be bought from developed states to help oversee 
implementation. Many of the African member states did not participate in the 
Uruguay negotiations because of lack of representation and expertise in these very 
technical agreements.490 This is not a slight on the countries of the developing world. 
The architect of the WTO, John H. Jackson, confessed in 1998 that: “the WTO 
Agreement, including its elaborate Annexes, is probably fully understood by no 
nation that has accepted it, including some of the richest and most powerful trading 
nations that are members”.491  
 
Ostry further argues that by the time of the 1999 WTO Seattle Ministerial Meeting the 
reality of the ‘Grand Bargain’ of the Uruguay Round was becoming clear: “They got 
less access than they had wanted, and the burden of the new agenda was far heavier 
they had understood”.492 Joseph Stiglitz employs the word ‘hypocrisy’ to describe the 
Western countries because they pushed the poorest countries to accept the elimination 
of barrier controls to goods and services from the developed world, whilst preventing 
developing countries from exporting agricultural produce. “The result was that some 
of the poorest countries in the world were actually made worse off.493 Stiglitz also 
points out that the acceptance of TRIPS was to have an impact on the ability of the 
developing countries’ corporations to develop drugs to address the pandemic of AIDS 
because developing countries cannot afford to pay for the high prices demanded for 
patents and the drugs. Perhaps what ought to be stressed is that the Uruguay Round 
ensured that corporate hegemony was now installed within the WTO. In doing so it 
                                                 
489 Sylvia Ostry. The Post Doha Trading System, Paper for Pre-G8 Academic Conference, Glasgow University, 
June 29-30, 2005. p. 5. (Unpublished). 
490 Sylvia Ostry. The Post Doha Trading System, Paper for Pre-G8 Academic Conference, Glasgow University, 
June 29-30, 2005. p. 9. (Unpublished). 
491 John H. Jackson. The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence, (The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs) London: Pinter, 1998, p. 1. 
492 Sylvia Ostry. ‘Institutional Design for Better Governance’, in Rodger B. Porter et al. (editors), Efficiency, 
Equity and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Washington, D. C.: Brooking 
Institution Press, 2001, p. 364. 
493 Joseph Stiglitz. Globalization and Its Discontents, London: The Penguin Press 2002, p. 9 
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was able to propagate the collective benefits to be gained from WTO membership and 
the acceptance of the reorganization of domestic society for a market economy 
sympathetic to transnational interests. As corporate interests were institutionalised 
within the WTO it soon became apparent the principles of non-discrimination and 
sovereignty were a fallacy. The biggest complaint from the developing countries 
concerning the WTO on the lead up to the Seattle Ministerial Meeting in 1999 was the 
undemocratic nature of the decision-making process. Consequently the Dominican 
Republic's trade ambassador remarked after Seattle, "…there is no trust between the 
developed and developing world”.494 
 
4.7 Undermining Decision-Making at the WTO 
Given the inequalities of power and wealth and the manipulation that occurred during 
the Uruguay Round, it is possible to critically re-examine the manner that the WTO’s 
negotiations and dispute settlement processes function, allowing as they do the 
corporate hegemony of the EC and US to continue to dominate the multilateral 
trading system. The Cancun Ministerial Conference will be used as an example of 
how inequalities of wealth and knowledge are used as a means to perpetuate the 
corporate interests of the EC and US. The section also illustrates how hegemonic 
powers use both coercion and consent to ensure compliance from other states by 
“making concessions that will secure the weak acquiescence in their leadership and if 
they can express their leadership in terms of universal or general interests, rather than 
serving their own particular interests”.495 Thereby through the EC and US, 
corporations have maintained their ‘structural power’ within the WTO. It is argued 
that these were the major factors why the Seattle and Cancun Ministerial negotiations 
broke down. It became clear that the only markets that were to be opened were for the 
                                                 
494 Justin Forsyth. The Southern Chorus at the WTO Sounds Like Seattle Again, 2000, p. 2. 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wto/2000/1130jf.htm
495 Robert, W. Cox. ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, in 
Millennium: Vol. 10, No.2, 1981, p. 137.  
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TNCs operating out of the EC and US where corporate hegemony had been 
constructed. 
 
As stated above, in theory sovereign equality is required for all WTO members to 
participate fully in decision-making. Inequalities between countries, however, have 
impacted on equity in decision-making and ensured the protection and expansion of 
corporate interests. For example sovereign equality may be enshrined in the WTO 
Charter because it specifies the practice of consensus, but it also stipulates that: “The 
body concerned shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter submitted 
for its consideration if no member, present at the meeting when the decision is taken, 
formally objects to the proposed decision”.496 The point is that a member has to be 
present to participate in a consensus. It has been estimated that there are 2,800 WTO 
meetings per year in Geneva (WTO councils, committees and working parties). A 
number of permanent representatives in Geneva are therefore required in order for a 
WTO member to fully participate.497 In May 2005, research showed that from a list of 
38 African members, South Africa and Tanzania were unique with nine permanent 
Geneva representatives. The Central African Republic, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Malawi, Niger, Sierra Leone, Swaziland and Togo had none; Djibouti and Namibia 
had one, Burundi, Mozambique and Rwanda had two.498 It also has to be remembered 
that these permanent representatives also have to attend UN meetings on behalf of 
their country. In contrast, the EC maintains a 15 strong team of delegates in Geneva, 
which works solely on WTO policies499, whilst the US has 27 permanent 
representatives in Geneva to deal with the WTO and the UN.500 These numbers ensure 
                                                 
496 The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article IX, 1994 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf
497 All Figures quoted from WTO Directory, May 2005, cited in Sylvia Ostry. The Post Doha Trading System, 
Paper for Pre-G8 Academic Conference, Glasgow University, June 29-30, 2005. p. 9. (Unpublished). 
498 All Figures quoted from WTO Directory, May 2005, cited in Sylvia Ostry. The Post Doha Trading System, 
Paper for Pre-G8 Academic Conference, Glasgow University, June 29-30, 2005. p. 9. (Unpublished). 
499 Information provided by DG Trade Information and Communication at the European Commission, 07 October 
2005,                     
TRADE-INFORMATION@cec.eu.int
500 United States Trade Representative’s Office. 
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that the EC and US corporate representatives can participate in all the councils, 
committees and workshops of the WTO, whereas the majority of the membership 
does not have the financial resources to attend meetings and have their views 
expressed. As a consequence it is difficult to challenge corporate hegemony at the 
WTO. 
 
Procedural justice is also prevented through other forms of exclusion from both 
decision-making and agenda setting. The agenda for a WTO’s Ministerial meeting 
will begin formulation in either Brussels or Washington before being discussed within 
the G7. It will then be presented to the WTO membership as a whole for the 
submission of other issues. However, as Steinberg points out, initiatives by the 
weaker countries have a habit of dying. Powerful countries are able to block them by 
linking outside issues to trade preferences (loans, aid or bilateral trade agreements), or 
through the use of smaller caucuses such as the now infamous ‘green rooms’.501 
‘Green room’ meetings are unofficial, informal, off-the-record meetings of a select 
group of members (between 20 and 30 countries) who have an interest in a particular 
area of the negotiations. The EC and US normally initiate these with the support of 
the WTO Secretariat. The drafts that emerge from these ‘green rooms’ are presented 
to the formal plenary meetings of WTO members and accepted by consensus with 
little or no amendments.502 As Kenyan WTO negotiator, Nelson Ndirangu, revealed 
after Cancun “when you are dealt with singly, the pressure is too much”. Therefore 
the influence that can be applied in ‘green rooms’ can remove certain issues from the 
agenda and negotiation proceedings, which do not reflect corporate hegemony. 
 
This was clearly the case in the months leading up to Cancun, and at the conference 
itself. Prior to Cancun the draft declaration on the agenda that emerged from Geneva 
                                                 
501 Richard H. Steinberg. ‘In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the 
GATT/WTO’, in International Organizations, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2002, p. 355. 
502 Richard Blackhurst. ‘The Capacity of the WTO to Fulfil its Mandate,’ in Anne. O. Krueger (editor), The WTO 
as an International Organization, London: The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 1998, p. 31-58. 
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was disputed by 40 states503 because it only reflected the corporate hegemony of the 
EC and US positions contained in the Singapore Issues and TRIPS. Yet, at the 2001 
Doha Ministerial Conference, the developing world had received assurances that the 
negotiations on these Singapore Issues (competition, trade facilitation, transparency in 
government procurement, and investment) would not begin without ‘explicit 
consensus’ at Cancun. At Cancun the vast majority of the developing states wanted to 
see evidence from research being conducted on each of these Singapore Issues before 
negotiations began.  
 
Consequently, as the conference drew closer two coalitions emerged, the G20504 and 
the G90,505 to contest the trading agenda proposed by the EC and US and place 
agriculture and cotton at the heart of the negotiations. These countries pointed out that 
the EC and US farm subsidies and tariffs undermined the economic growth of the 
developing world. Agriculture, textiles and clothing remain the key sectors of export 
trade for many developing states, especially when it is considered that the G20 
accounts for 65% of the world's population, 72% of its farmers and 22% of world 
agricultural output.506 The Tanzanian Minister for Trade and Industry, Iddi Simba, 
pointed out just how important the maintenance of thriving domestic agricultural 
markets is for smaller developing states when agriculture employs 80% of the 
population: "We [the Least Developed Countries] need the WTO far more than the 
US or the EU. We will do everything we can to make sure the Doha Ministerial 
succeeds. We understand that some governments may lose elections over agriculture 
reforms. But they need to understand that if agriculture continues to be mishandled, 
                                                 
503 See World Trade Organization. Draft Cancun Ministerial Text. WT/MIN(03)/W/4, 4 September 2003, 
paragraphs 13, 14, 15, and 16, dealing with the Singapore Issues.  
504 This group emerged at Cancun (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and 
Venezuela). 
505 This group comprised of the least developed countries, such as the African, Caribbean and Pacific (AFC) and 
African Union (AU). 
506 Alan Wheatley. End Farm Export Subsidies in 5 years, G-20 Says, Global Policy Forum, March 19, 2005. 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/trade/subsidies/2005/0319g20.htm
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we lose lives".507 Agricultural markets are then, not only central for economic growth 
for many of the developing world, they are essential for the survival of many of the 
world’s people. 
 
 
Although propagating the superiority of deregulation and market forces, a recent 
Congressional Budget Office report established that the EU, US and Japan were the 
top three global spenders on farm subsidies respectively. The EU and US accounted 
for over one-third of the world’s total farm subsidies, and Japan 15%.508 The EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), even after the reforms of June 2003, cost £43bn 
in 2005 - or 44% of the EU's annual budget. To put these subsidies into perspective, 
the annual income of an EU dairy cow exceeds the annual income of half the world's 
human population.509 In the US, $16.4 billion was spent on subsidies to US farmers in 
2003, a 27% increase since 2002.510 Import tariffs as well as subsidies ensure that 
world agricultural prices are fixed at a level with which developing farmers cannot 
compete because they do not receive such massive subsidies. Turning to agricultural 
import tariffs, the highest and most prevalent are in East Asian countries (Korea, 
Taiwan, India, China, Vietnam and Japan top the global list).511 It could be argued 
that these countries need tariffs to protect their agricultural produce from such highly 
                                                 
507 Quoted from Barry Coates. Doha: It's Déjà Vu All Over Again, Comments from Director Of The World 
Development Movement on the WTO Ministerial Meeting In Progress In Doha. 12 November 2001. 
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subsidised EU and US agricultural trade, which ensures an artificially low price for 
agriculture on world markets for dominant corporate agricultural social forces.512  
 
At the WTO Ministerial Conference at Cancun the corporate hegemony in the EC and 
US attempted to seek the acquiescence of the developing world first through coercion, 
and then through consent by discussing agricultural subsidies, but with little intention 
to reduce subsidies. In the preparations for the Cancun negotiations, developing 
countries were advised by the EC and US that membership of the G20 and a strong 
stance on agriculture would not be in their interests. Kenya’s application for a new 
IMF loan was implicitly threatened. Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica and 
Thailand’s bilateral free trade agreements with the US were jeopardised. Brazil, India 
and South Africa received telephone calls from Washington urging them not to take a 
strong stance on agriculture or cotton at Cancun. The EC also sought to discourage 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries from a strong stance through 
highlighting the fragility of their bilateral free trade agreements with them.513 At the 
Cancun negotiations the EC and US negotiators demanded a reduction in agricultural 
import tariffs from the rest of the membership. In reciprocation they only offered to 
agree procedures and general formulae for future reductions of their own farm 
subsidies, but left these unchanged. The specific figures and the framework detailing 
the phasing out of farm subsidies were missing.514  
 
When the G20 announced they could not be party to such an agreement, they were 
publicly condemned for not practising reciprocity.515 Given that the EC and US 
                                                 
512 Even a recent World Bank Report concluded “a subsidies cut by the US by 28%, the EU by 18%, Norway by 
16% and Australia by 28% would make a significant difference”. Kym Anderson and Will Martin. Agricultural 
Trade Reform and Doha Development Agenda, World Bank, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3607, 
May 2005, p. 8. 
http://wdsbeta.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2005/05/12/000011823_20050512121
406/Rendered/PDF/wps3607.pdf
513 See Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa. Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International Trade 
Negotiations/Lessons From Cancun – Updated Edition, London: Zed Books, 2004, p. xxxviii – xli. 
514 Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa. Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International Trade 
Negotiations/Lessons From Cancun – Updated Edition, London: Zed Books, 2004, p. xxvi. 
515 Franz Fischler. State of Play of Agriculture Negotiations, Press Release, Cancun, Mexico, 14 September, 2003. 
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demand such reciprocity and National Treatment in trade agreements, the developing 
states have argued that these principles do not create a ‘level playing field’ for 
international trade. Rather they argue that these two principles are biased in favour of 
the rich countries because they sustain a position of ‘equal treatment of unequals’. 
Due to the above inequalities, reciprocity and national treatment do not establish non-
discrimination: they perpetuate discrimination. It is also clear that agriculture was 
placed on the WTO’s agenda for discussion to ensure the participation of the 
developing world in the negotiation and in participating the developing world 
legitimised the negotiation process of the WTO. Yet, at the same time the demands 
made by the EC and US ensured that terms of the negotiations were unacceptable and 
could not change the status quo of agricultural subsidies in Europe and the US. By 
bringing the developing world to the negotiating table to discuss agriculture, however, 
corporate elites were able use the Cancun Ministerial as a means to coerce these states 
to accept the Singapore Issues that expanded transnational corporate interests.  
 
A further core contradiction of the WTO is highlighted by the ‘Doha Development 
Agenda, which promised to place the interests of the poorest states at the heart of 
negotiations. In reality, however, the Doha Development Agenda has been used as a 
‘stick and carrot’ to pursue the favoured the Singapore Issues of corporate hegemony. 
This was clearly the case at Cancun. At the Conference itself, the final Ministerial 
Declaration that emerged did not reflect the views of the entire WTO membership as 
expressed throughout the conference (Derbez text).516 The ‘Derbez text’ omitted the 
developing world’s position on agriculture subsidies and tariffs, especially cotton, and 
the Special and Differential Treatment of the least developed countries. The text was 
condemned for being a reproduction of the EC and US agenda on the Singapore 
Issues, and delegation after delegation voiced their anger at having their views 
ignored. As these speeches ended ‘green room’ negotiations began again, but without 
                                                 
516 Presented by conference chairman, the Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez. 
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yielding results. As no consensus could be made, the Conference collapsed. The 
Tanzanian President later stated that: “The only positive thing for the poor to have 
come out of the talks was the unprecedented show of unity among developing 
countries. I hope that this unity is sustainable, and I urge rich and powerful countries 
to try to direct it toward constructive outcomes rather than undermining it”.517 The 
corporate hegemony of the EC and US were unable to force an agreement from the 
developing states because of the creation of strong coalitions, but it was able to argue 
that the developing world was unwilling to negotiate on a quid pro quo basis. This 
was clearly argued by Pascal Lamy on a number of occasions.518  
 
Again this illustrates that the WTO does not promote free trade; rather it is used to 
pursue the opening of specific economic sectors that are advantageous to a 
transnational model of production, whilst also protecting the interests of transnational 
investment and intellectual property rights. For example, agricultural markets in the 
developed world remain heavily subsidised and protected, which maintains an 
artificially low price for these goods on the world market. As a result, the ability of 
the developing producers to sell their products at home or abroad is limited because 
they cannot compete with this artificially low price. The reduction of agricultural 
subsidies remains a bargaining tool for the developed world, to exchange for access to 
the service and high tech markets of the developing world. In addition the agricultural 
subsidies are a means of bringing political elites into the WTO arena to participate in 
the WTO process. By doing so the WTO attempts to establish agreement from the 
developing states to accept the leadership of corporate hegemony on the grounds that 
all members can benefit from negotiations. The structural power of corporations, 
however, ensures that the transnational corporate interests trump all other issues at the 
WTO.  
                                                 
517 Benjamin William Mkapa. ‘Cancun’s False Promise’, in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 3, 2004, p. 133. 
518 The then EC Commissioner for Trade Pascal Lamy argued this in his overview of the collapse of the Cancun 
Ministerial Conference when I attended his visited to the Department of Trade and Industry, London, October 
2003. 
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 4.8 Undermining Dispute Settlement at the WTO 
Finally, these disparities in wealth and knowledge are also causing the procedures of 
the DSU to be undermined. As already stated the dispute settlement process has 
become legalised within the WTO. Due to this there has been a “juridification of the 
process, including not only the rule of law but the rule of lawyers”.519 Ostry, a former 
Canadian Deputy Minister of International Trade, Ambassador for Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations and the Prime Minister's Personal Representative for the Economic 
Summit, argues there is a significant “knowledge gap” because rich countries are well 
equipped with legal talent and a worldwide network of personnel to provide data, 
whereas developing states are not. 520 Current research illustrates that of the 340 
complaints brought before the dispute settlement system the EC accounted for 19% of 
these and the US 23%. The other two members of the Quad accounted for 
significantly less - Japan 3% and Canada 8% - but this still means that the Quad were 
responsible for bringing over 50% of all legal cases to the DSB.521 In contrast there is 
an absence of any African country using the DSB. Corporate hegemony has ensured 
that the rule of law is confined to those that can afford to employ the best legal teams. 
A lack of national legal expertise is not easily overcome by employing private 
lawyers. “A conservative estimate of attorney fees in trade litigation begins at $90,000 
to $250,000 depending on the complexity of the case plus another $100,000 to 
$200,000 for data collection and economic analysis”.522 These costs spiral when a 
dispute requires the creation of an Appellate Body because litigation can take up to 
                                                 
519 J. H. H. Weiler. ‘The Rules of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on WTO Dispute Settlement’, 
in Rodger B. Porter et al. (editors), Efficiency, Equity and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the 
Millennium, Washington, D. C.: Brooking Institution Press, 2001, p. 335. 
520 Sylvia Ostry. The Post Doha Trading System, Paper for Pre-G8 Academic Conference, Glasgow University, 
June 29-30, 2005. p. 9. (Unpublished). 
521 All figures for Alasdair R. Young. Government Preferences and the Prosecution of Trade Disputes: The 
European Unions Use of the World Trade Organisations Dispute Resolution, 2005, p. 24 (Unpublished). 
522 Sylvia Ostry. The Post Doha Trading System, Paper for Pre-G8 Academic Conference, Glasgow University, 
June 29-30, 2005. p. 10. (Unpublished). 
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two and a half years.523 When interviewed, a senior official from Antigua revealed 
that his country could not afford to maintain legal action against the US over its 
protectionist gambling laws. This was because of costs incurred by the length of time 
it took to find the ‘mutually agreed compensation’ that the DSU demands.  
 
The impartiality of the Appellate Bodies is also questioned because of the ‘knowledge 
gap’. A lack of national legal experts means that the developing world finds it 
difficult to supply panellists for DSB or the Appellate Bodies.524 The corporate 
hegemony in the EC and US enjoy special privileges for selecting Appellate Body 
members. Candidates are often interviewed in Washington or Geneva prior to their 
endorsement.525 In an attempt to address these disparities in knowledge, in 2002 the 
WTO members (excluding the US) created the Advisory Centre for WTO Law, which 
has a small legal staff to assist developing countries. The cost of using the Centre’s 
legal staff is calculated in relation to the wealth of the country seeking aid.526 
However, Ostry argues that it still lacks adequate funding and coordination to 
effectively close the ‘knowledge gap’. As officials from the exploited peripheral 
countries enter the WTO with the goal of changing their policies from within, Cox 
points out that they are forced to work within the prevailing structures of the 
institutions. In working within these structures the individuals help to legitimise the 
hegemony. “Hegemony is like a pillow: it absorbs blows and sooner or later the 
would-be assailant will find it comfortable to rest upon”.527 One could therefore argue 
that by accepting the dictates of this legal process the developing states are accepting 
and legitimising the agreements and processes of the WTO. 
                                                 
523 Bernard M. Hoekman and Pertos C. Mavrodis. ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and Surveillance’, 
in The World Economy, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2000, p. 531. 
524 Bernard M. Hoekman and Pertos C. Mavrodis. ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and Surveillance’, 
in The World Economy, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2000, p. 532. 
525 Richard H. Steinberg. ‘Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints’, 
in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 98, No. 2, 2004, p. 264. 
526 John H. Jackson. ‘Perceptions about the WTO Trade Institution’, in World Trade Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2002, 
p. 112-113. 
527 Robert W. Cox. ‘Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay on Method’ (1983), in Robert W. 
Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair. Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 139. 
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 A further point of contention is that the Appellate Body does not have the power to 
impose economic compensation, only to suspend concession and legally sanction 
retaliations. It has long been accepted that smaller countries cannot credibly threaten 
the suspension of concessions to provoke compliance. Raising import barriers will 
have little impact on an offending state that has a large domestic market and can 
simply choose alternative trading partners to overcome its losses. Indeed it is the 
welfare of the smaller state that will be damaged most by the raising of tariffs and loss 
of the larger trading party.528 Wealth also allows the luxury of refusing to comply. 
The EC has chosen not to comply with authorised sanctions from the US and Canada 
for its refusal to accept GM crops and hormone enhanced beef. It has preferred to 
suffer the sanctions.529 Attempts to apply a system of financial compensation, or 
develop a system where punishment for non-compliance is based on the withdrawal of 
market access commitments to all WTO members, has been resisted. Therefore 
smaller economies are at a disadvantage. Not only because of the cost of litigation, 
but also because even if they win they will be unable to gain an equitable conclusion. 
This would suggest that corporate hegemony of the EC and US has been able to 
construct an institution, and determine the framework within which agendas are 
created and negotiations conducted in such a way as to ensure specific ends, but 
employ an ideology to legitimise the institution and the manner in which it functions.  
 
4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that there are significant contradictions between the WTO’s 
ideology and the practices of this institution. In addition it was suggested that the 
WTO has limited success in coopting elites from the developing world through 
                                                 
528 Bernard M. Hoekman and Pertos C. Mavrodis. ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and Surveillance’, 
in The World Economy, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2000, p. 531. 
529 Richard H. Steinberg. ‘Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints’, 
in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 98, No. 2, 2004, p. 264. 
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transnational corporate interests making concessions to the political elites in the 
developing world by expressing their “leadership in terms of universal or general 
interests, rather than serving their own particular interests”.530 It was illustrated that a 
neoliberal ideology emanating from the WTO’s Secretariat justifies the WTO 
agreements, whilst the principles of MFN, the principles of ‘equality before the law’, 
non-discrimination and sovereign equality have legitimised both the decision-making 
and dispute settlement at the WTO. These principles have been used to promote 
membership of the WTO. However, it has been argued that this ideology merely 
provides a veneer of legitimacy for the corporate hegemony within the EC and US to 
institutionalise their interests within the WTO. In doing so the ‘structural power’ of 
corporate hegemony has been institutionalised within the WTO and ensures that 
corporate interests are favoured in the WTO. This was seen in the tactic of placing 
agriculture on the agenda of the WTO’s negotiations, ensuring that the developing 
states participate in negotiations and are confronted with further acceptance of GATS, 
TRIMS and TRIPS policies. The promotion of developing states participating in legal 
schooling for dispute settlement can also be seen as the means of ensuring that 
acceptance of the policies of corporate hegemony are furthered throughout the world, 
and draw more political elites into the nebuleuse. 
 
By illustrating these points the chapter drew attention to the contradictions in the 
Charter because the attainment of development, equity, prosperity, peace and 
sustainable development – is subject to the interests of transnational corporate 
interests. The themes of non-discrimination and collective benefit through the MFN 
principle, ‘National Treatment’, reciprocity, equality in decision-making and equality 
before the law were all seen to be distorted by the wealth and knowledge afforded to 
the corporate hegemony of the EC and US. The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations 
was brought to a close through the obligation of the ‘single undertaking’. This 
                                                 
530 Robert, W. Cox. ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, in 
Millennium: Vol. 10, No.2, 1981, p. 137.  
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mandatory agreement for membership of the WTO ensured that continued access to 
the wealthy markets of the EC and US was conditional on acceptance of GATS, 
TRIMS, and TRIPS – these agreements enhance and protect corporate hegemony by 
ensuring a dominance of a transnational model of production. The Doha Development 
Agenda and the Cancun Ministerial demonstrated these contradictions. The 
agricultural products of the developed world remain highly subsidised, while these 
developing states’ have opened their markets to the corporate interests embedded in 
the WTO. The WTO is therefore not about promoting free trade, but the enhancement 
of a transnational model of production and the protection of corporate investment and 
intellectual property rights throughout the world. This was clearly seen with the 
pressure to accept the Singapore Issues at Cancun, and the impasse over agriculture. 
 
The WTO DSB also requires access to legal expertise and sufficient wealth to employ 
a legal team to pursue a dispute, and ensure the status of corporate hegemony. The 
inequalities in wealth and knowledge between members prevent all states from 
participating equally in dispute settlement. The dispute settlement system of the WTO 
rests on the ultimate penalty of withdrawing trading privileges from transgressors. 
The smaller states require continued access to the EC and US for economic growth. 
The absence of economic sanctions for the transgressions by the wealthy states 
ensures that the smaller states suffer because the withdrawal of market access does 
not penalise the most-powerful states and deter illegal action. Therefore on these 
grounds the chapter argues that the WTO allows for the distortion of consensus 
decision-making and equality before the law in dispute settlement by the 
representatives of corporate hegemony in the EC and US because it was designed for 
the purpose of protecting their corporate interests they represent. Concessions have 
been made in order to gain wider acceptance by political elites from the developing 
world, but this has been met with resistance from strong coalitions. 
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Chapter Five 
            
Alter-Globalization Movement: Hegemonic Distortion and Cooption 
 
What we write here should lay to rest the claim by corporate globalists that the 
goal of those of us who resist is the elimination of all institutions of global 
governance. This has always been a serious misrepresentation. The goal of civil 
society is to replace the autocratic institutions of corporate rule with democratic 
institutions, as earlier generations replaced the institutions of monarchy with 
those of political democracy.531 
 
Among the features of international organizations which express its 
hegemonic role are … they absorb counter hegemonic ideas532 … 
penetrate and coopt elements of popular movements … and thus 
enhance the legitimacy of the prevailing order. 533 
 
5.1 Introduction and Aims 
The purpose of this chapter is to begin to develop an analysis of the relationship 
between the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the alter-globalization movement. 
As pointed out in the introduction to this thesis, three strategies employed by the alter-
globalization movement to place its values at the heart of the WTO have been 
identified: demonstrations on the street; assisting developing states during 
negotiations; and submitting amicus briefs to the WTO’s dispute settlement body. Of 
                                                 
531 John Cavanagh et al Alternatives to Economic Globalization: A Better World is Possible. A Report from the 
International Forum on Globalization, San Francisco: Berrett-Keohler Publishers, Inc., 2002, p. 241. 
532 Robert W. Cox. ‘Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay on Method’ (1983), in Robert W. 
Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 138. 
533 Robert W. Cox with Michael G. Schechter. The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on 
Power, Morals and Civilization, London: Routledge, 2002. p. 104. 
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the three strategies, this chapter deals with the most symbolic and public of these 
strategies - mass demonstrations on the street by social movements to alter public 
consciousness. It thereby makes an important distinction between social movements 
and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), but acknowledges that NGOs 
participate in these transnational demonstrations.534 It will be argued that transnational 
counter-hegemonic forces bearing ‘organic intellectuals’ have emerged to propagate 
the contradictions of the nebuleuse in a ‘war of positions’ and to develop a global 
consciousness that rejects the legitimacy of world corporate hegemony. Although 
social movement theorists bring analytical clarity to the features of counter-
hegemony, it lacks acknowledgement of the magnitude and diversity of change 
demanded by counter-hegemonic forces. Diversity is a key feature of these counter-
hegemonic movements, and so a variety of ‘organic intellectuals’ advocate 
competing, alternative visions to corporate hegemony. A four part continuum will be 
constructed, ranging from ‘de-globalists’ to ‘alter-globalists’, to illustrate the many 
different ideological perspectives that are reflected in the current transnational 
counter-hegemonic forces. It will be argued that elements of the alter-globalization 
movement propose that alternative principles and policies can be realised through the 
application of radical democratic principles or a ‘bottom up’, ‘new multilateralism’ as 
defined by Robert W. Cox.535  
 
Since the Seattle Ministerial Conference of 1999 the WTO has become a target of 
criticisms from protesters, and it will be argued that a policy of cooption and 
distortion has been pursued by this central institution of the nebuleuse. As Cox points 
out a principal function of an international organization expressing hegemony is to 
“absorb counter hegemonic ideas”536 through ‘passive revolution’ or trasformismo.537 
                                                 
534 Chapter six of the thesis will analyse the engagement of the WTO with NGOs with an alter-globalization 
perspective. 
535 Robert W. Cox (editor). The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order, Basingstoke: 
MacMillian Press LTD, 1997, p. xvii. 
536 Robert W. Cox. ‘Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay on Method’ (1983), in Robert W. 
Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 138. 
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At the heart of this concept of trasformismo is the assertion that social reform initiated 
from above is for the sole purpose of forestalling popular political mobilization and 
thereby disabling the potential for democratic transformation. By controlling access to 
decision-making bodies political elites act as gatekeepers – determining who can 
participate, on what terms and by what means. On the one hand, demands of the 
protesters have been distorted by the prevailing images of violent extremist youths. 
On the other hand, since Seattle it is also possible to note a significant change in the 
language of hegemonic political elites in relation to trade and the WTO. This is 
clearly the case with the new buzzwords of ‘free and fair’ trade and the creation of the 
Doha Development Round, which embraces the language of the protesters to deflect 
criticism from the nebuleuse. The example of the United Kingdom’s Make Poverty 
History campaign in 2005 will reinforce this argument and illustrate how political 
elites have been able to depict themselves as the real champions of global justice. 
Thereby the primary argument of this chapter is that hegemonic political elites have 
engaged in trasformismo - both distorted and coopted the language of the alter-
globalization movement in order to legitimise the policies and procedures of the 
WTO. 
 
5.2 Transnational Protest and the Counter-Hegemonic Forces 
If 11th September 2001 brought ‘terrorism’ into the global public consciousness, the 
protests on the streets of Seattle during the World Trade Organization’s 1999 
Millennium Ministerial Conference were responsible for bringing neoliberal 
globalization into the global public consciousness. The WTO had been created in 
1995 ‘without much fanfare’, but the Seattle demonstration four years later pulled it 
out of obscurity. Due to the revolution in information technology, transnational 
protesters were able to coordinate and contest the global governance that facilitates a 
                                                                                                                                            
537 Robert W. Cox. ‘Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay on Method’ (1983), in Robert W. 
Cox and Timothy Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 130-
131 and 139. 
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neoliberal ideology. This same technology also enabled a global media to beam these 
criticisms into private homes around the globe. Questions were asked over the WTO’s 
legitimacy to exercise political power over elected governments, why policies were 
devoid of public scrutiny, and who was benefiting from these policies. The power and 
influence of transnational corporations (TNC) in determining national labour and 
environmental policies through the WTO also faced public attention. Discussion also 
turned to why the developing countries were claiming that the WTO was 
institutionalising the dominant economic interests of the developed countries. As with 
all social movements, these protesters attempted to use the media as a means of 
propagating their arguments to a wider general public. In attracting the attention of the 
media, however, the protesters were collectively labelled the anti-globalization 
movement. Consequently, Seattle brought neoliberal globalization and anti-
globalization into the public consciousness. This section seeks to illustrate the 
significance of the protest at Seattle within the context of the wider campaigns against 
transnational corporate hegemony.  
 
The Seattle demonstrations illustrated the direct targeting and contesting of the WTO, 
and the nebuleuse, which have enforced the implementation of neoliberal 
globalization and a transnational mode of production. The estimated 50,000 people on 
the streets of Seattle included 20,000 members of the American Labour Federation-
Congress of Industrial Organization (ALF-CIO), whose organised workers received 
relatively little press coverage. In contrast protest by NGOs, such as Greenpeace 
(protesting against the proliferation of genetically modified organisms in food and 
agriculture), Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen (against multinational corporations), the 
Sierra Club (against rainforest logging), Confederation Paysanne (against hormone-
fed beef), N30 (against global capitalism) and Sea Turtle Restoration Group (against 
turtle-killing shrimp nets) were all visible and caught some of the media attention. 
The Los Angeles Times headline: "Who on earth were they and what were they so 
mad about?" reflected the many pedestrians ignorant of their acceptance and consent 
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to corporate hegemony, but stunned by the size and the assertiveness of the protest.538 
Although it was heavily denied that these demonstrations had any bearing on the trade 
negotiations, Seattle was also the first WTO Ministerial Conference to collapse 
because no agreement could be reached amongst the members. Seattle proved to be 
the catalyst for the developing world to publicly criticise the developed states for 
hypocrisy and bullying within the WTO that generated unfair trade rules. 
Consequently the Dominican Republic's trade ambassador remarked after Seattle, 
"…there is no trust between the developed and developing world”539. The collapse of 
the WTO’s negotiations at Seattle signalled for many of the protesters a victory for 
the developing world, global justice and the rejection of neoliberal globalization. The 
main story the media focused on, however, was the isolated cases of violence, the 
Seattle Mayor declaring Marshal Law and the apparent naive attitude of the protesters 
to globalization.540 
 
It is important, however, not to see the protests in Seattle as an isolated event. Rather 
Seattle has to be seen in the context of wider resistance to corporate hegemony. 
Previously, national demonstrations had been seen against the policies of austerity and 
structural adjustment that became conditional for loans from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. For example, John Watson and David Seddon 
draw attention to the “IMF Riots”, which took place in many of the countries where 
people were adversely affected by food shortages created by these IMF policies 
during the 1970s and 1980s.541 John Cavanagh et al argue that the campaign that 
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emerged to resist and offer alternatives to the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) from 1991 to 1995 was also instrumental in educating Americans about the 
social and environmental costs of trade and investment liberalisation. The resistance 
to NAFTA brought together a transnational coalition of social movements and NGOs, 
such as the US based Alliance for Responsible Trade (ART), the Mexican Action 
Network on Free Trade (RMALC), and the Canadian Common Frontiers. By the time 
of Seattle “there existed a solid base of activists…who were eager to use the summit 
as an opportunity to voice their criticism of the WTO and free trade in general”.542 It 
is also worth noting that in 1998 activists had mobilised transnationally and claimed a 
victory in preventing the signing of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) - sponsored Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI). 
Social movements were also on the streets of London during 1999 making their 
voices heard against the Group of Eight (G8).  
 
The December 2001 Seattle protests were quickly followed by protest marches 
against the IMF and World Bank in Washington D.C.; against the Asian Development 
Bank in Chiang Mai, Thailand; and the World Economic Forum in Melbourne, 
Australia in 2000. Later in the same year Europe again saw demonstrators in Prague 
for the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change. In 2001, 
Davos, Switzerland witnessed demonstrations as it hosted the World Economic 
Forum, followed by Quebec because of the meeting of the Free Trade Association of 
the Americas, and Gothenburg, when the European Union (EU) heads of state 
gathered there for negotiations. This mobilisation of social movements in 2001 
culminated in the most violent of demonstrations seen to date during the G8 Summit 
in Genoa. In 2002, Johannesburg, Sydney, New York City, Florence, and Washington 
D.C. were also sites of protest. Cancun, Mexico, also became the focus of 
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transnational protest as the WTO chose it as the venue for its Ministerial Conference 
in 2003.543 We should not forget that transnational networks amongst activists created 
during this period of protest provided the contacts and infrastructure to mobilise an 
anti-war movement against the war in Iraq in late 2002 and early 2003.544 The global 
reach of this infrastructure was clearly demonstrated on 15 February 2003, when 11 
million people in 800 cities all over the world confirmed their refusal to accept the 
legitimacy of the US government led attack on Iraq. The coordinated mobilization of 
social forces from around the globe represented the largest one-day protest in world 
history. Consequently, the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the 21st 
century have witnessed an increased number of transnational social movement 
demonstrations not only nationally, but also at the official international organisations 
of the nebuleuse responsible for coordinating policy consensus for neoliberal 
globalization.  
 
5.3 Social Movement Theory: Why Transnational Protest? 
As mass demonstrations on the streets were beamed into the homes of people 
throughout the world by the media, street protests became a powerful symbol of social 
movement resistance to neoliberal globalization. It would be easy to assume that there 
is something ‘new’ and ‘unusual’ about the mobilisation of large numbers of the 
public to protest at a political system. It is important to acknowledge this could not be 
further from the truth. Social movements have been a constant feature of political life 
and accounted for in Western Europe since the 18th century and in the US since the 
19th century. A rich body of social movement theory has emerged within the 
discipline of sociology, which has developed its own conceptual language and 
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literature.545 Traditionally social movement analysis has been restricted to within the 
border of the state and favoured a comparative analysis. With the development of 
transnational social movement protests, however, a few social movement theorists 
have recently begun to consider the transnational dimension.546 For these writers there 
is a necessity of distinctions. Although social movements, NGOs, pressure groups, 
trade unions all emerge from civil society and participate in transnational protests, 
social movements are determined to be a separate category because they exist outside 
of organised and institutionalised politics.547 To hold them all together as a single 
entity is, in the words of social movement literature, a “source of analytical 
confusion”.548 This distinction is important because NGOs are organised in a way that 
social movements are not, and social movements use unconventional methods of 
political action to influence the political process.549 As Charles Tilly points out “No 
one owns the term” social movement, but using the term as a catchall phrase “badly 
handicaps any effort to describe and explain how social movements actually work”.550 
Therefore, this section will draw from social movement theory to understand the 
activities and reasoning behind the emergence of transnational social movements from 
this discipline. The assertions of social movement theorists will be qualified by 
adopting a Coxian perspective. 
 
Social movements have a long history of political influence. David A. Snow, Sarah A. 
Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi draw attention to this fact by pointing out  
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an understanding of many of the most significant developments and 
changes throughout human history – such as the ascendance of 
Christianity, the Reformation, and the French, American and Russian 
revolutions – are partly contingent on an understanding of the workings 
and influence of social movements, and this is especially so during the 
past several centuries.551  
 
It is worth remembering that some of the major events of the 20th century have been 
initiated by social movement protests with iconic leaders: Ghandi’s non-violent social 
movement’s protest in the fight for India’s independence; Martin Luther King’s 
peaceful protest for African American civil rights in the US and Nelson Mandela’s 
armed struggle against apartheid. Lest we forget the student protests throughout 
Europe in 1968; the demonstrations against the Vietnam war on both sides of the 
Atlantic; the campaigns against the deployment of nuclear missiles and nuclear testing 
in Western Europe; or the Velvet Revolutions of Eastern Europe during the fall of 
communism in the 1989; the student pro-democracy demonstrations of Tianamen 
Square and the 2005 Orange Revolution of the Ukraine. Just as these social 
movements have been responsible for bringing about some form of economic, 
environmental, political and social change, Tim Jordan reminds us that today’s 
transnational social movements are also important: “it is within some of these 
movements that beliefs are being invented that may shape our future. From activism 
may come new definitions of the good life and society.”552 Indeed the main aim of 
social movements throughout history has been to forge a new common understanding 
of alternatives to the status quo.  
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Social movement theorists are very specific about the presence of certain qualities in 
the definition of social movements. Social movements “are largely non-institutional, 
and they occupy a political terrain that is often quite separate from more established 
institutionalised political forms such as pressure groups, parties and the administrative 
and parliamentary systems of the state…Rarely is this dimension governed by formal 
laws and statutes of association”.553 Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani argue that 
in social movement theory, scholars from varying theoretical and territorial 
backgrounds share concern for at least four characteristics of social movements. 
These are: “(1) informal networks, based on (2) shared beliefs and solidarity, which 
(3) mobilise about conflictual issues, through (4) the frequent use of various forms of 
protest”.554 Political parties, NGOs and trade unionists may join a social movement, 
but it is the focus on informal networks and use of non-traditional forms of political 
participation that makes social movements distinct from other actors. Charles Tilly 
draws attention to three elements social movements combine: “1) campaigns of 
collective claims on target authorities; 2) an array of claim making performances 
including special-purpose associations, public meetings, media statements, and 
demonstrations; 3) public representations of the cause’s worthiness, unity, numbers, 
and commitment” (WUNC).555 It is the act of “protest – or the collective use of 
unconventional methods of political participation to try to persuade or coerce 
authorities to support a challenging group’s aims – is perhaps the fundamental feature 
that distinguishes social movements from routine political actors”.556 Russell Dalton 
identifies a continuum to illustrate four different levels that protest can take from the 
non-violent and legal, such as the signing of petitions, boycotts, marches and strikes, 
to the illegal occupation of buildings and, at the most extreme, acts of violence.557 
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Consequently, social movements’ protests can be either positive, creating sympathy 
with the cause, or negative, threatening to create disorder. Together these definitions 
illustrate that what is distinct about social movements is that they form informal 
networks of activists within civil society and are able to build collective identities 
because of collaborative participation in protest. The issue around which the protest is 
mobilised is then ‘dramatised’ to bring it into the consciousness of the wider public 
and to convince civil society to join the protest. The reason for this is that changes in 
individual consciousness are paramount in the transformation of political structures. 
 
In Della Porta and Tarrow’s opinion the mobilisation of transnational collective 
actions has emerged around two ‘master frames’: ‘global social justice’ and 
opposition to ‘neoliberal globalization’. These frames have brought about the 
transnational diffusion of beliefs, ideas, identities and repertoires, and the rise of 
domestic protests for foreign causes and attempts to use international organisations to 
change domestic governmental policies.558 In contrast Joe Bandy and Jackie Smith 
argue that transnational protest is emerging out of “resistance to economic 
globalization”.559 The injustice and inequalities that are inherent in capitalism and 
neoliberal globalization, however, are also what unite the two ‘master frames’ of 
‘global social justice’ and opposition to ‘neoliberal globalization’. Indeed, social 
movement theorists assert that transnational protest emerges because of the shifting of 
sites of political power coupled with developments in communications – two central 
features of neoliberal corporate hegemony. For example, Tilly identifies changing 
political contexts and developments in communication as the two factors that have 
been responsible for the developments and changes in social movements throughout 
history.560 From the 17th century, social movement campaigns have shifted from the 
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local to the national and to the transnational because of these two factors. Tilly 
explains that prior to the 19th century the exercise of political power and 
communication systems were local. In contrast as the “19th century brought the 
centralisation of the state, the development of national and international capitalism 
and the emergence of new forms of technology, which expanded the scope of 
communication”, it also caused social movements to adopt new forms of action.561 
Similarly, the 20th century has witnessed the exercise of political power outside of the 
state in the form of international organizations, the imposing of a transnational mode 
of production and all facilitated by a transnational communication system. Therefore 
these developments have combined to forge transnational social movements. 
 
Although these theorists do help to develop greater understanding of factors specific 
to social movements, the significance of hegemony for civil society is neglected in 
their analysis. Indeed without acknowledging hegemony, these theorists reinforce the 
naturalization of “the ‘top down’ process in which the dominant economic forces of 
capitalism form an intellectual and cultural hegemony which secures the acquiescence 
in the capitalist order among the bulk of the population”.562 Social movements are 
depicted as merely protesting and campaigning for small alterations to the existing 
system. They are not explained in “terms of ‘bottom up’ process led by the strata of 
the population which are disadvantaged and deprived under the capitalist order, who 
build a counter-hegemony that aspires to acquire sufficient acceptance amongst the 
population so as to displace the erstwhile hegemonic order”.563 As Cox points out 
civil society has the potential to transform the existing order, not just reform it to 
make it more palatable for the human conscience: “civil society is the realm in which 
existing social order is grounded; and it can also be the realm in which new social 
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orders can be founded”.564 Through a Coxian analysis of transnational social 
movements it is clear that in the current era of a transnational model of production 
“any locally based social forces will have to build transnational arrangements for 
mutual support. The alternative to capitalist globalization will need to build upon 
productive forces created by capitalism by converting them to the service of society. 
The counterforce to capitalist globalization will also be global, but it cannot be global 
all at once”.565 Therefore a Coxian analysis draws attention to the building of counter-
hegemony that aims to transform the existing nebuleuse, but begins within national 
societies before the creation of a more transnational linked and globally formed 
counter-hegemonic force. 
 
5.4 Counter-hegemony and the WTO 
Literature from activists concurs with Cox’s depiction of the source of the counter-
hegemonic force. Naomi Klein asserts that what unites these many national groups is 
the unleashing of TNCs on a global scale and the liberalisation trade policies by the 
IMF, World Bank and WTO.566 The negative effects of these corporate transnational 
activities and mode of production, coupled with the developments in communication 
technology, have been the catalyst for bringing about the transnational cooperation 
and organisation of social movements. As Klein explains “thanks to Shell Oil and 
Chevron, human rights activists in Nigeria, democrats in Europe, environmentalists in 
North America have united in a fight against the unsustainability of the oil 
industry”.567 Indeed it is clear that national social movements and NGOs on different 
sides of the planet have found that they are experiencing conflicts with the same 
corporation. Thus transnational linkages have emerged as allies and coalition partners 
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have been found outside of national borders to confront corporate hegemony. Klein 
captures the nature of transnational linkage between local protesters by describing 
transnational counter-hegemonic forces as the ‘movement of movements’ or 
‘coalition of coalitions’. Activist Kevin Danaher and Jason Mark point out that the 
2003 anti-war protests represented the  
 
globalization of conscience, not a globalization of commerce … trade 
unions have formed relationships among workers in different 
countries. Environmentalists have encouraged consumers to use their 
power to stop rainforest destruction. Human rights groups have 
brought attention to the plight of indigenous groups threatened by ill-
conceived “development” projects. Fair trade organizations have 
created links between producers in the world’s poor countries and 
consumers in the wealthier nations. And activists from all these 
movements have united across continents to challenge the power of 
institutions such as World Trade Organization, and the International 
Monetary Fund. The idea is that the community can act as an antidote 
to commodification.568 
 
Neoliberal globalization has then brought a common cause against the influence of 
corporate interests in governments, and has united the many diverse social movements 
and NGOs campaigning for environmental protection, human rights, indigenous 
peoples’ land rights, national and international organised labour, national land reform, 
social justice and women’s empowerment around the world.569 
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It is also clear from the activists that there is a campaign to significantly alter or 
transform the current system of world corporate hegemony. David Graebar, a self 
proclaimed “active participant” in the protests, writes that the movement has never 
been comfortable with the term anti-globalization because it is the label given to it by 
the US media. Rather he asserts that the protesters are a movement against 
“neoliberalism”, “market fundamentalism” or “corporate globalization”, which claims 
that there is no alternative to the application of market principles to all aspects of life 
on earth.570 He also dismisses the violence associated with the movement on the 
grounds that these are isolated flash points instigated by a minority, and not indicative 
of the movement as a whole. Similarly, Klein asserts that the label ‘anti-globalization 
movement’ is not useful because very few people understand what globalization 
means and therefore do not understand the arguments that transnational protest is 
making. She points out that the ‘movement’ has been given many names, such as 
“anti-corporate, anti-capitalism, anti-free trade, anti-imperialism”, but none of these 
precisely captures what is currently developing and emerging.571 
 
These sentiments are also strongly stated by David Hunter, the former president of the 
NGO Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL). He argues, “The label anti-
globalization is not even accurate. We don’t call ourselves the anti-globalization 
movement; we call ourselves the Economic Justice Movement. There is a Global 
Economic Justice Network and there is also the International Forum on Globalization; 
it’s not the International Forum Against Globalization”.572 Cavanagh et al drop the 
term anti-globalization movement altogether and use the terms “citizen movements”, 
“alliance of civil society movements” and “global civil society” when referring to the 
transnational social movement. These writers argue that the demonstrations that have 
taken place in countries all over the world are “against the institutions and policies of 
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corporate globalization”. And what is often neglected is that many demonstrators are 
in favour of “economic justice for all, international cooperation, vibrant cultural 
diversity, and healthy sustainable societies that value life more than money”.573 These 
statements are important because they are drawing attention to the rejection of the 
‘anti’ global label, and the assertion of the positive elements of the movement in 
demanding global justice, cooperation, solidarity and sustainable development. 
William F. Fisher and Thomas Ponniah, however, advocate understanding the 
‘movement of movements’ in terms of identifying a common adversary, but also 
engaging in “a counter-hegemonic discourse”, which illustrates that the means to 
solving the challenges that all of the movements face is through the application of 
radical democracy to overcome hierarchical relation of oppression from the local to 
the global.574 The transnational structures of neoliberal globalization are then 
responsible for drawing together diverse national social movements and forging 
transnational counter-hegemonic forces engaged in overthrowing corporate 
hegemony. 
 
Given that this counter-hegemonic movement rejects neoliberal globalization, it is 
clear why the activists have targeted the WTO as one of the central institutions of the 
current world hegemony. For example although the WTO’s Charter justifies the use 
of multilateral trade rules to reduce government barriers to trade for the realisation of 
development, employment, equity, prosperity, peace and sustainable development575; 
the Indian activist, Vandana Shiva, stated at Seattle: 
 
The rules set by the secretive WTO violate principles of human rights 
and ecological survival. They violate rules of justice and sustainability. 
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They are rules of warfare against the people and the planet. Changing 
these rules is the most important democratic human rights struggle of 
our time. It is a matter of survival.576 
 
Similar criticisms were crystallised by a ‘coalition of coalitions’ and presented to the 
WTO prior to the 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference. Over 1,000 organisations from 
87 countries, which included environmentalists groups, human rights groups and 
labour organisations, signed a statement opposing the Millennium Round and any 
further liberalisation policies proposed by the WTO. The statement read "in the past 
five years, the WTO has contributed to the concentration of wealth in the hands of the 
rich few; increasing poverty for the majority of the world's population; and 
unsustainable patterns of production and consumption".577 This ‘coalition of 
coalitions’ has been responsible for propagating the contradictions of the WTO’s 
hegemony to a wider public. Thereby it has attempted to establish the collective 
consciousness necessary to mobilise civil society against corporate hegemony. 
 
The reason that trade is linked to the environment is that trade deregulation is argued 
to place downward pressure on environmental laws as corporations are moving to 
countries where environmental legislation is weakest –“the race to the bottom”. On 
the one hand, advocates of trade liberalisation argue that liberalisation will actually 
cause an increase in environmental legislation because it promotes the economic 
growth necessary to facilitate the demand for environmental protection. In addition 
economic growth will allow the transfer of new technology that is more efficient and 
environmentally friendly.578 On the other hand, Eric Neumayer demonstrates that 
trade liberalisation can have a negative impact on the environment for a number of 
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reasons.579 He illustrates that most developing countries fall short of the economic 
growth needed to reach the turning point levels required for increased environmental 
protection. Secondly he states “trade liberalisation that shifts the production of 
pollution intensive goods towards the low-income, high polluting South increases 
global pollution as the decrease in the Northern emissions is insufficient at the 
margins to compensate for the increase in Southern emissions”.580 Research 
conducted by the OECD after the creation of the WTO predicted that international 
transport would increase by 4-5 per cent because of the increase of trade.581 Increases 
in transportation are directly related to noise and environmental degradation. 
Therefore, neoliberal globalization and corporate hegemony are argued to be 
responsible for environmental squalor. 
 
The WTO’s dispute settlement process is also criticised for placing trade liberalisation 
before environmental protection.582 Critics argue that the WTO’s judicial system has 
ruled to allow lower environmental standards to be given status over the more 
stringent national environmental legislation in trade disputes. This was seen in the 
disputes over the quality of harmful traded gasoline583 and the trading of shrimp 
caught in nets that kill endangered sea turtles.584 Health has also become a concern 
due to the WTO’s position on promoting genetically modified foodstuffs before 
scientific evidence proves that it is safe for human consumption.585 This was argued to 
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be the case when the WTO’s dispute settlement process penalised Europe for its 
refusal to import US hormone-enhanced beef.586 The WTO’s agreement on 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) has also led to the claim that this agreement was 
written by and for multinational pharmaceutical organisations, to provide them with 
twenty-year patients/monopolies for medicine, causing medicine to become too costly 
to deal with pandemics such as AIDS.587 Again it is possible to see the manner in 
which these counter-hegemonic forces are highlighting the contradictions of corporate 
hegemony and the policies of the WTO.  
 
Labour movements have also been drawn together due to the development of a 
flexible transnational production and the pressure that it places on labour rights 
throughout the world. Transnational production has seen TNC production locate 
where it receives its highest return, because there are no labour rights and minimal 
wages, creating sweatshop industries in cities such as Jakarta.588 Bill Jordan (the 
former General Secretary, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) has 
argued that deregulation “has put downward pressure on fundamental workers 
rights…as governments actually reduce workers rights in order to minimise labour 
costs”.589 He also points out that the freedom to create trade unions has been denied in 
Malaysia and Mexico, the ability to strike outlawed in Turkey, and that child labour is 
still allowed in countries such as Egypt. 590 In addition, in order to appear competitive 
and to dam this flow of jobs, developed states have allowed the implementation of 
short-term contracts and minimal wages and conditions for the majority of the flexible 
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workforce.591 The argument from unions is that trade liberalisation has allowed 
corporations to move production to parts of the globe where there are little or no 
labour rights because it is more cost effective. This has the affect of putting pressure 
on workers in the developed world to accept a reduction in existing labour standards 
to remain competitive in a global labour market.  
 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO), which represents workers from all over 
the world, released a press statement before the 1999 Seattle Talks to outline workers’ 
concerns. The Director General, Juan Somavia, stated that the ILO presence at the 
talks was intended: “to address the social dimension of globalization. We must 
understand the benefits are not reaching enough people. The backlash is brewing…we 
believe new directions are necessary to make markets work for 
everybody…developing countries and working families”.592 Thea Lea (Assistant 
Director of International Economics for the American Federation of Labour-Congress 
of Industrial Organisation (AFL-CIO)), argues that workers, communities and poor 
people in the North and South are being shut out of the decision-making process at the 
national and global level. To protect workers rights the AFL-CIO has actively 
engaged with individuals, unions and governments from all over the world to forge a 
common position to place pressure for labour rights to be part of the WTO agenda.593 
Yet, whilst liberalisation is promoted, members of the WTO have met the discussion 
of labour rights being integrated into the WTO’s agreements with hostility. 
 
Trade agreements then spill over into the environment, health and labour spheres of 
public life, but these decisions are not open to public scrutiny or participation. Even 
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when specific groups of citizens are directly affected by a dispute in which they are 
not allowed to participate. Using the example of the Windward Island banana 
growers, who were prevented from having preferential access to EU markets because 
of a case of unfair trade brought before the WTO by the US, Tony McGrew explains 
that these banana growers’ livelihood and future was decided without them being able 
to present their own case to the WTO. Consequently, “those with the most to lose in a 
dispute had no formal means to contest the process”.594 Due to such decisions it has 
been argued that the WTO fails to be accountable to the people that it governs. Jordan 
states that “until people’s social, developmental, and environmental concerns are 
properly addressed within the WTO system, its lack of credibility can only grow”.595 
Therefore, the legitimacy of the WTO is dependent on shifting away from the secrecy 
of the organisation, and allowing access to a wider public through transparency and 
democratic participation in decision-making. 
 
Drawing these criticisms together it is clear that counter-hegemonic forces are 
confronting the nebuleuse and the WTO. The WTO’s trade liberalisation rules are 
argued to be increasing inequality within and between states, undermining sustainable 
development through the damping down of environmental protection, causing a 
decline in labour standards and putting trade liberalisation and profit before health. 
Not only this, but the WTO is argued to be secretive and undemocratic. These diverse 
issues are all related to the current system of neoliberal corporate hegemony and have 
brought local and national social movements together within counter-hegemonic 
forces. The reason for this is that diverse groups have found a common cause in 
resisting and countering hegemony “that transcends nationality and state borders … 
[as] organisers around the world are beginning to see their local and national struggle 
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– for better funding of public schools, against union busting and casualisation, for 
family farms, and against the widening gap between rich and poor – through a global 
lens”.596 As Cox points out civil societies are becoming aware that “national policies 
and practices have been adjusted to the exigencies of the world economy of 
international production”597, and a product of a “globalization from above”.598 The 
‘pyramid model’ of leaders at the top with the followers at the bottom is argued to 
have created a ‘democracy deficit’ that is unresponsive to the issues and concerns of 
the people. Thereby radical democracy or a Coxian form of ‘new multilateralism’ is 
advocated by some sections of the counter-hegemonic forces to ensure global 
governance is a reflection of civil society. 
 
5.5 Counter-hegemony: Typology and Continuum 
The counter-hegemonic movement, however, is decentralised and non-hierarchical 
due to the fact that it has “no governing body, official ideology or a charismatic leader 
with a mandate to speak for the whole”.599 Without a centralised structure, Klein 
acknowledges, there is often “…a cacophony of disjointed slogans, a jumbled laundry 
list of disparate grievances without clear goals…slogans everywhere, to the point of 
absurdity”.600 As social movement theory argues, the collective nature of protest is 
essential for building a “common understanding of problems and their causes and 
shared sets of objectives and commitments to address them”.601 The parallel summits 
that have been organised in response to intergovernmental institution meetings of the 
nebuleuse have contributed greatly to the process of building such common 
perspectives. In 2001, 2002 and 2003, the World Social Forum (WSF) in Porto 
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 189
Alegre, Brazil became established as an arena for participation and discussion to build 
common objectives and commitments to resist neoliberal hegemony and constructive 
alternative world orders: “Peoples' movements around the world are working to 
demonstrate that the path to sustainable development, social and economic justice lies 
in alternative models for people-centred and self-reliant progress, rather than in 
neoliberal globalization.602 In 2003, 100,000 participants from 156 countries met for 
workshops, panels and plenary sessions on their personal experiences and different 
objectives in contesting the injustice of the current nebuleuse. In 2004, the WSF met 
in Mumbai, India. These meetings have also been complimented by a large number of 
regional social forums. It is here that transnational networks of activists are built, 
which share information and work on common goals together to challenge the 
nebuleuse – including the WTO.603 Therefore there have been attempts to construct a 
shared identity, goals and worldview within the counter-hegemonic movement. 
 
Fisher and Ponniah, however, outline the core issues of debate within the movement 
that emerged from the 2002 World Social Forum.604 Primarily there is the classic 
dilemma of ‘revolution versus reform’ - between the desire of some civil society 
groups to be a part of the global governance process and the determination of many 
other groups to protest and resist. Secondly, there is debate between the 
environmental movement and the unions over the priority of the environment and 
economic growth. Thirdly, workers in the developing world see the promotion of 
environmental, labour and human rights by their western counterparts as a form of 
protectionism, which would deter employers from setting up in the developing world. 
Fourthly, linked to the promotion of human rights is the claim that western values are 
universal. Rather than simply reject the idea of universalism and promote cultural 
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relativism, writers have proposed that it could be possible to champion global values 
that promote diversity and also address those groups that are marginalized by the 
process. Finally the question of how the different issues at the local, the national and 
the global levels should be addressed brings dispute within the movement. There are 
three positions here; those that promote the primacy of the local community and the 
merits of direct democracy; those that want to radically alter the state, which 
embraces participatory democracy and regulation by civil society; and then there are 
those that assert that global issues require global solutions and institutions, which are 
subject to overview by a world parliament and civil society. These writers point out 
that these disagreements are the “fault lines in the movement for global justice and 
solidarity”. Somewhat optimistically Cavanagh et al argue that at the moment it is 
sufficient to frame the issues and present the fact that another world is possible, one 
that is not based on neoliberal corporate hegemony.605 The purpose of this section is 
to develop a four stage continuum that depicts the many different ideological 
positions within the counter-hegemonic movement, but specifically identifies an alter-
globalization movement engaged in creating a Coxian ‘new multilateralism’. 
 
In an attempt to understand the wide number of ideological positions from ‘revolution 
to reform’ a small number of authors have offered their own typology. David Held 
and Anthony McGrew offer a continuum that spans three anti-globalization 
categories: global transformers, state/protectionists and radicals, and allows for a great 
deal of overlapping of these categories.606 Acknowledging Held and McGrew, Yahia 
Said and Meghnad Desai narrow their field of analysis and refer specifically to the 
“civil society response to global capitalism” and identify the three ‘anti’ positions of 
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“reformers, isolationists and alternatives”.607 Duncan Green and Matthew Griffith use 
the terms statists, alternatives and reformers to distinguish between the groups.608 In 
contrast Kate O’Neill offers a distinction that is based on the activity that each 
constituency uses to promote its cause. She thereby identifies three strands within the 
transnational social movement: the peaceful majority (travelling circus), the radical 
violent wings (the dark side), and the professional NGOs.609 Jan Aart Scholte, Robert 
O’Brien and Marc Williams have argued that civil society groups can be split into 
three categories: conformers, reformers, and radicals.610 In more recent years, 
however, Scholte has employed a more illuminating categorisation, which gets to the 
heart of the conflicting goals - distinguish between de-globalist and alter-globalist 
movements.611 In doing so he clearly draws attention to the conflicting objectives of 
either pulling down the institutions of global governance and advocating a return to 
local and national decision-making, or reforming/transforming existing global 
institutions so that they embrace new principles and ideals. What is clear from the 
alter-globalist agenda is that resistance to the current form of neoliberal globalization 
and corporate hegemony does not rule out that other forms of global governance are 
desirable and possible. 
 
By looking at transnational protest in terms of de-globalization and alter-globalization 
and employing some of the categories of Held and McGrew it allows for the 
construction of a four stage continuum beginning with the de-globalist, 
statist/protectionist, reformist and global transformationists at the end. Thereby the 
alter-globalist positions draws together the reformist and global transformationists 
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who advocate a Coxian ‘bottom up’ new multilateralism. The continuum begins with 
the ‘de-globalists’, who reject the state, global governance, global economic and 
global environmental policies in their entirety. At the other end are the alter-
globalists, who want to reform global governance so that it is democratic, transparent, 
working for all of humanity, and for the health of the planet. The more intense 
elements of the alter-globalization movement wish to transform the existing global 
system through socialist or anarchist principle and so move beyond legislation and 
institutions that ensure that capitalism and existing social structures work more 
efficiently. This continuum clearly illustrates the many ideological positions in a 
coherent manner. 
 
Beginning with the de-globalists, it is possible to locate those groups that reject global 
institutions and global policies and assert the primacy of small, local communities 
over all other political and economic communities. The position rejects the authority 
of global governance and of the state. Perhaps the best known advocates of this 
position are Black Bloc612, Co-Motion Action613, Continental Direct Action Network 
(CDAN)614, Protest Net615, Reclaim the Streets616, Ruckus Society617, Ya Basta618 and 
Zapatisatas of Chiapas State. As the Irish Black Bloc anarchist, John Blair argues, the 
removal of all hierarchical structures of power is the objective, not the 
democratisation of global governance and the state.619 Ward Churchill also asserts the 
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necessity of direct action and the futility of peaceful protest because it has brought 
demonstrations so near to “the realm of symbolic/ritual protest as to render 
themselves self-nullifying”. Commenting on Seattle, Churchill argues the protesters 
were coopted by the authorities: “notwithstanding much vociferous rhetoric 
denouncing the spiralling human and environmental costs attending the American-led 
drive to economic globalization, droves of “responsible” protesters served literally as 
surrogates for the police, forming themselves into cordons to protect major corporate 
facilities”.620 For some commentators, such as Graeber it is only because of the 
violence that the media was compelled to report on the protests at Seattle.621 
Therefore, for many of these de-globalists, it is only through rejection of corporations, 
global governance and the state that another world is possible. Although the end of 
the current form of global governance is distinctive about these groups, it should be 
noted that even Black Bloc envisages that a global society based on anarchist 
principles is possible and desirable. 622  
 
Moving along the continuum from these de-globalists are the statist groups. Here we 
see the demands for the strengthening of the nation-state to empower it to protect the 
identity, religion or ideology of the national populations from global forces. Their 
political argument rests on the primacy of nation states in all international linkages. 
The advocates of protectionism want to preserve and even enhance the capacity of the 
nation state to govern. Such a position breeds hostility or rejection to global linkages 
and international organisations and foreign commercial interests. In its most forceful 
form we encounter nationalist characters, such as Patrick Buchanan, Pim Fortuyn, 
Pauline Hanson, Vladimir Zhironovsky, and Jean-Marie Le Pen. Terrorists groups 
could also be added, who use “inequalities of power, bullying and fanatical violent 
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attempts to de-globalise” for nationalist ends”.623 Alternatively, the Tiger Economies 
of East Asia, which promote government inspired policies are a good example of 
states still engaged with the global institutions, but not so that they restrict their 
national policy autonomy. This is a position that many unions take, such as American 
Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organisation (AFL-CIO) and the 
International Conference of Free Trade Unions. Via Campesina (Canadian, Honduran, 
Brazilian, Spanish, Polish and Filipino activists) could also be included here too. This 
is a coalition of activists campaigning for the primacy of food as the sovereignty of 
every country. Therefore, within the statist/protectionist’s position there is a shift 
from disengagement and the primacy of the state to different degrees of engagement 
with global institutions along this continuum. Undoubtedly, this position does not 
transform the existing structures of hierarchical power to generate a new 
multilateralism, but maintains the old multilateralism. 
 
Working from this statist/protectionist position, which still engages in limited 
interaction with global institutions, it is possible to develop a reformist position that 
advocates different degrees of engagement and promotion of global governance along 
the continuum. At the end of the continuum are those that advocate a complete and 
radical reform of existing global institutions, which verge on sponsoring changes of 
revolutionary proportions. The global transformer’s position of Held and McGrew 
ultimately must fall into this category. The global transformer’s position begins with a 
“cosmopolitan political project”, which requires democratic arrangements or basic 
democratic law to link cities and subnational regions to nation-states, supranational 
regions and wider global networks.624 Through such democratic arrangements global 
governance and global policies can be better regulated and shaped to create a more 
desirable redistribution of wealth, rights and duties than currently exists. In many 
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ways this perspective is much closer to the radical changes required for the realisation 
of the ‘new multilateralism’ that is proposed by Cox because it advocates that the 
institutions of global governance open themselves up to participation by civil society 
groups. 
 
In practical terms, Held and McGrew assert that the global transformer’s position 
advocates the reforming of existing international institutions. A reformed United 
Nations (UN) is the preferred centrepiece of global governance. This reforming of the 
UN would involve the elimination of the veto system and the creation of a second 
chamber so that global civil society could be represented. Reform of both the IMF and 
WTO is also called for so that they are subordinate to the new UN role as the primary 
institution for addressing global poverty, welfare and related issues. The creation of 
public assemblies is also advocated at the global, regional and local level. 
Transparency and freedom of information would also be brought to bear on 
intergovernmental organisations, opening them to public scrutiny. Another goal 
would be an independent transnational military, financed by a global tax system, to 
ensure peace. Together it is argued that these reforms would foster democracy and 
social justice across borders.  
 
The International Forum on Globalization argues for a similar approach to reform of 
the current nebuleuse. Cavanagh et al in fact outline a project that mirrors many of the 
reforms advocated by Held and McGrew with the exception of placing more emphasis 
on national autonomy than the cosmopolitan position.625 However, in doing so 
Cavanagh et al take great care to emphasise that many parts of the transnational 
movement do not wish to pull down all the institutions of global governance, but that 
the primary goal is the democratisation of these global institutions so that they are 
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accountable to civil societies around the world.626 Both the reformist position of 
Cavanagh et al and Held and McGrew’s global transformation are useful because they 
illustrate the area of a distinct alter-globalization movement and agenda. For example 
both reject neoliberal corporate hegemony, but between Cavanagh et al (more 
national autonomy within global governance) and Held and McGrew (cosmopolitan 
global democratic governance) there are a variety of positions asserting different 
degrees of reform of the institutions and policies of global governance, which reflect a 
Coxian ‘new multilateralism’. These reforms emphasise the primacy of 
democratisation, justice, equality, gender, peace and the inclusion of civil society in 
the institutions of global decision-making. Academics, activists, social movements 
and NGOs that advocate such reforms, therefore, do not fall under the heading of 
‘anti-globalization’, but ‘alter-globalization’ because it encompasses all those that 
believe in reforming the institutions of the nebuleuse to make them more democratic 
so that the policies of global governance work for humanity and the health of the 
planet. 
 
The principles embodied within the term ‘alter-globalization’ movement outlined 
above do appear to reflect the objectives of a wide range, but certainly not all, of 
movements within the counter-hegemonic forces. Bandy and Smith illustrate that it 
has proven impossible to collate data on all transnational linkages amongst social 
forces.627 In an attempt to establish greater knowledge of this transnational social 
movement, these authors have employed the term Transnational Social Movement 
Organisations (TSMOs) to denote those transnational social movements that are more 
formally organised and appear in the Yearbook of International Associations. In doing 
so current research conducted by Bandy and Smith illustrates that the number of 
TSMOs have increased from 183 in 1973, to 959 in 2000. Although these TSMOs are 
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primarily organised around the protection of human rights (26%), the environment 
(17%), peace (10%), women’s rights (9%), and development (10%), there are a 
growing number of TSMOs that bring all of these issues together under the one 
umbrella, such as global justice/peace/environment (11%), and self-
determination/ethnic unity (2%).628 From this research it is clear that there is a 
demand for an alternative form of global governance, which respects marginalized 
groups, the environment and peace. 
 
Alter-globalization principles are also evident in NGOs and social movements - not 
all demand the radical transformation of the current world order, but they do demand 
the inclusion of civil society groups in the decision-making of international 
institutions. This is clear from the World Development Movement’s Trade Justice 
Movement, which campaigns for “fundamental changes to the unjust rules and 
institutions governing international trade, so that trade is made to work for all”.629 The 
Global Justice Movement “seeks to present well thought out alternatives to traditional 
globalization efforts.”630 ATTAC (International Movement for Democratic Control of 
Financial Markets and their Institutions) advocates reforming international financial 
institutions so that a Tobin Tax is applied to economic transactions to pay for the 
social costs of neoliberal globalization.631 The US coalition, International Centre for 
Policy Studies (ICPS) also calls for the reform of the UN before it takes a central role 
in global economic and social affairs. One World Trust is engaged in promoting 
“education and research into the changes required within global organisations in order 
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to achieve the eradication of poverty, injustice and war.”632 International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) has sought to provide information for 
the purpose of “empowering stakeholders in trade policy through information, 
networking, dialogue, well-targeted research, and capacity building, to influence the 
international trade system such that it advances the goal of sustainable 
development”.633 World Campaign for in-depth Reform of the System of International 
Institutions has been engaged in coordinating support for “democratic governance of 
globalization to contribute to resolving the grave problems and challenges that face 
our world”.634 One could also include Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO),635 
CorpWatch,636 Global Exchange,637 The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy,638 
and Our World is not for Sale (OWINFS).639 From the developing world alter-
globalization movements include Focus on the Global South,640 South Asian Civil 
Society Network on International Trade Issues (SACSNITI),641 The Development 
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GAP (The Development Group for Alternative Policies),642 and Third World Network 
(TWN).643 
 
This is not in any way intended to be an exhaustive list of all the social movements 
advocating an alter-globalization agenda as radical as Cox would demand; rather it is 
an attempt to illustrate that social movements pursuing an alter-globalist agenda work 
together in rejecting corporate hegemony and advocating reform of corporate 
hegemony. All of these groups take issue with the creation of the WTO, and 
campaigns have emerged to prevent the application and further negotiations of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).644 The alter-globalization 
movement is also well equipped with its own ‘organic intellectuals’. For example the 
Transnational Institute, a worldwide fellowship of committed scholar-activists 
provides “intellectual support to those movements concerned to steer the world in a 
democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable direction”645 These ‘organic 
intellectuals’ include Walden Bello, Susan George, John Cavanagh, Mariano Aguirre, 
Marcos Arruda, Phyllis Bennis, Praful Bidwai, Kees Biekart, Brid Brennan, Daniel 
Chavez, Jochen Hippler, Martin Jelsma, Boris Kagarlitsky, Dot Keet, Kamil Mahdi, 
Joel Rocamora, David Sogge, Myriam Vander Stichele, Achin Vanaik, Howard 
Wachtel, and Hilary Wainwright.646 OpenDemocracy has also been responsible for 
providing ‘organic intellectuals’ with an alter-globalization perspective with a global 
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on-line forum to propagate criticism of the existing system and possible alternatives to 
the current world order.647 Many of these ‘organic intellectuals’ have spoken at the 
WSF and at the Regional Social Forums to advocate resistance to corporate hegemony 
and alternative world orders.  
 
Undoubtedly, this continuum of ideological positions outlined here illustrates that a 
key feature of the counter-hegemonic forces is diversity. Such diversity, however, is 
argued not to be confused with incoherence and contradiction; rather it is claimed by a 
number of activists that such diversity demonstrates the reality of real democracy. 
Hardt and Negri celebrate this “proliferation of differences” and point out that the 
acceptance of difference and diversity of identity is the cornerstone of a rejection of 
the forced homogenisation of humanity through neoliberalism economics.648 Together 
these issues have brought diverse social movements together at the global level, but 
based on principles of decentralisation and non-hierarchical consensus democracy. 
Graebar further argues that the reason for this is that “this is a movement about 
reinventing democracy ... It is about creating and enacting horizontal networks instead 
of top-down structures like states”.649 Boaventura de Sousa Santos articulates what is 
entailed in this radical democracy. He asserts that the diversity found at the WSF is a 
result of the many movements being “embedded in diverse cultures and knowledges”. 
He therefore calls for an engagement in “the exercise of translation” through mutual 
recognition, dialogue, and debate “to identify and reinforce what is common in the 
diversity of counter-hegemonic forces”.650 This process of translation amongst the 
different knowledges of groups and cultures starts from acceptance that all are 
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incomplete and, therefore, can “be enriched by dialogue and confrontation with other 
cultures”.651 Thereby for many groups advocating an alter-globalization agenda 
common principles and policies can be agreed and then realised through radical 
democratic principles or a ‘bottom up’, ‘new multilateralism’ as defined by Cox.652  
 
5.6 The Reaction of Corporate Hegemony: Distortion  
At the core of world hegemony are the transnational networks of state elites, corporate 
interests and finance, which build consensus on the policies of global capitalism 
within international organizations and are supported by the international media - the 
nebuleuse.653 Since the WTO is a central institution of the current nebuleuse, which 
advances and legitimises corporate hegemony, it should be possible to detect the 
cooption of counter-hegemonic ideas and concepts by this institution. The purpose of 
the cooption of the language is to enhance the legitimacy of the WTO and 
neoliberalism without making significant change. In this section it will be argued that 
there is evidence of the distortion of the alter-globalization movement’s objectives by 
the media and political elites. In doing so political elites have been able to deflect 
criticisms and gloss over the contradiction of corporate hegemony to maintain the 
support and consent of civil society. Thereby ‘organic intellectuals’ from the alter-
globalization movement have found it difficult to undermine the coherence of 
corporate hegemony in the consciousness of civil society because their arguments and 
policies are distorted. 
 
The organisation of mass demonstrations on the street has been the most visible of all 
the strategies employed by the alter-globalization movement to gain media attention 
                                                 
651 Boaventura de Sousa Santos. ‘The Future of the World Social Forum’, in Development, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2005, p. 
15-22.  
652 Robert W. Cox (editor). The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order, Basingstoke: 
MacMillian Press LTD, 1997, p. xvii. 
653 Robert W. Cox. ‘Global Perestroika’ (1992), in Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair. Approaches to World 
Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 296. 
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and influence public opinion, thereby placing pressure on state elites to respond to 
public opinion and reform the WTO. The raising of public consciousness reflects 
Tilly’s assessment of the purpose of social movements in publicising the cause in 
terms of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment” (WUNC).654 The existence of 
the WTO, the closed nature of its negotiations, and the impact of trade policies in the 
developing world have been brought to the public’s attention through street protests. 
Gaining access to a wider public, however, relies upon access to the media, but this 
has its difficulties when the media is a powerful tool of hegemony. This was clearly 
illustrated at Seattle when the violence and not the politics of the demonstrators 
became the story. The exercise of violence is ‘newsworthy’ and, as Graeber points 
out, violence did catch the media’s attention:  
 
It's hard to deny that the Black Bloc in Seattle got a point across. All 
along, they were arguing that organisations like the WTO are yet another 
addition to a growing apparatus of global rule, in which the powers of 
the state hardly even pretend to respond to the needs of local 
communities, and are simply put at the service of multinational 
corporations. How could mere words bring this home as vividly as the 
spectacle of the mayor of Seattle declaring martial law in order to 
protect Starbucks?655  
 
This simple and powerful insight is, however, lost when the media portrays the 
violence as the main point of protest, and political elites merely engage in 
condemning the violence and are able to avoid answering the political questions 
raised by the protesters.  
 
                                                 
654 Charles Tilly. Social Movements, 1768 – 2004, London: Paradigm Publishers, 2004, P .7. 
655 David Graeber. ‘Anarchy in the USA’, in In These Times, January 10, 2000. 
http://www.inthesetimes.com/issue/24/03/graeber2403.html
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This is not to claim that Seattle was ineffective in raising public consciousness, but 
only that political messages have been distorted by the media, corporations and 
especially by political elites. Since Seattle books, such as Fast Food Nation: The 
Dark Side of the All-American Meal, Don't Eat This Book: Fast Food and the 
Supersizing of America, No Logo, Stupid White Men, Weapons of Mass Deception and 
films, such as Bowling for Columbine, Fahrenheit 9-1, Enron: The Smartest Guys in 
the Room, Wal*Mart - The High Cost Of Low Prices, The Corporation, Outfoxed - 
have all become part of popular culture. Each of these has illustrated the manner in 
which transnational production and corporate hegemony functions through an 
ideology perpetuated by the media to justify the current world order and undermines 
the quality of life of people throughout the world. Multinational coffee shops656 and 
corporations657 have begun advertising their ‘fair trade’ credentials to what they 
perceive to be a critical public and consumer.658 These developments, however, are 
not transforming corporate hegemony. Although the contradictions of neoliberalism 
are more widely propagated there is great difficulty in identifying what the 
alternatives could be. This is especially so when political elites continue to assert that 
‘There Is No Alternative’ to neoliberal globalization (see below). It has to be 
acknowledged that the resources available to the alter-globalization movement to 
illustrate the contradictions of corporate hegemony and the nebuleuse are limited. 
Indeed they are dwarfed by the material resources at the disposal of corporate 
hegemony to project their perspective of the world to civil societies throughout the 
world by means of the media and press releases from the nebuleuse. 
                                                 
656 For example see Starbucks. Good Coffee – Good Doing, September 2005. 
http://www.starbucks.com/aboutus/origins.asp
Costa Coffee. Costa Coffee Launches its Own Blend of Fairly Traded Coffee, September 2005. 
http://www.costa.co.uk/coffee/fairtrade.aspx
657 For example see NIKE. Corporate Social Responsibility Report, September 2005. 
http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?page=29anditem=fy04
GAP Inc. Social Responsibility, September 2005,     
http://www.gapinc.com/public/SocialResponsibility/socialres.shtml
658 In early 2003, Oxfam International launched a “Fair trade Coffee” campaign against Kraft Foods and Procter 
and Gamble, which was able to mobilise public opinion against the low prices they pay to coffee growers in 
Africa, Latin America and Asia, 3 May 2003.                    
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/press/releases/progreso130504.htm
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 For example with a few exceptions, from Seattle to Cancun the reaction of the media 
to the emergence of counter-hegemonic protest has been to focus on the outbreaks of 
violence, the destruction of private property, revolting adolescence and ill-informed 
arguments. After the protests in Prague against the IMF and World Bank, The UK’s 
The Daily Telegraph casts the activists as "highly educated, bourgeois offspring 
rejecting the ways and wealth of their parents' generation".659 Diane Coyle writing for 
the Observer stated that the protesters’ arguments against neoliberal globalization did 
not bode well with the facts and “Despite being so heavily criticised by the anti-
globalization protestors, with a one-member, one-vote rule, the WTO is the most 
democratic of the international institutions”.660 On the run-up to the Quebec protests 
Thomas Freedman wrote in the New York Times that the “anti-globalization 
movement is largely the well intentioned but ill informed being led around by the ill 
intentioned and well informed (protectionist unions and anarchists), who do not serve 
Africa's interests”.661  
 
There have been exceptions to this negative publicity. For example a significant 
number of the press have made a distinction between the peaceful and violent 
protesters making sure that they depict that the violence is a result of a small minority 
of people. For example Paul Reynolds of the BBC states  
 
But among the crowd, with its varied and colourful banners, were some black 
figures in anoraks and face masks … So the masked figures roamed the 
downtown area, blocking traffic, shouting their slogans, spraying walls and 
                                                 
659 Quoted in Katharine Viner. ‘Instead of Vilifying the Prague Protesters, We Could Learn From Them’, 
Guardian Newspaper, Friday, 29 September 2000.         
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,374906,00.html
660 Diane Coyle. What the Protestors Get Wrong’, Observer Newspaper, Sunday, 21 July 2002. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/globalization/story/0,,759344,00.html
661 Thomas Freedman. Foreign Affairs, Protesting for Whom? New York Times Newspaper, 24 April 2001. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/24/opinion/24FRIE.html?ex=1160625600anden=400a96eb00d56af8andei=5070
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windows with their graffiti and trying - and in some cases succeeding - in 
smashing windows of the elegant shops which are in the heart of Seattle.662 
 
James Harding of the Financial Times acknowledged the significance of neoliberal 
globalization in motivating transnational protest after spending time interviewing the 
activists. This caused him to write that the movement is not “strictly speaking ‘anti-
globalization’. The vast majority of activists are pro-globalization … Instead this is 
counter-capitalism. The new wave of political activism has coalesced around the 
simple idea that capitalism has gone too far”.663 The BBC also drew attention to the 
fact that after the violence and shooting at Genoa “All of the 93 people they arrested 
have been released without charge, and instead magistrates have now placed several 
of the officers under investigation for acts of brutality … Of the 93 arrested, 62 
needed hospital treatment.664 Thereby the media has debated the coherence of the 
different arguments coming from the protesters, especially the rejection of neoliberal 
globalization, but it has also focused on the outbreaks of violence. Consequently, 
violence, uninformed or extremist ideological politics have become synonymous with 
transnational protests and the political arguments can seem to be lost. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that the nebuleuse have not just ignored the protesters, 
they have condemned them, coopted the language and blurred the distinction between 
who is responsible for and who is campaigning against neoliberal globalization and 
transnational production. With the exception of the campaign against the invasion of 
Iraq, the term ‘anti-globalization’ has been used by corporate hegemony to describe 
the protesters. It cannot be denied that the term ‘anti-globalization’ is riddled with 
negative connotations. Indeed the hyphenated joining of these two words establishes 
                                                 
662 Paul Reynolds. ‘Eyewitness: The Battle of Seattle’, in BBC News, Thursday, 2 December 1999. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/547581.stm
663 James Harding. ‘The Anti-Globalization Movement’, in Financial Times, 15 October 2001. 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/define/2910.htm
664 Bill Hayton. ‘Genoa one year on’, in BBC News, Monday, 22 July 2002. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2144804.stm
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the assumption that there is unity within the movement against anything that is global. 
This label has played well in the hands of the political elites in their bid to discredit 
and distort the political message from the ‘organic intellectuals’ of the alter-
globalization movement. For example, after the Prague demonstrations UK 
Government Minister Clare Short stated that the protesters were "today's Luddites ... 
their call to halt historical change and tear down our international institutions offers 
no solution”.665 Philippe Legrain (Former Assistant to the WTO’s Secretary General) 
attempts to convince those not involved in demonstrating (the “millions of people 
who make up the silent majority”) that the people at the protests are “globaphobes” 
motivated by the extreme ideas of either communists or the far right of Le Penn.666 
This depiction of extremist politics is then married to the violent images in which 
“tens of thousands of demonstrators fight running battles…[which cause] the police to 
respond with water cannon, tear gas and clubs”.667 Michael Moore (former Secretary 
General of the WTO) also uses this imagery, but to claim that the protesters threaten 
civilised values of freedom, democracy and justice: “we were corralled behind wire 
barricades, I found myself wondering how such fine, noble, principled expression of 
universal values and rights as internationalism and solidarity became so 
denigrated”.668 John Macklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge go further and place the 
anti-globalization movement in the same category as terrorist organisations and 
leaders, such as Osama bin Laden.669 
 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair has also distorted the political motives and 
arguments of the demonstrators. After the Gothenburg demonstrations he stated:  
 
                                                 
665 Quoted in Katharine Viner. ‘Instead of Vilifying the Prague Protesters, We Could Learn From Them’, in 
Guardian Newspaper, Friday, 29 September 2000.   
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,374906,00.html
666 Philippe Legrain. Open World: The Truth About Globalization, London: Abacus, 2002, p. 17-18. 
667 Philippe Legrain. Open World: The Truth About Globalization, London: Abacus, 2002, p. 16. 
668 Michael Moore. A World Without Walls: Freedom, Development, Free Trade and Global Governance, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 8. 
669 John Macklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge. A Future Perfect: The Challenge and Hidden Promise of 
Globalization, London; William Heinemann, 2000, p. 277. 
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these protests began at Seattle…this is simply a form of anarchism 
directed at institutions of a collective nature…and we shouldn't dignify 
it in any shape or form by saying that this is some reasoned political 
argument… Insofar as they have an argument, it is an argument that is 
completely and totally wrong and misguided and we should challenge 
it at every level.670 
 
Given this strong condemnation it is little wonder that the term ‘anti-globalization’ 
has been responsible for causing a rejection of the alter-globalization movement or the 
counter-hegemonic movement as a whole in some quarters of civil society. Political 
elites have been successful in making protest synonymous with a movement that is 
violent, anti-global, and guided by extreme left and right politics. The alternatives that 
the protesters propose are deemed to be irrational, incoherent, contradictory and a 
threat to freedom, democracy and justice. Depicting the protesters in this way, Blair, 
Legrain, and Moore are attempting to convince the ‘silent majority’ or the mass of 
civil society consenting to hegemony to dismiss the protesters before they are aware 
of the issues that they raise. At the same time each of these political elites defends and 
reinforces the ideology of neoliberal globalization on the grounds that “There Is No 
Alternative” - the TINA effect. Therefore ‘organic intellectuals’, such as those from 
the Transnational Institute have had difficulty in raising their voices above these 
political elites to not only bring the contradictions of neoliberalism in the 
consciousness of civil society, but also to believe “Another World is Possible”. 
 
5.7 Hegemonic Cooption 
The persistence of counter-hegemonic forces to demonstrate the contradiction of 
corporate hegemony has also caused a policy of trasformismo to be employed as the 
                                                 
670Tony Blair (Prime Minister). Edited Transcript of a Press Conference by the Prime Minister, Gothenburg, 
Sweden, Foreign and Commonwealth News Website, Saturday, 16 June 2001. 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?5064#Top
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rhetoric of the nebuleuse has been significantly transformed. Corporate hegemonic 
elites have attempted to present themselves as the real champions of global justice and 
even supporters of the alter-globalization movement’s demands. In addition many of 
the policy demands used by the protesters during the street protests (‘fair trade’, 
global justice, labour and human rights, enhanced transparency and democracy within 
international organization, and sustainable development) have now become the 
buzzwords embedded in press releases and the political rhetoric of the nebuleuse. This 
strategy has been employed by the US administration. For example the US has been 
one of the key architects and enforcers of neoliberal globalization and the current 
nebuleuse – including the WTO. Yet, at Seattle, the US President Bill Clinton 
distanced himself from this fact by claiming that he sympathised and shared the views 
of the peaceful protesters on the streets. Clinton even used the language and 
arguments of the protesters declaring that the WTO had to embrace environmental 
concerns, public inclusiveness and transparency in order to remain legitimate.671 
Similarly UK PM Blair has blurred the distinction between himself and the corporate 
hegemony that he has enhanced. For example Blair has stated his commitment to the 
fair trade demands of the alter-globalization movement and even declaring in a press 
release to the Trade Justice Movement “I urge you to keep up pressure on 
governments, and can assure you that we're building alliances across the world on this 
issue”.672 The UK’s opposition party was also seen to uphold the ideology of the 
hegemony as the Conservative Party’s Shadow International Development Secretary 
Caroline Spelman told MPs in 2002: "Trade could be the greatest force for poverty 
reduction in history."673 By embracing the language and demands of the protesters it 
is difficult for civil society to identify who is responsible for the current world order. 
 
                                                 
671 Statement of the President of the United States, High Level Symposium on Trade and Environment, Geneva, 15 
March 1999. 
672 BBC News. Trade Lobby Gets Fair Hearing, Wednesday, 19 June 2002. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2053120.stm
673 BBC News. Trade lobby gets fair hearing, Wednesday, 19 June 2002. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2053120.stm
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Perhaps one of the most notable examples of the trasformismo after Seattle has been 
the shift in the vocabulary of political elites from a demand for “free trade”, to a call 
for “free and fair trade” as they coopt the language of the protesters. In 2001, the 
UK’s Trade and Development Minister, Patricia Hewitt, argued that the WTO only 
promoted ‘free and fair trade’ in order to elevate poverty, promote peace and 
prosperity, raise environment, health and labour standards, and worked for and with 
the poorest nations of the world.674 Further evidence of the shift in vocabulary is 
evident in the contrast between the speeches of US President G. W. Bush as he came 
to power in 2001 and reinforced the ideology of hegemony with the benefits from 
‘open trade’: “Along with economic progress, open trade also helps build democracies 
and spreads freedom as it reinforces the spirit of liberty by spurring economic and 
legal reforms. When we promote open trade, we promote both economic and political 
freedom. Societies that open to commerce will one day open to liberty”.675 By 2003, 
US President Bush was also seen to be advancing the merits of ‘free and fair trade’ for 
domestic workers: “You hear a lot of talk about trade," he said. "You're living in the 
trade world, and if we do a good job by making sure trade is free and fair, people are 
going to find work in America”.676 In 2004 Bush expressed the universal benefits to 
be attained from ‘free and fair trade’ to an Australian audience: “One of the great 
economic achievements since the end of the Cold War has been the success of free 
and fair trade in raising up the world's poor, bringing hope to the world's hopeless, 
promoting freedom among the world's oppressed, and creating jobs at home and 
abroad.”677 This argument for ‘free and fair’ trade was restated in 2005 as Bush told 
the US public “Free and fair trade creates jobs, raises living standards, and lowers 
                                                 
674 Patricia Hewitt (Rt. Hon). Free and Fair Trade for Peace and Prosperity’, Speech to the Foreign Press 
Association, 6 November  2001. 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/ministers/archived/hewitt071101.html
675 George. W. Bush (US President). A Proclamation By the President of the United States of America, The White 
House President George W. Bush, May 18, 2001.       
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010518-9.html
676 CNN News. Bush Touts Economy, 'Free and Fair' Trade, 10 November 2003. 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/11/10/elec04.prez.bush.campaign/
677 See George. W. Bush (US President). President Bush Signs U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Whitehouse 
Press Release, August 3, 2004 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040803-1.html
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prices for families throughout America. It also strengthens our relationships with 
other countries, helping us to forge new partnerships based on a commitment to 
generate new prosperity and a better way of life for people in America and throughout 
the world”678. Thereby since the protests in Seattle the rhetoric of political elites has 
evolved to embrace the demands of the alter-globalization movement. 
 
It is not only the language of political elites that has coopted the language of the 
protesters after Seattle, so too has the WTO engaged in trasformismo. As the 
protesters had drawn attention to the inequalities between the developed and 
developing countries and the role of the WTO in perpetuating these inequalities, the 
next round of the WTO trade negotiation was declared to be solely concerned with the 
needs of the developing world. Indeed in the lead up to the Doha Ministerial 
Conference the Director General of the WTO in 2001, Michael Moore, re-emphasized 
that the WTO negotiations were geared towards promoting the interests of the 
developing countries: “A strong, vibrant, predictable and rules-based multilateral 
trading system is in the interest of all countries, particularly developing countries. 
They should seize this opportunity to fashion the system in such a way that it would 
be responsive to their development needs”.679 It would appear from this statement that 
the equalities experienced in the developing world are caused by an inability of their 
political elites to assert their interests at the negotiation of the WTO. The subsequent 
Doha Development Agenda that emerged from the Ministerial Conference asserted 
that  
 
we shall continue to make positive efforts designed to ensure that 
developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, 
                                                 
678George. W. Bush (US President). A Proclamation By the President of the United States of America, The White 
House President George W. Bush, 12 May 2005. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050512-8.html
679 Michael Moore (WTO Director-General 2001). Introductory statement by the Director-General, World Trade 
Organization, Monday 10 September 2001.   
http://www.wto.org/English/news_e/spmm_e/spmm69_e.htm
 211
secure a share in the growth of world trade commensurate with the 
needs of their economic development.680 
 
Together these statements illustrate that the WTO’s Secretariat used the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration to weave the demands of the protesters concerning the 
interests of the developing world through press releases and policy statements to 
deflect criticisms. Thereby it appears – unlike the arguments of the protesters – that 
the WTO is not the cause of global inequalities, rather it is the solution because it 
advances the interests of the developing world within its negotiations. Indeed the 
answer to anyone asking at the WTO about the benefits of trade liberalization for the 
developing countries will find the Doha Development Agenda is pulled out of the 
proverbial hat as indisputable evidence of the central place of the needs of the 
developing countries in WTO negotiations.681 
 
Similarly, the corporate hegemony in both the EC and the US has publicly supported 
the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda on the grounds that it will not only advance 
the interests of the developing states, but the world as a whole. The United States 
Trade Representative asserted that “The United States will continue to push for 
substantial improvements in market access in agriculture, manufacturing and services 
because this will generate the most benefits for development, including poverty 
reduction”.682 The European Commission can also be seen to draw from the language 
of the protesters in defending the Doha Development Agenda: “Not only will the 
WTO continue to improve conditions for worldwide trade; it will also, through 
enhanced and better rules, be able to play a much fuller role in the pursuit of 
                                                 
680 World Trade Organization. Ministerial Declaration’ Doha WTO Ministerial 2001, 20 November 2001. 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm
681 Interviews conducted at the World Trade Organization, Geneva March 2004. 
682 Rob Portman (United States Trade Representative). USTR Portman Applauds G-7 Commitment to Ambitious 
Doha Round Lauds $4 billion in “Aid for Trade” to Developing Countries, 3 December 2005. 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2005/December/USTR_Portman_Applauds_G-
7_Commitment_to_Ambitious_Doha_Round_Lauds_$4_billion_in_Aid_for_Trade_to_Developing_Countries.htm
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economic growth, employment and poverty reduction. Better international governance 
and the promotion of sustainable development is the ambitious backdrop to the 
agenda. The EU firmly stands to push this agenda to a successful conclusion”683 The 
EU Trade Minister of 2003, Pascal Lamy, also employed the language of the 
protesters when he acknowledged that the WTO “cannot simply focus on trade 
opening while ignoring the inter-linkage between trade and the environment, social 
development, health, corruption, corporate governance”.684 In his capacity as the 
Director General of the WTO, Lamy has also been able to weave the language of the 
protesters throughout WTO public statement to justify the WTO 
 
We must also remember that we live in a world where millions continue 
to live on less than $1 a day. This has direct implications for sustainable 
development. As the Brundtland Report had put it, what many countries 
face is the “pollution of poverty.” Poverty forces people to overexploit 
their natural environment, and such overexploitation, in turn, hurts their 
chances of development. For, as we all know, a healthy natural resource 
base is itself a vital ingredient for economic growth. Trade, and the 
WTO, can help by bringing that growth about.685 
 
Clearly, the elites of the nebuleuse have engaged in trasformismo as they have used 
the Doha Development Agenda and public statements to coopt the language of the 
protesters in order to deflect criticisms and attempt to legitimise the WTO.  
 
                                                 
683 European Commission. The Doha Development Agenda, 22 July 2006. 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/newround/doha_da/index_en.htm
684 Pascal Lamy (European Union Trade Commissioner). The Future of the WTO for European Parliament 
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685 Pascal Lamy (Director General of the World Trade Organization). Trade Can be a Friend, and Not a Foe, of 
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http://www.wto.org/English/news_e/sppl_e/sppl07_e.htm
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As part of the nebuleuse the World Bank and IMF have supported and defended the 
WTO against the criticisms voiced by the protesters. The World Bank has defended 
the Doha Development Agenda, and thereby the necessity of the trade policies of the 
WTO: “Trade is not only in my view a mainspring of development, but ultimately of 
international peace and solidarity as well. Trade creates wealth. It generates new and 
better jobs, transfers knowledge and technology and fosters shared responsibility to go 
with interdependence. Together there is much we can do to make increased trade 
serve the interests of the poor. More trade will help to build a more inclusive 
world”.686 On the eve of the Cancun Ministerial Conference the World Bank stated “A 
trade deal that addresses the concerns of developing nations could spur global growth 
and reduce poverty by as much as 144 million people by 2015, according to a new 
World Bank report issued today. The report is being launched on the eve of a meeting 
of the world's trade ministers in Cancun next week that will review progress on WTO 
negotiations on the Doha Development Agenda”.687 The IMF also attempted to 
undermine the arguments of the protesters. “We must seek to persuade the skeptics of 
the benefits of free trade. We must persuade all governments to narrow the gap 
between rhetoric and practice. A successful Doha round outcome would, in my view, 
be the best possible means of achieving these objectives”.688 On the eve of Cancun the 
IMF restated the arguments for free trade and the work of the WTO “The Doha 
Declaration is a powerful signal of the international community's determination to 
tackle poverty decisively, and to ensure that the benefits of globalization are more 
                                                 
686 James D. Wolfensohn (World Bank President). World Bank Statement at WTO Talks in Doha: Strengthening 
the International Trade Architecture for Development, 10 November 2001. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20044022~menuPK:34464~pagePK:343
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688 Anne O. Krueger (Acting Managing Director International Monetary Fund). Willful Ignorance: The Struggle to 
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widely spread. The importance of trade for poverty reduction has been repeatedly 
emphasized”.689 
 
In 2003, the World Bank President James Wolfensohn was also seen to coopt the 
language of the protesters. In a public statement he went further and claimed that the 
institutions of the nebuleuse and the World Social Forum were working towards the 
same goals. 
 
Our collective demand is for a global system based on equity, human 
rights and social justice. Our collective quest for a more equal world is 
also the quest for long-term peace and security. This growing consensus 
is playing out in the emergence of a global partnership for poverty 
reduction. At the recent United Nations conferences in Monterrey and 
Johannesburg, and at the launch of the Doha round of World Trade 
Organization (WTO) negotiations, developed countries pledged to help 
developing countries by strengthening capacity, increasing overseas 
development assistance, opening markets to trade and reducing 
agricultural subsidies ... Rich and poor countries alike have reaffirmed 
their commitments to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. At 
the World Bank, we have now reoriented our strategy to help developing 
countries meet the Goals - including halving poverty, ensuring basic 
education and health for all, promoting gender equality and protecting 
the environment - and pressing the richest countries to meet their 
obligations under the Goals to help the poor.690 
 
                                                 
689 Horst Köhler (Managing Director International Monetary Fund). Cooperation in Trade and International 
Financial Integration, International Monetary Fund, 13 May 2003. 
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Through these public statements, and declarations by the nebuleuse it can be argued 
that the demands of alter-globalization have been interwoven and coopted by political 
elites. In doing so the nebuleuse is able to deflect attention from who is responsible 
for the global inequalities generated by corporate hegemony. In some cases the 
developing countries are argued to have been responsible for undermining attempts to 
advance their own interests. For example after the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial 
Conference in 2003, the trade representatives of both the EC, Pascal Lamy691, and US, 
Robert Zolleck, condemned the developing states during negotiations for turning the 
WTO into a “forum for the politics of protest”692, not cooperation. Such ‘official’ 
declarations are important because they establish a perspective in the mind of civil 
society, which paints the alter-globalization movement as being misinformed and 
engaging in misguided campaigns and arguments – a fringe social movement that 
criticises the world of politics which it knows nothing about.  
 
These claims about the ability of the WTO to address global inequalities, however, 
have been criticised. In 1997 the United Nations argued that the poverty and 
inequalities had become worse as any benefits of neoliberal economic globalization 
were spread unevenly across the globe and countries.693 Writing in 2001, Robert 
Hunter Wade reinforced this point by showing that world income inequalities had 
increased over the last 20 years, regardless of the claims of the WTO to universally 
distribute wealth through its free trade policies. The richest 20% of the world are the 
recipients of 82.7% of the world’s income. The consequence of such disparities, he 
argues, is that the world is divided into one of peace and prosperity and another of 
                                                 
691 Pascal Lamy (European Union Trade Commissioner). Press Conference Closing the WTO 5th Ministerial 
Conference, Cancun, Mexico, 14 September 2003. 
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/speeches_articles/spla190_en.htm
692 Robert Zoellick (US Trade Representative). America Will Not Wait For The Won’t Do Countries, 22 September 
2003.                         
http://www.ustr.gov/speech-test/zoellick/2003-09-22-ft.htm
693 United Nation Development Programme. Human Development Report 1997, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997. 
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poverty, war and turmoil.694 On the one hand perhaps, it is too early to judge the Doha 
Development Agenda as merely rhetoric. On the other hand, Joseph Stiglitz has 
argued: “today's Development Round does not deserve its name. Many of the issues 
that it has addressed should never have been on the agenda of a genuine development 
round, and many issues that should have been on the agenda have not”.695 Four years 
after the Doha Development Agenda was celebrated there is still no decrease in the 
subsidies of the EC and US on agriculture and textiles. The so-called ‘peace clause’696 
that allowed WTO members to maintain agricultural subsidies without being 
challenged has authorised the continued agricultural and textile subsidies of the EC 
and US, which are detrimental to the economies of the developing world. In January 
2005 the ‘peace clause’ expired and the EC and US have attempted to convince 
members of the WTO to renew its terms.697 In fact the US almost doubled its 
subsidies on cotton in 2004. In the WTO publication The Future of the WTO: 
Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium, which has come to be 
known as the ‘Sutherland Report,’ it was clearly stated that only governments could 
be thought of as participating within the decision-making process of the WTO.698 This 
would suggest that the language of the alter-globalization movement has been 
hijacked to legitimise the policies and process of the WTO, but with little substantive 
reforms of the WTO in terms of civil society engagement and ‘new multilateralism’ 
(see chapter six). 
 
                                                 
694 Robert Hunter Wade. ‘Inequalities Of World Incomes: What Should Be Done’, in Open Democracy, 2001. 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/forum/document_details.asp?docid=832andcatid=99
695 Joseph E. Stiglitz. The Development Round that Wasn’t, Webdiary, 14 May 2005 
http://webdiary.com.au/cms/?q=node/1058
696 Uruguay Round Agreement. Agreement on Agriculture, Part VII, Article 13. ‘Due Restraint’. 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_02_e.htm#articleXIII
697 Oxfam America. Immunity from Challenge at WTO Would Undermine Development Round, 13 December 
2005. 
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/press_releases/press_release.2005-12-13.7485082947
698 Peter Sutherland et al. The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium, 
Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Pantichapakdi. Geneva: The World Trade 
Organization, 13 March 2004.        
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.pdf
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Consequently, it is difficult for the alter-globalization movement to present a clear 
distinction to civil society between themselves and the official spokespersons of 
corporate hegemony. The obscuring of this distinction has been a deliberate ploy to 
ensure that civil society is unclear about who is responsible for the inequalities and 
suffering perpetuated by the current corporate world hegemony. In doing so it appears 
that political elites are motivated and capable of generating the reforms of 
international institutions to bring about the realisation of global justice. Perhaps more 
importantly this blurring of who is responsible ensures that civil society is unaware of 
the structural power of corporate hegemony within international organizations. Due to 
this the reforms offered by political elites will only ever be cosmetic and so maintain 
the existence of corporate structural power and world hegemony. At the same time 
discussion of reform by political elites is enough to weaken the mobilization of civil 
society behind the issues raised by the alter-globalization movement. Thereby the 
political elites of the nebuleuse are able to neuter support for counter-hegemonic 
forces, and avoid the radical change or transformation in world politics required to 
emancipate the world from corporate hegemony through ‘new multilateralism’. 
 
The problems of trasformismo were also evident during the global Action Against 
Poverty campaign in 2005. Again political elites did not ignore the protesters, but 
promoted themselves to the public as the champions of global social justice, whilst at 
the same time waging war in Iraq and maintaining the debt and global trading system. 
In the lead up to the July 2005 G8 meeting at Gleneagles, Scotland, a UK coalition of 
500 British NGOs and campaign groups came together to form Make Poverty 
History.699 This coalition began to campaign for the G8 to address the African debt 
relief, aid and trade rules, which perpetuated the poverty within the continent. This 
campaign received a phenomenal degree of public support, in schools, churches and 
universities. Their emblem was a white wristband with the word’s Make Poverty 
                                                 
699 Make Poverty History. 16 October 2006. 
http://www.makepovertyhistory.org/ 
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History emblazed upon it. On the 3rd July 2003, 250,000 people marched through the 
city of Edinburgh in white shirts making a single white band around the city as a 
symbol of the poverty trap for many developing countries due to international debt 
and unfair trade rules by the WTO. Bob Geldof, the man who brought the famine and 
starvation in Africa to the world’s attention through Live Aid in the 1980s, organised 
Live8 concerts to draw attention to the G8 Summit. The UK Prime Minster Tony 
Blair, and Finance Minister Gordon Brown met with Bob Geldof, Bono and Richard 
Curtis, the organisers and performers of the UK Live8. Many of the Make Poverty 
History organisers were uncomfortable with the close relationship these pop stars 
maintained with the UK political elites because both Blair and Brown argued that they 
believed in, and indeed would march in, the Make Poverty History demonstration. 
 
The significance of this close relationship between the UK political elites and the pop 
stars that gained media attention and sought to speak for the campaign was that Make 
Poverty History was hijacked. John Hilary of War on Want drew attention to this 
hijacking and the fact that the UK is a member of the G8 and a leading advocate of 
neoliberal globalization, but that in contradiction to this they were advocating a 
campaign for the G8 to change its policies.700 Such a close relationship between the 
self-appointed spokespersons for the campaign and the political elites blurred the 
message of who was responsible for global inequalities, war and debt. Similarly in a 
squabble between the pop stars an important point was raised on the issues of 
cooption. On the one hand Bob Geldof declared that the conclusion of the G8 talks 
was a success for the people in Africa, whilst Bono declared that George W. Bush 
“deserved a place in history for turning the fate of the continent around”.701 Yet, the 
reality of the G8 proposals to address the plight of the World’s poorest is 
                                                 
700 John Hilary quoted from Tom Burgis, ‘Insiders-Outsiders: The NGO Fracture Zone’, in Open Democracy, 4 
July 2005. 
701 Bono quoted from Bianca Jagger, ‘Why I Don’t Trust Them, or Sleeping with the Enemy’, Open Democracy, 
15 July 2005. 
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disappointing when analysed properly.702 On the other hand Bianca Jagger argued 
Blair and Brown “neutralised and coopted the efforts of hundreds of NGOs, 
grassroots organisations and people throughout the world united in their desire to see 
poverty eradicated. They achieved their aims with the help of Geldof and Bono”.703 
Jagger does raise an important point about cooption of the Make Poverty History 
campaign.  
 
The leaders of the G8 also made statements that they would address the trading 
relations of the least developed states at the WTO’s Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference in December 2005. Throughout this 2005 campaign Make Poverty 
History collected the e-mail addresses of thousands of UK citizens, who agreed with 
the sentiments of this alter-globalization movement. These e-mail addresses have 
been used to regularly update these people on recent events and upcoming campaigns 
in order to encourage them to get involved in protest activism again. Using the latest 
technology Make Poverty History has made simple procedures in order to 
electronically e-mail politicians as they engage in decision-making in the institutions 
of the nebuleuse, such as the WTO. For example on 10 December 2005, the Make 
Poverty History coalition delivered a total of 750,000 votes from campaigners all over 
Britain calling on the UK Government to deliver trade justice at the Hong Kong 
WTO.704 Unfortunately, Hong Kong achieved nothing in terms of the trading reforms 
that Make Poverty History had campaigned for to alleviate poverty in Africa. 
 
In many ways these demonstrations that began in Seattle and the arguments that these 
protesters took to the door of the WTO Ministerial Conference have been brought into 
the consciousness of a much wider public. As the Make Poverty History campaign 
                                                 
702 Ben Young. NGO Assessment of the G8 Proposals for Debt Cancellation, Jubilee Scotland, 2005, (Unpublished 
Manuscript). 
703 Bianca Jagger, ‘Why I Don’t Trust Them, or Sleeping with the Enemy’, in Open Democracy, 15 July 2005, p. 
2. 
704 Make Poverty History. Santa Delivers’, Make Poverty History, 12 December 2005 
http://www.makepovertyhistory.org/yearsofar/santa.shtml 
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demonstrates, the alter-globalization movement has refined its repertoires. It is now 
clear that there are counter-hegemonic movements striving to alter the institutions of 
global governance and neoliberal globalization so that they address the global ills of 
poverty, alienation and war they perpetuate. The alter-globalization movement is also 
reaffirming the concept of the public accountability of political elites. This was 
demonstrated in the latest Make Poverty History campaigns, such as ‘The World is 
Watching’ and specifically the ‘Lend Us Your Eyes’ campaigns, which asked for 
individuals to e-mail pictures of their eyes so that these pictures could be sent as a 
giant collage to world leaders.705 Such campaigns draw attention to the altering of 
public consciousness to make political elites aware that a more informed and critically 
aware public is watching their actions and decision-making. At the same time political 
elites have begun employing a strategy of distortion and coopting the language and 
issues of the alter-globalization movement into their rhetoric. Therefore, the message 
from the demonstrators and political elites has begun to sound the same even though 
they are very different.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
The chapter has attempted to illustrate that hegemonic political elites have engaged in 
a policy of trasformismo - both distorted and coopted the language of the alter-
globalization movement into their own rhetoric in order to justify the policies and 
procedures of the WTO – thus enhancing the legitimacy of the prevailing hegemonic 
order. In the first instance, the chapter illustrated that the events at Seattle were part of 
a wider campaign to resist and propagate the imposing of corporate hegemony to the 
world. Through consulting social movement theory it was argued that although these 
theorists provided insight into some of the core factors attributed to social movements 
(informal networks, forms of protest and the reasons for shifts in campaigns: 
                                                 
705 Make Poverty History. Lend US Your Eyes, 12 December 2005. 
http://www.actionaidspace.org/campaigns/EYESITE.htm 
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communication networks and shifts in centres of power) it negated the core concept of 
hegemony. Social movement theory was then argued to naturalise the ‘top down’ 
nature of hegemony because it did not identify the manner in which social movements 
from civil society attempted to transform the existing system of hegemony. In contrast 
it was asserted that transnational counter-hegemonic forces have emerged because of 
the creation of corporate world hegemony. With the coordination of neoliberal 
globalization by the nebuleuse and the unleashing of TNCs throughout the world, 
national social movements have found allies outside of national borders in a common 
cause of resistance to the institutions of corporate hegemony. From literature written 
by activists it was clear that this was why the WTO was targeted and that the term 
counter-hegemonic forces captures the common denominator of this transnational 
protest, rather than the term ‘anti-globalization’ movement. 
 
The chapter has also attempted to establish a continuum between ‘de-globalist’ and 
‘alter-globalist’ perspectives to illustrate the many different aims and objectives of the 
counter-hegemonic forces. In doing so it was argued that it was possible to identify a 
distinct ‘alter-globalization’ movement, which demands reform or transformation of 
the institutions of global governance. Those social movements and NGOs that fall 
within this alter-globalization movement definition do so because they promote 
reforming global governance towards the principles that address aid, debt, poverty, 
environmental protection, human rights, indigenous peoples’ land rights, national and 
international organised labour, national land reform, social justice, and women’s 
empowerment. More specifically a significant number advocated the participation of 
civil society groups in international decision-making in a similar manner to radical 
democracy of Coxian ‘new multilateralism’.  
 
Finally, the chapter has sought to argue that the protests on the street by the alter-
globalization movement have not been able to change the policies and processes of 
the WTO through mobilising civil society. The reason for this is that the political 
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elites of corporate hegemony have been able to successfully distort and coopt the 
arguments and language of the alter-globalization movement. It was pointed out that 
the media and political elites have used the term ‘anti-globalization’ movement to 
draw the public’s attention to the use of violence at each site of protest and not the 
political arguments of ‘organic intellectuals’. Since Seattle US and European 
hegemonic political elites have begun to speak of the need for global justice, fair trade 
and peace as they coopt the language of the alter-globalization movement. The ‘so-
called’ Doha Development Agenda also appears to have hijacked the language of the 
protesters and is used as a source of evidence that the interests of the people in the 
developing world are at the core of all WTO decisions. The UK’s Make Poverty 
History campaign in 2005 reinforced this argument. It was argued that UK’s Prime 
Minster had been able to hijack the campaign to promote global reform of 
international aid, debt and trade and the momentum of the protest was neutralised. 
Such cooption has been used to legitimise the policies and process of the WTO to a 
wider civil society. 
 
It could be argued from these examples that the reforms offered by political elites are 
only cosmetic and so maintain the existence of corporate structural power and world 
hegemony. At the same time discussion of reform by political elites is enough to 
weaken the mobilization of civil society behind the issues raised by the alter-
globalization movement. Thereby the political elites of the nebuleuse are able to 
neuter support for counter-hegemonic forces, and avoid the radical change or 
transformation in world politics required to emancipate the world from corporate 
hegemony through ‘new multilateralism’. There is nothing new in these tactics, as 
Tom Burgis explains, “the history of power, is the history of assimilating 
dissidence”706 – or as Cox has pointed out cooption of the demands of counter-
hegemonic forces is a core function of any institution of world hegemony.  
                                                 
706 Tom Burgis, ‘Insiders-Outsiders: The NGO Fracture Zone’, in Open Democracy, 4 July 2005. 
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Chapter Six 
            
‘Alter-NGO’: Legitimising or Altering the World Trade 
Organisation. 
 
In fifty years’ time we might look back and say that NGOs were an essential 
impulse to democratic change in areas like international trade, even if they 
themselves were not always the answer.707 
 
Any effort to explore counter-hegemonic efforts to curb corporate global rule 
should address corporate counter efforts to silence, evade, oppose, and coopt 
such unwarranted political pressures.708 
 
Trasformismo also absorbs potentially counter-hegemonic ideas and makes these 
ideas consistent with hegemonic doctrine.709 
6.1 Introduction and Aims 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the impact of the strategies of Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) with an alter-globalization agenda on the policy 
and process of the World Trade Organizations (WTO). Alter-globalization NGOs 
(Alter-NGOs) reflect the principles of a Coxian ‘new multilateralism’, and emphasise 
the primacy of a ‘bottom up’ democratisation of the decision-making of the nebuleuse 
through the active participation of civil society.710 In a previous study, Robert O’Brien 
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Cox and Timothy Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 139. 
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et al acknowledged that NGOs had very limited access to the International Monetary 
Fund, World Bank and WTO (institutions of the nebuleuse) and the access granted 
was largely to pacify public critics. These writers also claimed that the limited 
participation offered by the WTO still presented NGOs with a “yardstick by which to 
measure performance”.711 Indeed participation of NGOs at the WTO was seen as 
evidence of a process of ‘complex-multilateralism’, which signalled the beginning of 
a Coxian ‘new multilateralism’. Similarly, Alison Van Rooy argues that “Incremental 
change ought not to be discounted: it signals nascent frame-changing through 
alterations in staffing (NGO liaison units have been set up at the World Bank and 
IMF, for instance), procedural policies (such as the WTO’s formal guidelines for its 
relationship with NGOs, or the banks’ guidelines on participation), and change in 
language (to include terms such as ‘civil society’ and ‘partnership’).712 Warning 
against such incremental changes, Mark Rupert points out, that “(r)evolutionary 
change needs to be distinguished from reform which may result in significant 
redistribution of resources, but which has the political effect of demobilizing 
grassroots movements, pre-emptive transformative process of struggle and collective 
self-empowerment, and contracting the horizons of self-empowerment, and 
contracting the horizons of the political possibility”.713 This chapter will argue that 
accreditation and participation of Alter-NGOs at the WTO should be viewed with 
caution and even suspicion, rather than being celebrated.  
 
There is a cause for concern over the political elites of the nebuleuse granting official 
access to Alter-NGOs at the WTO because of the danger of cooptation. Robert W. 
Cox, following Antonio Gramsci, has drawn attention to this type of ‘reform from 
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above’ as it represents ‘passive revolution’ or trasformismo.714 At the heart of this 
concept of trasformismo is the assertion that social reform initiated from above is for 
the sole purpose of forestalling popular political mobilization and thereby disabling 
the potential for democratic transformation. By controlling access to decision-making 
bodies political elites act as gatekeepers – determining who can participate, on what 
terms and by what means. In performing this function structural power is used to 
ensure that Alter-NGOs are seen to be participating to a wider public, but in reality 
they are not meaningfully part of the decision-making process and their presence is no 
more than a public relations exercise. Thereby trasformismo satisfies the demand for 
public oversight and participation at the WTO, whilst weakening the argument that a 
democratic deficit exists and ultimately building legitimacy for the WTO. There is 
therefore a danger that Alter-NGOs are being coopted by the WTO in order to pacify 
demands for just change, whilst also legitimising both the existing structure and 
neoliberal ideology to a wider civil society.  
 
In order to build this argument the chapter will first establish why the WTO has a 
democratic deficit and why NGOs are deemed to be able to address this problem. In 
the next section the nature of NGOs and the problems of cooptation within the United 
Nations (UN), IMF and World Bank will be examined. It will also be pointed out that 
there has been condemnation of the emergence of highly professional transnational 
private aid agencies because they push out the local social movements and 
depoliticise decision-making. Having established some of the problems with NGO 
participation in the institutions of the nebuleuse, the chapter will then illustrate the 
favouring of business NGOs and the cooptation of NGOs through the WTO opening 
some official channels to NGOs - accreditation, symposia and access to more official 
documentation. Terms such as ‘civil society’ and ‘partnership’ may be part of the 
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WTO’s official language now, but the reality is still that official access to the WTO 
decision-making bodies has been fiercely resisted. Subsequently, the chapter will 
evaluate two strategies employed through unofficial channels by Alter-NGOs to place 
their interests at the heart of the WTO: offering their expertise to the developing 
countries during trade negotiations to build counter-coalitions; and secondly, Alter-
NGOs submitting their demands though amicus briefs to the WTO’s Dispute Settle 
Body (DSB) and relying on the judicial activism of Appellate Bodies for their 
acceptance. Both of these strategies have been fiercely condemned by hegemonic 
elites. Through the example of the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference the role of 
Alter-NGOs will be examined. It will be suggested that the collapse of Cancun has 
perhaps helped to legitimise the WTO system and its neoliberal ideology. The denial 
of Alter-NGOs’ access to the DSB and the promise of reform by the WTO’s elites 
will be used as an example of further trasformismo. At the moment it appears that the 
Alter-NGOs have little leverage within the WTO and are pawns in the elite process of 
passive revolution and cooption.  
 
6.2 Democratic Deficit: To NGO or not to NGO, that is the Question. 
Since the creation of the WTO in 1995 it has been criticised for suffering from a lack 
of public transparency and sustaining a democratic deficit. After the protests at Seattle 
in 1999 these arguments were brought to a wider public. It has to be remembered that 
it is not only critical writers, such as Robert W. Cox that have identified a democratic 
deficit, so too have mainstream political scientists and legal theorists. For example 
Steve Charnovitz outlines three reasons why a democratic deficit may be found within 
a multilateral international organisation like the WTO: (1) international organisations 
are not run in a democratic manner vis-à-vis participating states; (2) multilateral 
organisations do not make it mandatory for all members to have democratic 
governments in order to participate and ensure that the will of their people is 
represented through their national governments; (3) international organisations are not 
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run in a democratic manner vis-à-vis the public.715 This section will demonstrate that 
as an institution of the nebuleuse the WTO clearly suffers a democratic deficit in each 
of the categories outlined above because it is engaged in top down hegemonic elite 
rule.  
 
Firstly, a democratic deficit exists because not all members of the WTO are able to 
participate equally in the negotiations and because of the inequalities of power and 
knowledge that exist within dispute settlement.716 Hegemonic states have been able to 
use their superior capabilities to provide leverage in negotiations. Green Room 
discussions have allowed for this leverage to be used in a way that transgresses the 
rules of consensus decision-making at the WTO. The legal and complex language 
used in the agreements necessitates the employment of specialised legal teams to 
engage in negotiations and disputes. The ability to buy such legal expertise varies 
significantly across the members. Together these factors allow the corporate 
hegemony emanating primarily from the EC and US to dominate the decision-making 
and dispute settlement process of the WTO. David Held et al clearly acknowledge this 
when they state: 
 
In a world where powerful states make decisions not just for their own 
people but for others as well, and where transnational actors and forces 
cut across the boundaries of national communities in diverse ways, the 
questions of who should be accountable to whom, and on what basis, do 
not easily resolve themselves.717  
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Susan Marks voices similar unease at the loss of the democratic will of the people: 
“since decisions are taken for collective life outside of the national settings, then 
democracy remains compromised … the nation state can no longer be considered the 
container of democracy”.718 Thereby within the WTO the democratic principles of 
consensus decision-making are ignored and the resources to participate in negotiations 
are such that a democratic deficit exists. 
 
Secondly, because the WTO includes non-democratic states the demos of all members 
of the WTO are not represented and a democratic deficit exists. Amongst the 
democratically elected governments, however, it has been suggested that Latin 
America, the US and Western Europe have experienced a decline in electoral 
participation.719 In addition Christophe Bellmann and Richard Gerster have argued 
that with the exception of the US, national parliaments play little or no role in 
international trade negotiations or the ratification of agreements: “the people’s 
representative simply approve what trade diplomats and governments have negotiated 
in a complex give-and-take process leading to the acceptance of multilateral 
packages”.720 This point was highlighted during the US Congress’s vote to agree to 
the Uruguay Round of negotiation that brought life to the WTO. No US Senators 
would agree to the challenge set by Ralph Nader to sign an affidavit declaring that he 
or she had read the Uruguay Round text and publicly answer ten simple questions 
about its content.721 Nader’s point, of course, is that none of the representatives of the 
US people could declare that they were acting on behalf of their constituents because 
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they did not understand what they were agreeing to by signing the US membership of 
the WTO. Thereby the interests and oversight of the demos of all members appears 
unrepresented through the state membership at the WTO because of a lack of 
democratic engagement and oversight from the national representatives within 
democratic and non-democratic countries.  
 
Finally, as Tony McGrew has illustrated, the WTO makes binding decisions within 
negotiations and dispute settlement, which impact directly on the public, but the 
public does not have a right to observe or participate in this decision-making.722 The 
international trade lawyer and academic Robert Howse articulates this problem well:  
 
Governments will still depend largely on the insider network to 
develop the agenda and the negotiating proposals while the “external” 
constituencies look in from the outside. This, in fact, is the real 
democratic deficit, the management of the process by agents who have 
a distinctive interest of their own, which tends to exclude or 
marginalise those that are important to democratic principles.723  
 
Attention is drawn here to the fact that the national demos are not directly represented 
or able to oversee the ‘distinctive interests’ that are being negotiated in their name by 
national trade representatives. Taken together it is clear that a number of academics 
are asking questions regarding the democratic nature of trade negotiations because of 
the lack of input and oversight directly from the national demos, or even through 
national assemblies, into the WTO agreements. The exclusive nature of negotiations 
and dispute settlement also illustrates that an absence of transparency and the 
existence of a ‘democratic deficit’ are very real. As Cox points out this is because 
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national trade representatives are part of the nebuleuse or the transnational networks 
of state elites, corporate interests and finance, which build consensus on the policies 
of global international organizations.724 The absence of public oversight is deliberate 
in order to allow the pursuit of transnational interests without the impediment of the 
demos. 
 
It is not only the WTO that is determined to exhibit such democratic deficits, so too 
are the IMF and World Bank.725 To overcome these democratic deficits there have 
been calls for greater civil society participation in global governance. For example 
drawing attention to the essential role of civil society in generating transparency from 
participation Patrizia Nanz and Jens Steffek argue:  
 
The democratisation of international governance will ultimately depend 
upon the creation of an appropriate transnational public sphere … [and] 
organised civil society groups have the potential to act as ‘transmission 
belts’ […] giving voices to citizens concerns and channel them into the 
deliberative process of international organisations.  Second, they can make 
the internal decision-making process of international organisations more 
transparent to the wider public and formulate technical issues in accessible 
terms.726  
 
There are also two interesting points which Nanz and Steffek are drawing attention to 
here. Firstly, they are asserting that interstate relations are not a sufficient means of 
ensuring a democratic and transparent process within international organisations. In 
order to ensure the plurality of diverse interests is brought into the negotiation process 
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and exclusion is prevented, direct participation by civil society groups must be 
allowed. Direct access to the decision-making process is also argued to facilitate 
greater public understanding of what is being negotiated and how this impacts on the 
lives of citizens. In many ways these demands reflect the ‘globalization from below’ 
as articulated by Coxian ‘new-multilateralism’.  
 
What is interesting is that this demand for greater civil society participation in global 
governance is very often translated into a demand for greater NGO participation. 
Indeed to overcome the WTO’s democratic deficits there have been calls for a more 
formal and structured engagement with NGOs from academics727, statesmen728 and 
NGOs729. These NGOs are deemed to be able to represent the interests of civil society 
generally, and more specifically environmental protection and human and labour 
rights, within the negotiating and dispute settlement process of the WTO.730 Daniel 
Esty, an international lawyer and a supporter of the WTO’s policies of deregulation 
tied to environmental protection, has long argued the necessity of the WTO to allow 
NGO observation and participation in the form of information gathering and 
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argumentation, but not voting.731 The reasoning behind his argument for NGO 
participation is based on his belief that because the vast majority of the public lacks 
an understanding of how the WTO functions, the closed nature of its procedures 
encourages much of the public to see the WTO as a ‘black box’ and suspect that 
multinational corporations and other insiders are taking advantage of their access to 
the levers of power within the system.732 Since it has become almost universally 
accepted that any judicial process that is deemed to be fair ensures ‘justice is seen to 
be done’ in an open court allowing public scrutiny, “The existence of ‘secret 
tribunals’ links the WTO in the minds of many to dictatorships and other 
undemocratic governance systems”.733 It is also argued that NGOs should play an 
important role in representing interests beyond those just relating to trade because: 
 
the WTO cannot help but make decisions that affect a great many 
other policy realms. In doing so, the WTO must show sensitivity to the 
concerns and values that are reflected by those other domains ... 
Broadening the base of its connections to the citizens of the world 
through NGOs represents an important step forward for the 
organisation734 … the dialogue will help to solidify the WTO’s 
legitimacy, deepen its debates and therefore improve the 
organisation’s authoritativeness, and demonstrate its capacity for 
fairness and its ability to balance trade liberalisation goals with other 
important values such as environmental protection.735  
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 Thereby NGOs can bring information, expertise and alternative proposals to the 
WTO. In doing so this can enhance political support for the WTO by ensuring, 
through public oversight, that citizens have their interests represented and that fair 
procedures are being followed within the WTO. 
 
The NGOs themselves clearly believe that they can represent the public interest in a 
manner that can overcome the democratic deficit and enhance the WTO’s legitimacy. 
In 2001 an open letter from forty-six NGOs proposed that the WTO bring 
transparency into all areas of decision-making:  
 
Non-profit public interest nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) groups 
have a major role to play in rebalancing trade policy, to ensure that it 
serves the poor and the environment. WTO members should continue to 
harness the creativity and support of civil society. Failure to engage with 
NGOs has already proved problematic for the WTO. Increasing protests 
against powerful economic institutions demonstrates public suspicion and 
mistrust of these institutions. This mistrust must be addressed through 
open discussion, information sharing and subjecting decisions to public 
scrutiny at both the multilateral and national levels.736  
 
What has to be remembered is that the participation of NGOs in international 
organisations is not some new and radical leap into the unknown. NGOs are 
recognised as legitimate political actors, and have been used to provide technical and 
specialist knowledge to advise political elites since the League of Nations.737 At the 
end of WWII, 1200 NGOs came to San Francisco to participate in the proceedings on 
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the adoption of the United Nations Charter. Their main objective was to ensure that 
the UN Charter would not be confined to international security matters but would 
include provisions dealing with economic, social and cultural matters. These NGOs 
are credited by some with securing the inclusion of human rights provisions in the UN 
Charter.738  
 
This democratising function of NGOs has by no means found universal agreement, 
and a number of writers have cast doubt on just who these NGOs represent and what 
legitimate right they have to observe or participate at the WTO.739 At the core of this 
argument is the view that government-to-government negotiations are as democratic 
as trade negotiations can be. As the three former Secretary Generals of the WTO 
jointly stated in 2001, the WTO is an intergovernmental organisation within which 
only its members can participate, and questions of democracy ought to remain at the 
national level.740 The WTO’s negotiations are deemed to be of a specifically sensitive 
nature due to the binding nature of its rights and obligations, which endows it with a 
“special character”.741 Another way of articulating this is that domestic interests are 
compromised in horse-trading over access to markets. As such there is no place for 
NGOs to be involved in these discussions because they could make public just whose 
interests were being compromised. As a former Argentinian trade official queried 
“can anyone really imagine a trade negotiator agreeing to reasonable trade and 
environmental disciplines while the representatives of the business sector and the 
local branch of Greenpeace or the World Wildlife Fund are seated next to each other 
and him or her at the WTO”.742 Therefore, it is argued that the intergovernmental 
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nature of the WTO determines that only governments are required to sit at the 
negotiating tables. These sentiments were restated again in 2005 when the former 
Secretary General Peter Sutherland brought together seven trade specialists in the 
publication of The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the 
New Millennium, which has come to be known as the ‘Sutherland Report’.743 Fuelling 
this debate, many of the developing states have expressed suspicion at allowing 
NGOs access to the WTO on the grounds that it is inviting another force from the 
developed world to set the trading agenda.744 Therefore there has been a mixed 
reaction to the role that NGOs can play in enhancing the legitimacy of the WTO and 
whether in fact a democratic deficit does exist. The WTO, however, has allowed 
limited access for NGOs to enhance its legitimacy to a wider a public (see below). 
 
6.3 Alter-NGOs: Advocacy, Cooption or Depoliticising 
This apparent acceptance that NGOs represent civil society, however, needs to be 
qualified. It is necessary to further analyse NGOs to illustrate some important 
distinction, which relates to just who is being represented by an NGO. This section 
will define the concept of NGOs and the many ideological positions these NGOs 
support. In doing so it will be illustrated that Alter-NGOs have raised concerns about 
cooptation at the UN, IMF and World Bank. It will also be demonstrated that there are 
fears we are witnessing a ‘globalization from the middle’ as well-funded Alter-NGOs 
with middle-class personnel are pushing out the smaller grassroots social movements 
and causing a depoliticisation of counter-movement within the nebuleuse. 
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There are a number of definitions for non-governmental organisations. For example 
Peter Willets advocates a definition, which encompasses: “any group of people 
relating to each other regularly in some formal manner and engaging in collective 
action, provided that the activities are non-commercial and non-violent, and are not on 
behalf of a government”.745 This definition is very loose and allows Willets to 
incorporate social movements. The problem with doing so is that Willets blurs the 
important distinction between social movements and NGOs. Social movement 
theorists demand a distinction in order to differentiate the different methods of 
organisation and engagement that is unique to each entity when engaging with a 
political system. Social movements are organised around informal and loose 
networks, which employ unconventional forms of protest through unofficial modes of 
political participation.746 In contrast, Timothy Doyle and Doug Mceacher draw a 
distinction between social movements and NGOs on the grounds that NGOs are 
formally organised and engage with political institutions through formal channels.747 
They point out that “NGOs have legitimised themselves through the adoption of 
constitutions, setting rules of conduct and defining organisational goals…Such NGOs 
are as formal as non-institutional politics gets”.748 Most NGOs also seek formal 
recognition from political institutions. There is great diversity amongst the size, 
activity, philosophy and degree of institutionalisation amongst NGOs. As Lorraine 
Elliott points out NGOs are created for one or all the following: conducting research, 
lobbying and pressure group activities and grassroots activism.749 
 
A further distinction to be drawn is between NGOs that operate within one national 
territory, and those that engage in transnational activities and come under the term 
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International Non-Governmental Organisation (INGO).750 Due to technological 
advances in the realms of communications and transport transnational networks of 
NGOs have been made easier in recent years. The formal organisation and the use of 
formal political channels of NGOs are highlighted by the six specific principles laid 
down for NGOs seeking accredited status to the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council (UNECOSOC). These principles state that the NGO should be; representative 
and democratic, non-profit, non-violent, not a political party, not an organisation 
created by an intergovernmental treaty and that they support the aims of the UN.751 
Due to this distinction between formal and informal structures, Doyle and McEacher 
argue that NGOs ought to be considered as contingent parts of social movements and 
not an entirely separate phenomenon. This is an important point because NGOs 
coordinate with social movements, engage in protests and use non-official channels of 
political participation too. Therefore, on the one hand it is the manner in which NGOs 
are formally organised through a constitution that really distinguishes NGOs from 
social movements. On the other hand it is only NGOs that can be accredited to 
international organizations – social movements currently cannot. A further important 
distinction is that NGOs are distinct from corporations because the former does not 
pursue profits.  
 
Since the 1970s, social movements and NGOs have been actively forming 
‘transnational advocacy networks’, which have campaigned for recognition of mainly 
environmental legislation and human rights. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler 
Chayes752, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink753 and Jonathan Graubart754 have 
all demonstrated that NGOs have been instrumental in campaigning for states to 
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uphold human rights and environmental protection norms within existing international 
treaties. Keck and Sikkink describe transnational advocacy networks, which link 
domestic social movements and NGOs in campaigns through a ‘boomerang effect’. 
This boomerang occurs “when channels between the state and its domestic actors are 
blocked, the boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of transnational networks 
may occur: domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out international 
allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside”.755 Thereby social 
movements have actively sought help from advocacy INGOs in the form of lobbying 
both governments and international organizations to condemn the offending state. 
These transnational advocacy networks were successful in bringing international 
pressure on Argentina, Chile and South Africa for human rights violations. Keck and 
Sikkink argue that the international condemnation seen after the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square massacre in China was a result of the 1970s campaigns by transnational 
advocacy network on human rights, which shaped public and state perceptions of 
what is acceptable conduct for states.  
 
The growth in the number of INGOs has been significant. At the beginning of the 20th 
century there were just 176 INGOs, by 1996 there were 38,243 INGOs756, and by 
2001 there were to 48,000 INGOs worldwide.757 Van Rooy asserts that the diversity 
of these INGOs can be identified in terms of Supporters, Rejectionists, Reformers, 
and Alternatives.758 It was established in the previous chapter that social movements 
and NGOs could be situated on a four stage continuum depending on their ideological 
position - beginning with the de-globalist, statist/protectionist, reformist and global 
transformationists. The alter-globalization NGOs were identified as those that fall 
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between the reformist and global transformation positions. Such Alter-NGOs are 
engaged in transnational advocacy networks to represent the disposed and abused 
people by attempting to bring their plight to the attention of the world. Thereby the 
principles of ecology, equality, gender, justice, and peace as articulated by these 
different civil societies, through Alter-NGOs, such as ActionAid, Amnesty 
International, Centre for International Environmental Law, Focus on the Global 
South, International Policy Studies, Greenpeace, Red Cross, Save the Children, Third 
World Network, and the World Development Movement. In doing so these Alter-
NGOs reflect the principles of a Coxian ‘new multilateralism’, and emphasise the 
primacy of a ‘bottom up’ democratisation of the decision-making of the nebuleuse 
through the active participation of the ignored and dispossessed civil society 
groups.759 Drawing from Van Rooy’s category of supporters, however, it is important 
to recognise the NGOs responsible for advocating more neoliberal policies to support 
corporate hegemony. It is also important to illustrate the dangers of cooption that 
Alter-NGOs face. 
 
Although a corporation cannot be defined as an NGO, corporations have cooperated 
to create their own NGOs to lobby on their behalf. With names such as the Global 
Reporting Initiative (Deutsche Bank, Ford, General Motors, Nike and Royal Dutch 
Shell )760, Social Accountability International (Open Society of George Soros, and the 
McArthur, Ford and Rockefeller Foundation )761, and the Triple Bottom Line Initiative 
(IBM, Shell, Heineken, BASF, Philips and Canon)762 their corporate supporting 
identities are not obvious. Ronen Shamir defines such ‘supportive’ NGOs as Market 
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Orientated – NGOs (Ma-NGOs) to explicitly establish their position.763 Through 
Shamir’s analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) he demonstrates that 
corporate hegemony has been able to take control of the demand for civil society 
participation in order to justify the institutions, policies and process of the nebuleuse. 
Firstly he points out that corporate hegemony has determined that it is only NGOs that 
can represent civil society within the nebuleuse. The demands from protesters for 
transparency and democratisation of the nebuleuse through civil society 
representation have been converted to NGOs as the agents responsible for 
representing civil society. The legitimacy of an institution and its policies then rests 
upon NGOs’ involvement in the decision-making process. Shamir argues that 
corporations are aware of this legitimising function that NGOs perform and have 
created their own non-profit Ma-NGOs in order to campaign and participate in 
governing arrangements to establish legitimacy. In creating Ma-NGOs corporations 
have been able to claim that civil society oversight and participation is taking place 
under the label of NGOs, and therefore claim civil society has approved of the 
institution and its policies.  
 
Shamir points out that corporations have assertively embarked upon strategies to 
address the public demand for greater control of corporations through constructing the 
frameworks for CSR themselves. Part of this strategy has been to weave the language 
of ‘accountability’, ‘transparency’ and ‘participation’ throughout CSR, with a focus 
on NGO involvement to ensure its legitimacy. Crucially, however, this framework 
ensures that the very notion of CSR is amenable to corporate concerns. Consequently, 
“the common denominator of all corporate-orientated and corporate-inspired notions 
of “social responsibility” is the voluntary, non-enforceable, and self-regulating 
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meaning of the term”.764 Successful lobbying has resulted in a corporate-inspired 
‘Global Compact’ at the UN to oversee CSR, and similar bodies have been created 
with the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Each of these bodies promotes voluntary, 
non-enforceable, and self-regulating CSR, and advocates voluntary cooperation 
between corporations and NGOs through “constructive dialogue”. Those NGOs 
participating and legitimising the process are the Ma-NGOs, such as Global Reporting 
Initiative, Social Accountability International, and the Triple Bottom Line Initiative.  
 
In contrast Alter-NGOs, such as Corporate Watch, Human Rights Watch, and 
Amnesty International have voiced fierce reservation and suspicion of the NGO and 
corporate ‘partnership model’. For example these Alter-NGOs have cooperated to 
create ‘Alliance for a Corporate-Free UN’, and have asserted in an open letter to the 
UN 
 
The Global Compact allows the name and reputation of the UN to be 
abused by corporations whose practices are in contradiction with the 
values of the UN. Partnerships with these corporations damage the 
integrity and mission of your agency and of the United Nations … We 
also describe the use of the Global Compact by participating lobby 
groups as a rhetorical weapon in the effort to prevent progress on the UN 
Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights. … Therefore, 
again, we call on you to end your agency's participation in the Global 
Compact, in favor of initiatives that emphasize cooperation with groups 
that share the aims of the United Nations, and in favor of measures to 
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hold powerful corporations accountable in an international legal 
framework.765 
 
Indeed these Alter-NGOs have warned against such corporate ‘partnership models’ 
because it draws Alter-NGOs into relationships with corporations, which affords them 
little input into decision-making, but portrays NGOs as advocating these policies. 
Thereby such arrangements of NGO inclusion perform a legitimising function for 
corporate governing bodies because Alter-NGOs are seen to be participating, but the 
reality of their limited involvement in decision-making ensures that the policies from 
governing bodies do not reflect the interests of the Alter-NGOs. Shamir therefore 
draws attention to the corporate blue wash, and the corporatization of the UN and 
other bodies of the nebuleuse, which advocate corporate and NGO partnership 
because it is not an equal relationship.766  
 
Claims that Alter-NGOs are suffering from cooptation at the IMF and World Bank 
have also gained voice in recent years. Far from the claim made by O’Brien et al that 
these institutions were beginning to open up their procedures through accreditation for 
NGOs resulting in policies modification767 – a very different story of cooptation is 
emerging. As Van Rooy argues, in theory accreditation is responsible for 
“legitimising an active role for civil society in economic decision-making”.768 The 
reason for such hesitation, however, is that the consequence of NGO engagement has 
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not evolved in a way that NGOs would have wanted. As Jackie Smith stresses many 
NGOs that have gained access to the World Bank have become coopted by the 
institution creating Coopted NGOs (CONGOS). Smith sums up these concerns 
succinctly when she states that  
 
many activists argue that the limited access provided to international 
arenas reflects an attempt by states to co-opt movement organisations and 
to channel movement pressure in directions that limits its capacity for 
achieving fundamental social change. And the fact that states govern the 
rules of NGO access to international institutions means that the more 
radical critics are kept outside of this institutional arena.769  
 
Similarly David Craig and Doug Porter draw attention to the manner in which the 
language of apparently apolitical catchwords like participation, partnership, and 
community have been used to legitimise the policy process at the global level. 
Partnership and participation here have powerful legitimating roles, as NGOs and 
civil society groups are routinely involved as proxy representatives for the marginal. 
But these approaches are nonetheless prone to accusations of being mere ‘spin and 
deceit’.770 
 
During the late 1990s Jonathon Fox documented the realisation of such fears as he 
saw NGOs cooption at the World Bank.771 Similarly Goldman has illustrated how the 
World Bank has drawn from the demands of the global green movement to weave 
their language through the rhetoric of World Bank policies without providing real 
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input into decision-making.772 Similarly in 2004 ActionAid pointed out that since 
1999 NGOs had been encouraged to contribute to the creation of Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) as a means of bringing public influence into the conditions 
set by the IMF and World Bank loans.773 ActionAid, however, asserted that NGOs 
representing civil society groups were prevented from advocating alternatives to the 
policies proposed by the IMF and World Bank. In 2005, the Civil Society Members of 
the World Bank-Civil Society Joint Facilitation Committee, including a number of 
Alter-NGOs accredited to the World Bank declared that the World Bank was ignoring 
them.774 Accredited NGOs also expressed anger after meetings with the World Bank 
were postponed. Allegations were made that the meetings were merely a “public 
relations exercise” and that the World Bank was not serious about giving a greater 
voice to indigenous and local people affected by the finance projects of this 
institution.775 The Alter-NGO, Global Policy Forum, has also argued that the wide 
discussion of the merits of PRSPs shows the unease of many NGOs and academics 
with the narrow interpretation given to the concept of ‘participation’ by the IMF and 
World Bank. This in turn has led to assertions that the demand for participation from 
protesters has been hijacked by the nebuleuse. Participation has come to mean that 
NGOs are consulted and in doing so provide legitimacy to the policies and process of 
the nebuleuse. What the contrived definition of participation by the IMF and World 
Bank, however, entails is that NGOs are not actually being able to influence the 
decision-making process. Therefore ‘participation’ is argued to have become the "new 
tyranny".776 
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 As neoliberal hegemony has privileged civil society consultation in terms of NGOs as 
a source of policy legitimacy, criticisms have also been directed at the emergence of 
professional transnational advocacy networks. Shamir illustrates that this NGO 
paradigm, which establishes the “right way of doing things” “is heavily biased 
towards the corporate hegemonic model of organization and implementation ... 
perceived grievances of oppressed, marginalized and exploited populations are 
transformed into a meaningful political and legal voice by relatively affluent and 
secure career-situated experts who often speak the language of and deploy the 
instruments of hegemonic rational organization and managerial systems characteristic 
of contemporary capitalism”.777 Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Cesar A. Rodriguez-
Garavito illustrate the point that “Missing from this top-down picture are the myriad 
local, non-English-speaking actors – from grassroots organizations to community 
leaders – who, albeit are often working in alliance with transnational NGOs and 
progressive elites, mobilize popular resistance to neoliberal legality while remaining 
as local as ever”.778 Yet, because it is only NGOs that can be represented within the 
institutions of global governance many non-western civil society groups are 
overlooked or crowded out. By defining who is eligible to participate and under what 
conditions, there is a fear that professional western NGOs have become complicit in 
diluting the demands of grassroots civil society groups in order to maintain their 
position in negotiations. Therefore Shamir raises concerns over the ‘deradicalization’ 
of participation within the institutions of corporate hegemony.  
 
Jeremy Gould and Julia Ojanen’s analysis of domestic Tanzanian civil society 
engagement in the development of PRSPs also raises similar concerns over the NGO 
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paradigm.779 The expertise required for effective participation within PRSPs, and 
global governance in general, privileges the organizational form of transnational 
private aid agency NGOs. These writers point out that the voluntary and ad hoc nature 
of grassroots domestic organization undermines their ability to participate effectively 
in the decision-making process of PRSPs. They illustrate that Tanzanian civil society 
groups were overwhelmed by the nature of the “intellectual challenges of formulating 
alternatives to the hegemonic neoliberal policy regime … Leading advocates are 
ignored when their arguments are too critical, or coopted into the mainstream by the 
Government and its partners”.780 Voicing similar concerns to Shimar, Gould and 
Ojanen highlight that reliance on professional NGOs is causing a depoliticisation of 
the PRSPs’ negotiating process because more radical demands are removed. Such 
unease is based on the observation that “the new corps of policy advocates are not 
necessarily ‘movement veterans’ – grassroots activists with deep ties to a social cause 
– but development professionals whose vocational skills have been moulded first and 
foremost by the bureaucratic demands of the development industry”.781  
 
Gould and Ojanen argue that an ‘iron triangle’ of transnational middle-class 
professionals from state actors, donor agencies and NGOs has emerged to dominate 
negotiations of PRSPs. This leads Sen to argue that far from representing 
‘globalization from below’, the growing reliance on professional advocacy NGOs to 
represent grassroots civil society groups within international debates and institutions 
has resulted in a debate amongst a transnationally homogenous middle-class – a 
‘globalization from the middle’. Genuine grassroots ‘processes, identities and 
cultures’ are subordinated to an exclusive dialogue among those with a common 
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“class, lifestyle and language".782 It is argued that since these transnational middle-
class professionals have all been similarly schooled in the problem-solving approach 
to development a process of ‘deradicalisation’ and ‘depoliticisation’ has emerged 
from this ‘iron triangle’, which does advocate counter-hegemony. Similarly, Craig 
Murphy argues that regardless of the inclusion of NGOs in global governance they are 
no match for the prominence of business interests, which ensures the plight of the 
world’s politically, economically and socially excluded will not change unless it is in 
the interests of the market and supported by the dominant states.783 Therefore there is 
a fear that the dominance of professional transnational advocacy networks may 
perform a key role in passive revolution. 
 
Acknowledging the possibility of cooptation and the ‘deradicalisation’ of political 
debate through NGO participation in the international organizations of the nebuleuse 
is not intended to dismiss Alter-NGOs. Undoubtedly, Cox was weary of looking to 
NGOs as the source of counter-hegemony and that incremental change from above is 
motivated by the desire to absorb and manipulate demands for an alternative order so 
that their arguments and movements come to conform to the hegemonic doctrine.784. 
It would appear that this warning has validity given to the criticisms voiced by the 
Alter-NGOs that the political elites of the nebuleuse have engaged in trasformismo 
though defining that only NGOs can represent civil society groups and limiting NGO 
engagement in decision-making to the minimal level of a definition of participation. 
The fear that a reliance on advocacy NGOs will ‘deradicalise’ the demands of 
grassroots social movements as transnational middle-class values and norms dominate 
debate, is also the reason that Cox asserted, “only where representation in 
                                                 
782 See Sen, Jai. Civilising Globalisation? Globalising Civilisation? Some Reflections Towards Civil Governance 
and a Conscious, Critical Globalisation, Paper presented to the Helsinki Conference 2002 on Searching for Global 
Partnerships, 2002, p. 13-15.      
http://www.helsinkiconference.I/netcomm/news
783 Craig Murphy. ‘Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood’, in International Affairs Vol. 76, No 
4, 2000, p. 802. 
784 Robert W. Cox. ‘Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay on Method’ (1983), in Robert W. 
Cox and Timothy Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 139. 
 248
international institutions is firmly based upon an articulate social and political 
challenge to hegemony – upon a nascent historical bloc and counter hegemony – 
could participation within international organizations pose a real threat”.785 Important 
and insightful as these arguments are, de Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito point 
out “If hegemonic structures and discourses are so pervasive as to absorb and dilute 
counter-hegemonic strategies (which renders the latter undistinguishable from what 
they oppose), we are left with a deterministic image of globalization in which there is 
virtually no space for resistance or change”.786 It is therefore essential to acknowledge 
that Alter-NGOs may not be perfect, but they do provide a means of bringing the 
principles of ecology, equality, gender, justice, and peace as articulated by different 
civil society members into the institutions of the nebuleuse. The point being made is 
that Alter-NGOs have to be cautious of being invited into the institutions of the 
nebuleuse, and finding that their political demands are being ignored or diluted, whilst 
their participation is used to legitimise the corporate world order. 
 
6.4 After Seattle: The Limits of Official NGO Engagement at the WTO 
It could be strongly argued that trasformismo has been the WTO’s response to the 
protests in Seattle in 1999. What has to be remembered is that since its creation the 
WTO’s Charter has established provision for consultation and cooperation with NGOs 
through the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE).787 In 1996, this 
Committee made it clear that it thought NGOs really ought to be directing their 
energies at the national level and not at the WTO.788 Since the WTO’s Singapore 
Ministerial Conference in 1996, NGOs have been able to attend Ministerial 
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Conferences after they had first undergone a process of registration and accreditation. 
Jan Aart Scholte, Robert O’Brien and Marc Williams concluded from their analysis of 
this conference that the WTO had done very little to institutionalise relationships with 
civil society, but had preferred to focus engagement with the supportive groups of 
business, whilst providing a merely cosmetic level of engagement with the rest of 
civil society.789 Access to WTO Ministerial Conferences had revolved primarily 
around business groups that were in favour of greater access to foreign markets. For 
example, over 65% of those NGOs accredited to attend the Singapore Ministerial 
Conference represented business interests. Inequality of access to the WTO also exists 
between NGOs from the North and South. The NGOs based in the North “urban 
based, university educated, computer-literate, relatively high earning, English 
speakers” were asserted to have had greater access to the WTO than those civil 
society groups that have emerged from the South. Those representatives have also 
been gender biased towards men.790 The WTO, they therefore argued, was guilty of 
“unequal access, shallowness, and limited reciprocity”. 
 
At the Seattle Ministerial Conference, 686 NGO organizations were accredited and 
present, and an official WTO parallel NGO Symposium was held during the 
Ministerial Conference. The symposium took place outside the formal structure of the 
WTO and physically outside the building holding the Ministerial Conference itself. 
The purpose of the symposium, asserted the WTO Secretariat, was to encourage an 
informal dialogue between WTO members and representatives of non-government 
organizations on issues likely to affect the international trading system of the WTO in 
the next century in order to (1) enhance awareness of the issues involved (2) provide a 
forum for exchange of ideas and (3) increase the understanding of the WTO's 
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contribution in these areas.791 Michael Chossudivsky undermines the credibility of 
this symposium by drawing attention to the blatant corporate interests that were 
present and involved in its organization.792 Firstly formal accreditation was conducted 
by the Seattle Host Committee, which was chaired by Microsoft’s Bill Gates and 
Philip Condit of The Boeing Company. He further argues that the symposium was 
organized in 1998 to ensure that radical or potential conflictual NGOs were absent, 
and only ‘partner NGOs’ vetted to ensure their sympathy to the WTO’ free trade were 
able to attend. He argues that these ‘partner NGOs’ “serve to deflect the articulation 
of ‘real’ social movements against the New World Order”. Similar to the self-
regulation of CSR, Chossudivsky draws attention to a ‘moratorium’ demanded by 
civil society groups on the run up to Seattle, which became an official audit on the 
effectiveness of the WTO - conducted by the WTO and Western Governments.793 
NGOs that were providing the background reports for this audit were performing a 
legitimising function for the WTO, he claimed.794 Therefore prior to the Seattle 
protests a policy of trasformismo appeared to be employed by the WTO to regulate 
the participation of NGOs to ensure business interests were allowed access, whilst 
also ensuring that it could claim legitimacy for the institution because public access 
was granted through engagement with Ma-NGOs. 
 
Immediately after the protests at Seattle the WTO engaged in a public relations 
exercise, which included statements about establishing forums for NGOs to engage 
with the WTO. A major part of the strategy to address the claims of non-transparency 
and the democratic deficit in decision-making was to promote the WTO’s own 
website. Documents from WTO meetings that had previously been restricted were 
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now available to the public and NGOs via the WTO’s official website. On 1 February 
2001 a new electronic document database was created. In addition, the WTO 
declassified documentation on the outcomes of trade negotiations, the creation of 
Panels, and the rulings of dispute settlements from the Appellate Body. These are also 
available to the public through the WTO’s own official website.795 Through this ‘on-
line out-reach’ the Sutherland Report declared that the WTO has made significant 
efforts to become more transparent and involve civil society groups.796  
 
The second part of the public relations exercise was to assert that relations were being 
built with NGOs and therefore public involvement was taking place at the WTO. The 
WTO began to engage in a number of ‘dialogues and briefings’ whereby NGOs were 
now able to engage in informal discussions and formal symposia with the WTO 
secretariat; attend technical seminars on particular issues of the WTO remit; and a 
specific out-reach section on the WTO’s website to receive NGO position papers. 
Research papers from NGOs were also accepted by the WTO at the annual NGO 
Symposium. These annual symposia have allowed NGOs to voice their opinions on; 
‘Issues Confronting The World Trading System’ (6 and 7 July 2001)797, ‘The Doha 
Development Agenda and Beyond’ (29 April to 1 May 2002)798, ‘Challenges Ahead 
on the Road to Cancún’ (16 to 18 June 2003)799 ‘Multilateralism at a crossroads’ (25 
to 27 May 2004)800 and “WTO After 10 Years: Global Problems and Multilateral 
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Solutions” (20 to 22 April 2005).801 But as Ernest-Ulrich Petersmann explains, “[The 
symposia] are no substitute for internationalising civil society representatives as an 
advisory body with access to WTO documents and the right to submit 
recommendations to all WTO bodies subject to procedures”.802  
 
Nevertheless, O’Brien et al celebrated the participation of NGOs within the 
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) as the beginning of a process of more 
engagement with the civil society groups.803 Yet in 2005 the WTO’s own website 
continued to state that observer status is as far as NGO participation can go: 
 
It would be inappropriate to allow NGOs to participate directly as 
observers in the proceedings of the CTE. The main consideration for many 
delegations was that primary responsibility for informing the public and 
establishing relations with NGOs lies at the national level. Another 
concern related to the special character of the WTO, which is both a 
legally binding instrument, involving rights and obligations for its 
Members, and a forum for negotiations.804 
 
Moreover observer status for NGOs has been prevented within "special sessions" held 
by the CTE, which reserves access solely for member state representatives.805 As 
Ngaire Woods and Amrita Narlikar state, transparency is not enough. Real 
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accountability requires active participation.806 Consequently, rather than NGOs 
finding that they have begun to prise open the door of the WTO to establish greater 
access, as O’Brien et al assert, the intergovernmental nature of the WTO takes 
precedence over transparency and actual participation. Observation status satisfies the 
requirement that NGOs are engaged in WTO agreement, but also ensures that NGOs 
are unable to bring their issues to the negotiating table and influence decision-making 
with one exception (see below). 
 
The number of NGOs actually accredited to the WTO for Ministerial Conferences 
also rose after Seattle. At Seattle, 776 were deemed eligible for accreditation and 686 
were present. Following Seattle, at the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001 the WTO 
claimed that of the 651 NGOs with accreditation, only 370 were represented because 
of the “lack of accommodation available”. At the Cancun Ministerial Conference, 785 
NGOs and almost 1,600 of their representatives attended.807 Regardless of these high 
numbers of NGOs present at Ministerial Conferences and the WTO reforms since 
Seattle, Rorden Wilkinson, points out WTO negotiations still take place behind closed 
doors and officially NGOs are still not permitted entrance.808 Wilkinson asserts that 
since Singapore a strict vetting procedure emerged, so that in order to receive 
accreditation NGOs have been “requested to provide general information on the 
institutional structure of their organization, including details of national, regional and 
international representation, the number of staff, size of membership, and financial 
statements, as well as a statement of whether they have previously attended WTO 
Ministerial Meetings”.809 Consequently, NGOs are chosen by the WTO from those 
deemed to have a legitimate interest in trade issues so that “the WTO’s emerging 
regime for dealing with NGOs is likely to continue to favour those well organized, 
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Northern-based NGOs that can demonstrate a legitimate interest in WTO affairs and 
which pursue a largely unthreatening agenda – precisely those NGOs that already 
have access to the WTO”.810 Finally, Wilkinson points out that these provisions were 
unlikely to expand meaningful access to the WTO for many NGOs because the vast 
majority of the forums take place in Geneva, which is costly to travel to and stay for 
most non-western NGOs. 
 
Consequently, it appears that the WTO’s selection process ensures that the WTO 
establishes relations with NGOs based upon what NGOs can do in terms of nurturing 
free trade capacity in developing countries, rather than as scrutineers of decision-
making. Alter-NGO access to the WTO has been limited to participation in symposia 
far from the decision-making bodies of the WTO. Indeed in 2005 the Secretariat’s 
External Relations spokesman made it very clear to NGOs that they were wasting 
resources by engaging with the WTO, and would be better placed campaigning at the 
door of national governments.811 He has also consistently publicly argued that NGOs 
are undemocratic and unaccountable agents in the global economy that needed to be 
accredited to have their status verified, and listed on the WTO’s website.812 Yet once 
an NGO has accredited status at the WTO it also ensures that this NGO is seen as a 
willing participant, if not complicit, in the WTO system. It could be argued that this 
list of accredited NGOs performs a legitimising function for the WTO because it 
allows the WTO to hold up this list as evidence that public participation is taking 
place and therefore the demands of the protesters are being met. Indeed the list 
appears on the WTO website – transparency has its benefits. Therefore it could be 
argued the WTO has engaged in a top-down trasformismo to present a picture of the 
WTO as an institution engaging with civil society on conditions of its own making 
that ensure non-participation in decision-making, but enough engagement to claim 
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legitimacy. Although this limited access could be used as a “yardstick by which to 
measure performance” of WTO engagement with NGOs it also provides enough 
access to divert criticism of the WTO. 
 
6.5 Unofficial Channels: Transnational Advocacy Networks 
Since the official channels of access to the WTO remain closed to participation by 
Alter-NGOs other unofficial channels have been sought. Two strategies employed 
through unofficial channels by Alter-NGOs are through offering their expertise to the 
developing countries during trade negotiations to build counter-coalitions; and 
secondly, Alter-NGOs have submitted their demands though amicus briefs to the 
WTO’s DSB and relied on the judicial activism of Appellate Bodies for their 
acceptance. This section will evaluate the strategy of Alter-NGO collaboration with 
the developing states at the Cancun Ministerial Conference as they have attempted to 
place their interests at the heart of the WTO. It will be suggested that this strategy 
may have only brought about the cooption of Alter-NGOs by the developing states, 
and further helped to legitimise the ideology of corporate hegemony. The following 
section will address the strategy of amicus briefs. 
 
Transnational advocacy networks of Alter-NGOs have cooperated with the 
developing countries within the WTO to redress the inequalities in negotiations and 
dispute settlement. At Seattle, although Alter-NGOs had limited influence in building 
alliances and coalitions with the developing countries, many still felt that the 
demonstrations outside “empowered the South to walk away from the negotiating 
table.”813 In contrast at Cancun Alter-NGOs provided their legal and informational 
expertise to the developing states, and helped to build common policy positions 
amongst the developed countries. Prior to Cancun in May 2003, an international Civil 
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Society Forum for Advancing LDC Interests in the Fifth WTO Ministerial met in 
Dhaka to review the official work plan for Cancun and to use their expertise to 
express possible policy positions for the Least Developed Countries (LDC). 
Participants also included government trade representatives from Malawi, Togo, and 
Zimbabwe. The day after this civil society conference ended, trade Ministers from 
thirty-eight LDC countries gathered in Dhaka for an official meeting on the Cancun 
Ministerial Conference. As these trade officials met they were presented with a 
declaration from the civil society groups on possible policy positions to be taken at 
Cancun. The official Dhaka Ministerial Declaration reflects many of the positions 
stated in the civil society declarations on agriculture, cotton and the Singapore 
Issues.814 The South Asian Civil Society Network of International Trade (SACSNIT) 
met in Kathmandu, Nepal during July 2003 to discuss the south Asian agenda for the 
Cancun Ministerial Conference, which was intended to provide a common position 
for South Asian countries.815  
 
The specialised knowledge and expertise of certain Alter-NGOs was also actively 
sought by developing countries in preparation for the Cancun negotiations. The CIEL 
claimed that it could not keep up with the demand for legal advice and consultation. 
Fourteen papers were written by the CIEL on Trade Related-Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) for states such as Brazil, China, India and Pakistan. The 
CIEL had been requested to perform an analysis of the TRIPS agenda proposed by the 
EC and US for Cancun, and to outline possible policy responses to these proposals. 
The CIEL also provided papers, evaluating the investment negotiations as part of the 
Singapore Issues, to the developing world in the run up to Cancun.816 Third World 
Network was directly involved in advising the governments of the developing 
                                                 
814 Second LCD Trade Ministers Meeting. Dhaka Declaration, Part I, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 31 May – 2 June 2003. 
http://www.sdnbd.org/sdi/issues/economy/ldc_dhaka/documents/ldc_final_decleration.pdf
815 Saman Kelegama and Indra Nath Mukherji. WTO and South Asia From Doha to Cancun, 2003. 
http://www.epw.org.in/showArticles.php?root=2003andleaf=09andfilename=6254andfiletype=html
816 Interview with Dan McGrew [President of the Centre for International Environmental Law]. Washington, 
Wednesday 2 June 2004. 
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countries to keep the four Singapore Issues from being more widely accepted at 
Cancun. 817 Oxfam International claimed that “At Cancun, negotiators from the 
developing countries used Oxfam’s research and policy analysis to influence the 
policy debate…Oxfam’s lobbying gave the new power blocs added strength to come 
together and stay together”.818  
 
At the conference itself, this preparation and cooperation amongst the developing 
states and the Alter-NGOs was clearly evident. Matthew Baldwin (the EC Deputy 
Commissioner for Trade at Cancun) explained at Cancun:  
 
there was an amazing sea change and the NGOs completely rethought 
their game. The environmental and labour unions disappeared from the 
scene, they were effectively not players in Cancun and the development 
NGOs stepped into the scene and united with the South. Indeed I would 
say encouraged the South to take a stance […] NGOs actively 
sponsored, championed advocated and wrote the position of the 
developing countries in Cancun.819  
 
Sylvia Ostry’s experience of NGOs at Cancun caused her to describe similar 
cooperative action 
 
African NGOs were included in many official delegations and they 
provided ongoing information as well as research and policy analysis. 
African NGOs, in turn, had regular briefing sessions from officials and 
                                                 
817 Interview with John Cavanagh [Director of International Policy Studies]. Washington, Friday 5 June 2004. 
818 Oxfam International. Oxfam International Annual Report 2003. December 2003. 
http://www.oxfam.org/en/files/annual_report_2003.pdf
819 Interview with Matthew Baldwin (Former EU Deputy Commissioner for Trade). Brussels, 11 November 2003. 
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Ministers. They were not demonstrating outside the tent but consulting 
inside many tents.820  
 
Examples of Alter-NGO cooperation were seen in both Uganda and Kenya as 
representatives from ActionAid formed part of their national delegation at Seattle, 
Doha and Cancun.821 
 
The impact of Alter-NGOs cooperating with the developing countries in Cancun once 
again brought the inequalities in international negotiations out into the public domain. 
As a senior EC commissioner observed: 
 
The message from NGOs was loud and clear at Cancun. For example 
in practical terms in Cancun the European Commission represented 
between 15 and 25 member governments and had a team of five 
people of whom three were actively speaking to the media. Oxfam had 
12, whose message came over more clearly and we could not compete 
with that volume.822  
 
Christian Aid, Third World Network, Oxfam International and the World 
Development Movement all provided daily reports on their websites on the tactics and 
impact of the policies used by the corporate hegemony represented by the EC and US. 
 
As the Cancun conference collapsed without an agreement, NGOs were blamed for 
the role that they had played. The United States Deputy Trade Representative 
(USTR), Josette Sheeran Shiner, was openly critical of Oxfam International for 
                                                 
820 Sylvia Ostry. Canada in a Changing Trade Environment, Statistics Canada Economic Conference 2004, June, 
2004. 
821 Davis Ddamilura and Halima Noor Abdi (CAFOD). Civil Society and the WTO: Participation in National 
Trade Policy in Uganda and Kenya, August 2003. 
http://www.cafod.org.uk/archive/policy/Civilsocietyrpt03.pdf
822 Interview with Matthew Baldwin (Former EU Deputy Commissioner for Trade). Brussels, 11 November 2003. 
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assisting four African countries in their bid to win concessions on cotton, and stated 
that NGOs like Oxfam were not helping negotiations by constantly criticising the 
WTO system.823 Franz Fischler the EU’s agricultural minister condemned NGOs for 
the failure of Cancun; "One of the biggest problems was that too many people were 
not interested in the success of the round and the second problem was that there was a 
misperception of what negotiations mean [...] This was led partly by NGOs, they 
conveyed the message to developing countries that no deal was better than a bad 
deal." 824 The impasse at Cancun caused the EC and US to claim that the WTO 
negotiations were becoming unworkable because it was an institution resembling a 
“medieval organisation”825 that had become a “forum for the politics of protest”826 not 
for cooperation. Yet, in the immediate post-Cancun fever of May 2004 the then EC 
Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy and Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler 
circulated a letter to their trading partners, offering to end all export subsidies and 
proposed more lenient treatment of the weakest and most vulnerable developing 
countries in the current round of talks.827 
 
For many activists the collapse of Cancun was a victory for global justice and 
evidence that the hegemony could be countered. Mark Ritchie and Kristin Dawkins 
argued:  
 
The most remarkable success in Cancun was the WTO meeting itself. 
What happened was simply that most of the countries refused to go 
                                                 
823 Josette Sheeran Shiner (Deputy USTR). The Bretton Woods Committee Delves into Doha and Why Global 
Trade Talks Stalled, 2003 
http://www.brettonwoods.org/agtrade0903.html
824Jeremy Smith. WTO Mood at Cancun Worsened by NGOs-EU's Fischler, 19 September 2003 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/int/wto/2003/0919cancun.htm
825 Pascal Lamy (European Union Trade Commissioner). Press Conference Closing the WTO 5th Ministerial 
Conference, Cancun, Mexico, 14 September 2003. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/speeches_articles/spla190_en.htm
826 Robert Zoellick (US Trade Representative). America Will Not Wait for the Won’t Do Countries, 22 September 
2003. 
http://www.ustr.gov/speech-test/zoellick/2003-09-22-ft.htm
827 See Bridges Weekly News Digest, Vol. 8, Number 17, 13 May 2004. 
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/index.htm
 260
along with the demands made by the cabal that has been running things 
up until now. It was the first time that the World Trade Organization 
began to feel like a truly global organisation--not just an extension of the 
U.S. government's foreign and domestic economic policy. In previous 
ministerial meetings, there have been small hints of shifting power 
relations at the WTO, but Cancun was a breakthrough: a giant shift in 
the balance of forces in global politics.828 
 
Delighted with the collapse of Cancun, John Cavanagh (Director of International 
Policy Studies) argued that countries like Brazil and Argentina had acted as the new 
‘counter veiling power’ to halt corporate hegemony.829 Indeed the emergence of 
coalitions, such as the G21 and G90 were celebrated as being instrumental because 
they prevented corporate hegemony represented by the EC and US from dominating 
the trade agenda of the WTO. Strangely, interviews conducted with a number of the 
WTO Secretariat immediately after Cancun revealed that there was broad agreement 
that the collapse of Cancun was a positive development because it illustrated that 
“voices other than the EU and US were being heard, which is what multilateralism is 
about”.830  
 
The ‘voices being heard’ from the G21 and G90 emerged confident from Cancun and 
began negotiating and forcing compromises from the dominant trading actors through 
the DSB. A spokesman for the G21 stated that they represent 51 per cent of the 
world’s population and, with the “world’s opinion” on its side, further negotiations at 
the WTO would be conditioned on “improving and elevating the standard of living” 
                                                 
828 Mark Ritchie and Kristin Dawkins. A New Beginning for WTO After Cancun, Foreign Policy In Focus 
(Heinrich Boll Foundation: The Green Political Foundation), April, 2004. 
http://c1.cancun.boell-net.de/en/web/410.html
829 Interview with John Cavanagh [Director of International Policy Studies], Washington, 5 June 2004. 
830 Interviews conducted at the World Trade Organization, Geneva March 2004. 
 261
for the world’s poorest.831 In April 2004, Brazil won the first Panel of its case against 
US cotton subsidies paid from 1999-2000 at the WTO’s DSB. Brazil argued that the 
US was responsible for driving down world cotton prices, and harming Brazilian 
farmers while increasing the US share of the global cotton market. Clodoaldo 
Hugueney, Brazil's leading trade negotiator stated, "this Panel is going to show how 
important it is that you really change this policy of developed nations".832 The 
subsequent Appellate Body’s final report found that the US was guilty of 
transgression of WTO rules by following this policy. The WTO also received a 
request from Mexico to begin dispute settlement procedures with the US for allegedly 
dumping stainless steel.833  
 
It would appear that both Mexico and Brazil are now in a position to challenge the 
corporate hegemony represented by the EC and US through the WTO’s laws created 
at Uruguay. A more critical analysis might exercise reservation over celebrating these 
events as illustrating the emergence of counter-hegemony. A point of interest is 
whether the G20 do represent the interests of half the world’s poor or the corporate 
interests emanating from the developing world. Argentinian, Brazilian, Indian, and 
Mexican political elites are demanding market access to the heavily protected 
agricultural and textile markets of the EC and US, but as the above examples illustrate 
they are also demanding access for the goods and services of their own corporate 
interests. In many ways this does not challenge corporate hegemony; it reinforces and 
expands its sphere of interests. More importantly the G20 are also legitimising and 
naturalising the free trade ideology upon which corporate hegemony rests. The 
argument that is being presented by the G21 in challenging the EC and US is that 
more free trade is necessary in order to make the whole world healthy, peaceful and 
                                                 
831 Quote from the statement of the G21 at their post-Cancun meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina, 10 October 
2003. See BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest Vol. 7, No. 34, 15 October 2003, Pg. 1. 
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/03-10-15/index.htm
832 See Bridges Weekly News Digest, Vol. 8, No. 15, 28 April 2004. 
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02-10-02/story1.htm
833 World Trade Organization. United States - Anti-Dumping Determinations regarding Stainless Steel 
(WT/DS325/1, G/L/727, G/ADP/D60/1) entitled from Mexico, 10 January 2005. 
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prosperous, not that free trade and corporate hegemony ought to be challenged. 
Indeed this claim about free trade is the very ideology that justifies the WTO. 
Secondly, in using the WTO’s DSB to gain access to these EC and US markets the 
WTO’s existing structure and power are legitimised in the eyes of wider public. 
 
Advocacy work by Alter-NGOs therefore did play a significant role in the collapse of 
the Cancun negotiations by working with the developing countries. The events at 
Cancun raised public awareness of the manipulation and bullying that the EC and US 
are willing to engage in to force other states into accepting a specific transnational 
corporate trading agenda. This cooperation between Alter-NGOs and the developing 
world, however, did not change the WTO’s agreements and procedures. In fact it 
could be suggested that the collapse of Cancun has helped to legitimise the WTO 
system and its neoliberal ideology. On a more positive assessment of Cancun, Thea 
Lea believes that the Cancun collapse brought the WTO to a new era in its history:  
 
at the moment we are at a place where the WTO’s forward momentum is 
clearly broken and it is an organisation that is now unable to move 
forward smoothly and implement its agenda, which I think is a good 
thing. I think that before you can turn around a train you have to stop it. 
That is where we are now; we have kind of slowed down the juggernaut 
and now the burden is on us to build a positive forward looking agenda 
for some kind of multi-lateral rule setting that is more progressive more 
inclusive more open more accountable than the WTO has been.834 
 
Lea rightly draws to our attention the claim that the WTO will have to rethink its 
attitude to the demands from Alter-NGOs after the collapse of Cancun. But it has to 
be accepted that neither the trade negotiations at Cancun nor the collaboration with 
                                                 
834 Interview conducted with Thea Lea [Assistant Director of International Economics] American Federation of 
Labour-Congress of Industrial Organisation (AFL-CIO), Tuesday June 1 2004. 
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the developing nations allowed the Alter-NGOs to place environmental issues, 
gender, human and labour rights at the heart of the WTO. The procedures of the WTO 
also remain intact preventing Alter-NGOs from gaining rights to participate in the 
decision-making of Ministerial Conference or the DSB. Cancun may have stopped the 
WTO from generating further trading agreement for corporate interests, but the DSB 
is busy opening markets around the world for corporations from the developed and 
developing world. Hegemony is therefore expanding and not contracting. The Alter-
NGOs won a battle at Cancun, but not the war to counter-hegemony and altering the 
WTO so that a ‘bottom up’ new multilateralism can emerge based upon alternative 
values to corporate hegemony. 
 
6.6 Influencing Dispute Settlement: NGOs and Amicus curiae briefs 
The issues of transparency and who ought to be able to participate in the WTO’s 
dispute settlement process have been debated since the negotiations that led to the 
WTO’s creation.835 CIEL, in conjunction with the World Justice Movement, has been 
instrumental in spearheading the campaign for Alter-NGO participation within the 
DSB. CIEL argues that it is absurd that trade dispute settlement is conducted solely 
amongst trade experts. Trade policy impacts directly on public policy and therefore 
requires that environmental, health, labour and rights experts ought to be able to 
supply the trade experts with information on the social and environmental impact of 
their decisions. 836 Although there is no provision in the Charter for non-members to 
participate in the DSB Panel or Appellate Body proceedings, Alter-NGOs and the 
business community have attempted to find ways to ensure that their interests are 
represented at the DSB. In all there are four ways that these NGOs have attempted to 
                                                 
835 See Terence P. Stewart (editor). The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Volume II: 
Commentary, The Hague; London: Kluwer Law International, 1993, p. 2750-1, and also GATT Document, No. 
MTN.TNC/W/35, and Draft Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, Informal Note by the 
Secretariat, 25 March 1992. 
836 Interview with Dan McGrew [President of the Centre for International Environmental Law]. Washington, 2 
June 2004. 
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influence and participate in the dispute settlement system: (1) NGOs have assisted in 
the litigation preparations of WTO members behind closed doors.837 (2) Amicus 
curiae briefs838 (friends of the court) written by NGOs have been submitted and 
appended to a WTO Member’s litigation submission during involvement in DSB.839 
(3) Independently of any WTO Member, amicus briefs from NGOs have been 
submitted to WTO Panels.840 (4) Finally, and again independent of any WTO 
Member’s input, amicus briefs compiled by NGOs have been presented to the 
Appellate Body.841  
 
In this section it will be illustrated that the submission of amicus briefs to the dispute 
settlement process by these non-members has caused vehement debate both inside, 
and outside the WTO. A quarrel within the WTO has been sparked off because the 
acceptance of amicus briefs has only been possible because of the manner in which 
                                                 
837 World Trade Organization. Report from the Panel, Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film, 
WT/DS44/R, 31 March 1998. In the Kodak-Fuji dispute the two governments written submissions and oral 
arguments were written by Kodak and Fuji lawyers, acting jointly with US and Japanese government officials 
respectively. 
838 The term amicus briefs will be used hitherto.  
839 See World Trade Organization. Report of the Panel, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R, 15 May 1998. “3.129. The Panel received two amicus briefs submitted by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). The first one was submitted on 28 July 1997 jointly by the Centre for Marine 
Conservation (CMC) and the Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL) … The United States had 
decided to attach the "factual portions" of the amicus brief to its oral statement only at the end of the second 
substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, after the formal rebuttal statements had been made and the 
question-and-answer session completed.” Also see the World Trade Organization. Report of the Panel, European 
Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, WT/DS135/9, 8th November 
2000 is most notable because it invited amicus briefs from interested parties. 
840 World Trade Organization. Report of Appellate Body, United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismouth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, 
WT/DS138/AB/R, 10 May 2000, “On 7 February 2000, "amicus curiae briefs", from the American Iron and Steel 
Institute and the Specialty Steel Industry of North America. WTO. European Communities – Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing products, WT/DS135/R, September 18, 2000, World Trade Organization. 
Report of the Panel, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon – Recourse to Article 21.5 by Canada, 
WT/DS18/RW, 18th February 2000. Amicus briefs received from concerned fisherman in South Australia. 
841 World Trade Organization. Report of Appellate Body, United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismouth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, 
WT/DS138/AB/R, 10 May 2000, “On 7 February 2000, "amicus curiae briefs", from the American Iron and Steel 
Institute and the Specialty Steel Industry of North America, World Trade Organization. Report of the Appellate 
Body, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams 
from Poland, WT/DS122/AB/R, 12 March 2001. 62.On 1 December 2000, the Appellate Body received a written 
brief from the Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition ("CITAC"), a coalition of United States companies 
and trade associations. World Trade Organization. Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities - Trade 
Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, 26 September 2002. World Trade Organization. Report of the 
Appellate Body, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures in Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248, 
249, 251, 252, 253, 254, 259, /AB/R, 10 November 2003. World Trade Organization. Report of the Appellate 
Body, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from 
Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R, 19 January 2004. 
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successive Appellate Bodies have acted independently in their interpretation of the 
Articles of the DSB. Prior to this judicial activism, which began in 1997, neither 
Panels nor Appellate Bodies accepted amicus briefs. Consequently, a majority of the 
members, mainly the developing states, have condemned the judicial wing of the 
WTO for acting outside its authority as laid down in the WTO Charter. On the other 
hand, the EC and US have been supportive of the acceptance of amicus briefs to bring 
expertise and knowledge to disputes. There has therefore been tension between the 
majority of the membership and the Appellate Body because they feel that the 
intergovernmental nature of the WTO is being threatened. The strategy of Alter-
NGOs submitting their demands though amicus briefs, however, has been resisted. It 
will be suggested that demands for access to DSB by Alter-NGOs have caused the 
WTO to begin another process of trasformismo as certain NGOs have been given 
observer status to pacify public demands for transparency. 
 
Petros C. Mavroidis explains that an amicus brief is sent to the WTO for two reasons; 
“to provide some information (an opinion how to interpret facts established by others) 
on the one hand, and to sensitise a court about the interest that a particular case might 
have for the wider public on the other. This second ground is in fact the bridge 
between court and the society”.842 Dinah Shelton points out there is nothing new 
about the submission of amicus briefs to judicial systems. The history of amicus 
curiae can be traced back to ancient Roman times.843 The US legal system has 
allowed the submission of evidence from third parties on the basis that it will “prevent 
a collusive suit to protect unrepresented persons or the public interest, or to point out 
error to the court”.844 Georg C. Umbricht illustrates the significant development of 
these submissions from the ideal to the pragmatic:  
                                                 
842 Petros C. Mavroidis. Amicus Briefs Before the WTO: Much Ado About Nothing, Jean Monnet Working Paper 
2/10, 2002, p. 11. 
843 See Dinah Shelton. ‘Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings’, in 
The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 88, No. 4, 1994, p. 612. 
844 See Dinah Shelton. ‘Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings’, in 
The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 88, No. 4, 1994, p. 612. 
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 The concept of amicus curiae briefs, as it is understood today, is that a 
private person or entity who has no direct legal interest at stake in the 
dispute at hand may submit an unsolicited report to the court in which 
such person or entity may articulate its own view on legal questions and 
inform the court about factual circumstances in order to facilitate the 
courts ability to decide the case…Today, most amici are guided by their 
own interests and try to influence the judges into taking a position that is 
the most favourable to their interests, either by pointing out new factual 
aspects or by trying to fortify a specific line of argumentation that seems 
to be most beneficial to their position. What was once an idealistic 
service to the court has now become an instrument to influence judicial 
decision-making.845  
 
Therefore it is argued that due to the fact that amicus briefs are not neutral, but are 
advocating a particular interest on one (or either) side of a dispute, their inclusion in 
the WTO dispute settlement system has been problematic. What should also be 
stressed is that very few international organisations, however, actually accept amicus 
briefs. 
 
Ultimately, the acceptance of amicus briefs has only been possible because of judicial 
activism on the part of the Appellate Body. The Appellate and Panel reports were 
adopted in 1998. Concerns had been raised in the past by advocacy NGOs through 
amicus briefs over the quality of harmful traded gasoline846, hormone-enhanced beef, 
genetically modified foodstuffs847, the trading of asbestos products848, and more 
                                                 
845 Georg C. Umbricht. ‘An ‘Amicus Curiae Brief’ on Amicus Curiae Briefs at the WTO’, in Journal of 
International Economic Law, Vol. 4, No, 4, 2001, p. 778. 
846 World Trade Organization. Report by the Appellate Body, United States – Standards for Formulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, May 20, 1996.  
847 World Trade Organization. Report by the Appellate Body, European Communities – Measures Affecting Meat 
and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB, April 16, 1998. 
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recently the rights of indigenous people.849 These, however, have been rejected or 
dismissed on grounds that Article 13 of the DSU, specifically states, “Each Panel 
shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any individual or 
body it deems appropriate”. Since amicus briefs had been submitted without the Panel 
formally seeking information and technical advice they were considered to be 
unsolicited.850 As Mavroidis points out, however, “through artistic legal 
expression”851 the Appellate Body decided that the Panel’s interpretation of Article 23 
was “unnecessarily formal and technical in nature”.852 Consequently, the Appellate 
Body concluded that it could decide to accept information and technical assistance in 
the form of amicus briefs, not just actively seek it as stated in Article 13. 
 
This unique interpretation of the word “seek” emerged from a dispute in 1996. India, 
Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand brought a joint complaint against a ban imposed by 
the US on the importation of certain shrimp and shrimp products.853 The US 
protection of sea turtles was at the heart of the ban. The US Endangered Species Act 
of 1973 listed as endangered or threatened the five species of sea turtles found in US 
waters, and prohibited fishing without nets specifically designed to prevent the 
catching of protected turtles. As the Appellate Panel decided to accept amicus briefs 
under its new interpretation of ‘seek’, two were submitted by environmental Alter-
NGOs to support a US ban on the import of foreign shrimp and shrimp products, 
which had been caught by methods that could kill endangered sea turtles. The first 
was a joint amicus brief from the Centre for Marine Conservation (CMC) and the 
                                                                                                                                            
848 World Trade Organization. Report of the Panel, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Products Containing Asbestos, WT/DS135/9, 8th November 2000. 
849 See World Trade Organization. United States: Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain Softwood 
Lumber From Canada, WT/DS236/R, 27 September 2002, also see the International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD), ‘WTO members Comment On Indigenous Amicus Brief In Lumber Dispute’ 
http://www.ictsd.org/biores/02-05-16/story2.htm
850 See World Trade Organization. United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/R, 15 May 1998. 
851 Petros C. Mavroidis. Amicus Briefs Before the WTO: Much Ado About Nothing, Jean Monnet Working Paper 
2/10, 2002, p. 2. 
852 World Trade Organization. United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, p. 107. 
853 World Trade Organization. United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Request 
for Consultations by India, Malaysia, Pakistan And Thailand, WT/DS58/1, 14 October 1996. 
 268
CIEL.854 The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) submitted the second. The 
Appellate Body decided that the US was in breach of WTO agreements, not because it 
sought to protect the environment but because it discriminated between WTO 
members. The US had provided countries in the western hemisphere (mainly in the 
Caribbean) with technical and financial assistance and longer transition periods for 
their fishermen to start using turtle friendly nets. It did not, however, give the same 
advantages to the four Asian countries that filed the complaint with the WTO.855 The 
opposing parties to the Shrimp/Turtle dispute also very quickly condemned this 
interpretation of Article 13 of the DSU.856 The Malaysian delegation asserted that a 
“procedural flaw concerned the Appellate Body's treatment of amicus curiae briefs 
submitted by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). His delegation believed that 
members, not the Appellate Body, should decide the extent to which NGOs might be 
involved in a dispute settlement process”.857 It would not be difficult to argue that the 
US government was merely coopting the influence of high profile Alter-NGOs in 
order to get public opinion behind the demand for protectionist policies from US 
corporate fishing interests, rather than the interests of endangered turtles. 
 
In 2000, an Appellate Body went one step further and asserted that although Appellate 
Bodies did not have a legal duty to accept or consider amicus briefs from those parties 
outside of the “WTO members which are parties or third parties in a particular 
dispute”, it did have “the legal authority under the DSU to accept and consider amicus 
curiae in an appeal in which we find it pertinent and useful to do so”.858 The 
Appellate Body made it clear that it was under no legal obligation to respond to the 
                                                 
854 The Centre for Marine Conservation, Red Nacional de Accion Ecologica (RENACE) of Chile, the 
Environmental Foundation Ltd of Sri Lanka, and the Philippine Ecological Network. 
855 World Trade Organization. United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp nd Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, see Sections 185 and 186. 
856 World Trade Organization. United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 1, 
Minutes of Meeting, 6 November 1998, WT/DSB/50, Published, 14 December 1998. 
857 World Trade Organization. United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 1, 
Minutes of Meeting, 6 November 1998, WT/DSB/50, Published, 14 December 1998. 
858 World Trade Organization. United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead 
and Bismouth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/AB/R, 10 May 2000, p. 41 
and 42. 
 269
sender or reflect on the content of the brief received. The final step, and one that 
provoked a backlash from a number of member states, came in November 2000 when 
an Appellate Body decided to publicly invite amicus briefs from all interested parties 
during a dispute over the trade of asbestos.859 This document stated “in the interest of 
fairness and orderly procedure in the conduct of this appeal” it was willing to accept 
amicus briefs on the grounds of Article 16, section 1 of its Working Procedures.860 It 
then stated seven preconditions for submission, which included that the submissions 
must be limited to legal argument. 
 
This initial opening up of the WTO Appellate Body to NGO participation through 
submission of amicus briefs was very quickly reigned in, but not stopped. A number 
of the WTO members, initiated by Egypt, requested a special meeting of the WTO’s 
General Council to address this issue.861 The overwhelming tone of this meeting, with 
only a few exceptions, was one of accusation and outrage. The Appellate Body’s 
interpretation of the DSU, it was argued again and again, had caused it to be engaged 
in judicial activism in an area outside of its authority, and which undermined the 
special intergovernmental character of the WTO.862 It is worth dwelling on the 
arguments of the delegations to get a sense of how seriously the members guard the 
intergovernmental nature of the dispute settlement process, and the WTO in general. 
 
The Uruguay delegation pointed out that the Appellate Body did not have the 
authority to interpret the agreements, especially on an issue that “affected the rights 
and obligation of the WTO members”.863 Egypt stated that the decision “went far 
                                                 
859 World Trade Organization. European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing 
Asbestos, see WT/DS135/R/Add.1, September 18, 2000, WT/DS135/9, 8th November 2000. 
860 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,                  
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf
861 See World Trade Organization. General Council, Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, 22 November, Published 
23 January 2001. 
862 See World Trade Organization. General Council, Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, 22 November, Published 
23 January 2001.Chairman’s comment, Point 114. 
863 Uruguay, Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, Point 4. 
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beyond the Appellate Body’s mandate and power”,864 and this was also stated by 
Mexico, Singapore, Columbia, Costa Rica, Argentina, Australia, Tanzania, Pakistan, 
and Japan. Uruguay argued that the Appellate Body was guilty of granting 
“individuals and institutions outside of the WTO a right that members themselves did 
not possess. This procedure allows individuals or institutions to present their points of 
view, and possibly influence a purely legal and interpretive decision on the rules of a 
specific case, while the right was solely reserved to the parties and third parties to a 
dispute, and was even refused to other WTO members”.865 Argentina asked if WTO 
members that were not party or third parties to a dispute, could present themselves as 
NGOs in order to submit amicus briefs? And if this were the case, would the dispute 
settlement system be “flooded by an unmanageable amount of briefs?”866  
 
Argentina and Brazil asserted the acceptance of amicus briefs had political 
implications. Argentina stated “the DSB would be excessively influenced by NGOs or 
by large corporations who would offer legal services”.867 Brazil pointed out that the 
neutrality of the dispute settlement system was under threat when the Appellate Body 
could determine who had the right to submit amicus briefs, such that “the dispute 
settlement mechanism could soon be contaminated by political issues that did not 
belong to the WTO, much less to its dispute settlement mechanism”.868 Argentina, 
Pakistan, and Tanzania cited objections on the grounds that the submission of amicus 
briefs gave undue advantage to NGOs in the West, because NGOs from the 
developing countries and least developed countries did not have access to the Internet 
and available information to participate.869 The real question that needs to be asked is: 
what do the states have to hide from the rest of the world? Perhaps what is being 
hidden is the manner in which the structural power of corporate hegemony is able to 
                                                 
864 Egypt, Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, Point 12. 
865 Uruguay, Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, Point 7. 
866 Argentina, Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, Point 93. 
867 Argentina, Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, Point 93. 
868 Brazil, Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, Point 51. 
869 Argentina, Minutes of Meeting, Point 93; Pakistan, Minutes of Meeting, Point 66; and Tanzania, Minutes of 
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manipulate negotiations and decisions to expand and reinforce its interests throughout 
the world. Without transparency speculation will continue, and the public will not 
know what is being negotiated in their name. 
 
In contrast, the US, EC, Canada and Australia were less scathing in their contribution 
to the discussion. The US was the only Member to argue that the Appellate Body 
acted appropriately, and within its authority to interpret agreements.870 The EC 
pointed out that it had always been in favour of greater transparency of the DSB, and 
recognised that “obviously civil society had a clear interest in some of the issues 
related to the work of the WTO, and particularly the DSB”. The EC therefore asserted 
the need for further discussion and debate was required on the role of non-members. 
Siding with the Appellate Body, the EC asserted “if the legislative arms fell short of 
legislation, the judicial arm had the tendency to fill in the gaps”.871 Canada agreed that 
it was in favour of greater transparency, but that amicus briefs were not about 
transparency, they were about participation by non-members, and as such would 
require further debate by the members over the acceptance of this development.872 
Australia was in favour of continued negotiations, but within the parameters of 
respecting and preserving the rights of members, of respecting the WTO as an 
intergovernmental body, and of the need to respond to public interest in the WTO’s 
work.873 
 
In the Chairman’s summary of the meeting, he drew attention to the majority of 
members asserting the intergovernmental nature of the WTO, and that they did not 
want unsolicited amicus briefs to be accepted by Appellate Bodies in the future.874 
India, Pakistan, Egypt and Malaysia asked that the amicus brief procedures be 
                                                 
870 US, Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, Point 74. 
871 EC, Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, Point 96. 
872 Canada, Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, Point 71. 
873 Australia, Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, Point 105. 
874 Chairman, Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, Point 114. 
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withdrawn on the grounds that the WTO agreements clearly state that the organisation 
is member state driven, and only member states can participate in the dispute 
settlement. Members told the Appellate Body dealing with the asbestos dispute that it 
must proceed with "extreme caution" in future dealings with NGO participation in the 
dispute settlement process.875 Consequently, all of the 17 requests to submit amicus 
briefs from Alter-NGOs were refused by the Appellate Body.  
 
It is clear from the above discussion that the majority of members, especially the 
developing countries, are against the acceptance of amicus briefs and the judicial 
activism that caused them to be submitted. It is also clear that the majority of 
developing countries do not want NGO and social and environmental issues to gain 
access to Appellate Bodies. If amicus briefs must be submitted they must be limited to 
legal issues. To ensure the artificial distinction between trade and its social and 
environmental consequences, members have pointed to Article 3.2 of the DSU, which 
specifically states: “Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add or diminish 
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements”.876 In addition, 
members have emphasised the Agreement Establishing the WTO, Article 5.2, which 
makes it clear that only the General Council has the authority to determine the 
appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with NGOs, since it is the 
highest authority when the Ministerial Conference is not in session. Although the EC 
and US have been in favour of greater NGO engagement it would be in the realms of 
fantasy to declare them as champions of Alter-NGO evolvement at the DSB. It is 
possible to advocate greater NGO participation to gain wider public exposure as a 
state committed to transparency and democratisation, whilst also knowing that this 
position would never become a reality as it would be vetoed by the rest of the 
                                                 
875 The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), WTO General Council Slaps 
Appellate Body on Amicus Briefs, Vol. 4, No. 45, 20 November 2000. 
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876 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Annex 2, ‘Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
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membership. In addition opening the WTO to NGO participation would also allow 
Ma-NGOs to use their greater resources and marketing power to flood the DSB with 
demands for more free trade and deregulation. 
 
Academics have debated the pros and cons of the submission and acceptance of 
amicus briefs. Outlining the advantages, Umbricht argues that all available 
information is an asset to determining the settlement of a dispute, and the fair 
representation by governments of every minority forming part of their constituency is 
a fiction.877 On the arguments against, he notes there is a fear that by allowing NGOs 
to participate it will entail a shifting of more power to the industrialised countries 
from which most NGOs emanate. The submission of amicus briefs is seen as a 
slippery slope towards full participation and recognition of non-members in what is 
deemed to be an exclusively intergovernmental institution.878 It is feared that the 
dispute settlement system will become politicised by amicus briefs submitted by 
NGOs, rather than purely deliberating and concluding disputes on points of law as 
laid down in the WTO agreements by the members. There is alarm about the prospect 
of an independent and active Appellate Body causing unpredictability and uncertainty 
in the dispute settlement process, by choosing to bring social, economic, and 
environmental issues into the trade disputes.879 Kent Jones argues that the WTO 
dispute settlement system is not the place to address non-trade issues e.g. 
environment, labour standards, and human rights. That is not what the WTO is 
designed for, he claims, and their inclusion and enforcement would only increase 
protectionism and distort trade by using trade sanctions to ensure the application of 
non-trade issues.880 
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 C. L. Lim asserts that the Member states need to address the issue of the submission 
of amicus briefs during the reform of the DSU, to lay down detailed terms of action to 
prevent judicial activism on the part of the Appellate Body, and thereby preserve the 
stability and predictability of the intergovernmental nature of the DSU.881 In contrast, 
Ernesto Hernandaez-Lopez argues that amicus briefs ought to be accepted to “stress 
the global nature of the WTO” because of the economic social, political and 
environmental effects of trade dispute settlement.882 To ensure that amicus briefs do 
not overwhelm the Appellate Body, Umbricht argues, amicus briefs ought only to be 
accepted at the Panel level. In doing so no new evidence is submitted for the final 
review by the Appellate Body.883 Mavroidis, however, argues that there is a 
disproportionate importance placed on the submission of amicus briefs and the 
judicial activism by the Appellate Body because ultimately it is the members that 
have the authority to correct the Appellate Body and its rulings. 884 More critically, 
Steinberg claims that ‘judicial activism’ to incorporate environmental issues, labour 
standards, and human rights by the Appellate Body will not be tolerated by the most 
powerful states. This is especially true if they damage the “powerful political interests 
in both the European Community and the United States”. He concludes that judicial 
activism will be prevented by the EC and US by rewriting DSU rules, de-legitimising 
the Appellate Bodies through diplomatic statements and defying the rulings, and 
ultimately threatening to exit the WTO altogether.885 
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Perhaps what Steinberg is overlooking is that a policy of trasformismo ensures that 
the corporate interests represented by the EC and US are protected behind ‘reform 
from above’. The majority of the WTO members, mainly the developing states, have 
been the most vocal critics against the acceptance of amicus briefs in either the Panel 
or Appellate Body. Primarily, it has only been the EC and US that have supported the 
acceptance of amicus briefs. As pointed out above, the official objections have been 
primarily on the grounds that the WTO is an intergovernmental organisation, and as 
such the development of its agreements, rules and procedures are exclusively 
determined by the WTO’s member states. Yet the decision to accept amicus briefs, 
even in the face of continued reprimands by many of the members, was not initiated 
by the members, but through judicial activism on the part of the Appellate Body.886 
The majority of the members may not be happy about the acceptance of amicus briefs 
and consistently voice their disapproval, but the membership as a whole has been 
unable to find a consensus on an agreement that rejects or accepts amicus briefs. The 
WTO membership has consistently postponed reforming the DSU from 1999 to 
2004.887 Consequently, so long as this remains the case and the Appellate Body is 
willing to continue to accept amicus briefs from NGOs the social, economic and 
environmental impact of trade agreements will be submitted to the dispute settlement 
system. To date, however, the amicus briefs promoting the values of the alter-
globalization movement have yet to have a substantive impact on the policies and 
process of the WTO. Indeed gaining access to DSB through amicus briefs Alter-
NGOs may actually result in establishing greater legitimacy to the WTO without 
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really being able to change the deregulations policies. Through a process of 
trasformismo it is clearly possible to envisage having a token clause on trade 
agreement that asserts the voluntary, unenforceable/open to interpretation statement to 
uphold environmental standards or human rights as was seen with the UN and CSR. 
 
Indeed due to the criticisms received on the issues of transparency, accountability, 
social justice, environmental sustainability and lack of NGO access, there have been 
major changes in rhetoric within the institution. For example, the former WTO 
Director-General Michael Moore discusses in his recent book the need for a 
'democratic caucus' (a second chamber containing parliamentarians from around the 
world) to bring legitimacy and accountability to the WTO. In the post-Cancun world, 
the EC Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy acknowledged that the WTO “cannot 
simply focus on trade opening while ignoring the inter-linkage between trade and the 
environment, social development, health, corruption, corporate governance”888. He 
has spoken about the need for a more structured relationship between the WTO, civil 
society (NGOs) and parliamentarians to give the WTO legitimacy.889 In many ways 
this builds on Lamy's earlier argument that the EU experience of regional economic 
integration, which necessitated political institution building for transparency and 
accountability coupled with social and environmental chapters, provides a model for 
global governance.890  
 
Pascal Lamy is now the Director-General of the WTO and in September 2005 NGOs 
were allowed for the first time to observe the operations of one specific dispute 
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settlement Panel.891 The EU and US voluntarily agreed to allow the opening of this 
Appellate Body’s proceedings for observation, but not for representation and 
participation by NGOs.892 At the request of the parties to the disputes, the Panels 
agreed to open their proceedings with the parties and scientific experts on 27-28 
September and with the parties on 2-3 October 2006 for observation by WTO 
Members and the general public via closed-circuit broadcast to a separate viewing 
room at WTO Headquarters in Geneva.893 The WTO’s website advertises this opening 
up of the dispute settlement process as evidence of public oversight and transparency 
at the WTO with great enthusiasm. In November 2005, the WTO was again criticised 
by 68 union and civil society groups in an open letter to Director-General Pascal 
Lamy, for failing to ensure that agenda for the negotiations of GATS at the Hong 
Kong Ministerial Talks were set through consensus decision-making.894 Lamy replied 
to these groups on the very same day through the WTO website, claiming that the 
concerned groups were misinformed about the manner of decision-making. 
Importantly he claimed that his reply was “in the interest of transparency”.895 One 
could argue that this was Lamy demonstrating that NGOs are recognised as legitimate 
actors at the WTO with a recognised constituency. Given these developments, there 
could be reason to be somewhat optimistic for future transparent and accountable 
reforms of the WTO. The optimism has to be measured because rhetoric is cheap and 
substantive change has yet to be seen. The experience of Alter-NGO cooption within 
the World Bank raises fears that this participation may be so limited that Alter-NGOs 
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have little real influence, and merely legitimise the WTO procedures. Indeed it would 
seem to suggest that this may be another example of a policy of trasformismo at the 
WTO. 
 
6.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that the sustained attempts by Alter-NGOs to change the 
principles and processes of the WTO have had limited success. This was argued to 
have been due to the manner in which trasformismo has ensured limited access of 
Alter-NGOs to the WTO and the cooption of those Alter-NGOs that gain access. This 
clearly seemed to be the case with the IMF, UN and World Bank as Alter-NGOs were 
expressing frustration at being part of a ‘public relations’ exercise, which afforded 
them little influence. The language of participation and transparency has been 
redefined by these institutions to ensure legitimacy, but prevent actual access to 
policy decision-making. Attention was also drawn to professional and well funded 
advocacy NGOs that were criticised for pushing out smaller social movements, and 
deradicalising the political process as a new transnational middle class came together 
to problem-solve issues of development without challenging corporate hegemony. 
Therefore it was claimed that advocacy NGOs were responsible for removing the 
radical nature of counter-hegemonic social movements. Accepting these arguments it 
was argued that Alter-NGOs still played a role in raising issues, but needed to be 
careful of cooptation through trasformismo by nebuleuse political elites. 
 
In the first instance it was suggested that in the official channels of access to the WTO 
a policy of trasformismo had been pursued to ensure that NGOs were closely vetted 
and prevented from gaining access to the decision-making bodies of the WTO. 
Although Alter-NGOs have employed two strategies to gain access to the WTO, the 
chapter argued that these have had limited success. At Cancun Alter-NGOs wrote the 
policy positions and joined national delegations of developing countries. Thereby 
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Alter-NGOs were able to unofficially gain access to the WTO negotiating process. 
The creation of common policy positions by Alter-NGOs also played some role in 
helping to establish common ground for the state coalitions that emerged between the 
G21 and G90 at Cancun. The collapse of the talks, however, did not fundamentally 
alter the content of the agreements or the process of the WTO towards the principle of 
the alter-globalization movement. Indeed it could be argued that the failure of the 
Conference has helped to reinforce the need for more open markets and that 
neoliberalism is the only way to address world poverty and war. The subsequent use 
of the DSB by the members of the G20 further legitimises the WTO’s procedures and 
focus on corporate hegemony. Finally, the submission of amicus briefs has also been 
a strategy with no real evidence of success. The WTO’s judicial system has been 
severely reprimanded by the members from the developing world for engaging in 
judicial activism, which allowed amicus briefs to be submitted. To date no amicus 
brief submitted by NGOs has played a substantive role in influencing the DSB to 
warrant any claim of success. Rather it was suggested that further discussion by 
political elites about the opening of the DSB to NGO participation is an example of 
further trasformismo to ensure that NGOs are only able to observe and legitimise the 
WTO and not place their interests and values at the heart of the WTO. 
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Chapter Seven 
            
 
Conclusion 
 
A pessimist sees the contraints that define the limits of the possible, the 
strong bonds that hold the existing structure together, and the influences 
that orient its direction of development. The pessimist as critic also looks 
for the contradictions in the status quo that might become triggers of 
change and focus on how desirable change might be pursued 
realistically.896 
 
7.1. A Brief Summary 
At the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 1999 Millennium Ministerial Conference 
in Seattle, transnationally coordinated social movements and Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) attacked the integrity of the WTO. Public attention was drawn 
to questions regarding the WTO’s legitimacy to exercise political power over elected 
governments and why negotiations and decisions appeared to be devoid of public 
scrutiny. The collective prosperity, peace and sustainability development promised 
from the neoliberal ideology propagated by the WTO was criticised for providing a 
smoke screen for who was really benefiting from these policies. The real beneficiaries 
it was alleged were the powerful transnational corporations (TNCs) who were 
determining national labour and environmental policies through the WTO. Discussion 
also turned to why the developing countries were claiming that the WTO was 
institutionalising the dominant corporate economic interests of the developed 
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countries, whilst ignoring all other interests. The emergence of these transnational 
protesters in 1999 further fuelled academic interests on the degree to which such 
global social movements were “altering either agendas for social change or political 
engagement”.897 
 
This thesis has argued that the historical materialism of Robert W. Cox’s provides an 
insightful conceptual framework to understand the dynamics of the global political 
economy in which these actors are situated. It was seen that Cox, drawing from 
Antonio Gramsci, not only applied the concepts of hegemony, counter-hegemony, 
organic intellectuals, and trasformismo, to international organizations, he also 
developed his own concepts of nebuleuse and ‘new multilateralism’ to provide a 
unique analysis of the current world order. Cox’s analysis is also equipped with a 
programme of action to transform and develop a 'new multilateralism' within 
international institutions that shifts decision-making way from the monopoly held by 
government and economic elites. The less powerful civil society groups promoting 
“greater social equality, greater diffusion of power among countries and social 
groups, protection of the biosphere, moderation and non-violence in dealing with 
conflict, and mutual recognition of civilizations” are to be given priority in setting the 
agenda of international organizations.898 This ‘new multilateralism’ was deemed to be 
inherently democratic from the ‘bottom-up’ because it was based upon the interests of 
civil society groups, which sought the acceptance and celebration of cultural 
identities.  
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Although Robert O’Brien et al had applied a Coxian theoretic framework to the WTO 
in 2000; it was heavily diluted with a level of liberal pluralism that weakened the very 
critical edge that is sought from a Coxian analysis. Focusing exclusively on NGOs 
these writers sought to measure the influence of these non-state actors and used the 
term ‘complex multilateralism’ to illustrate their acknowledgement of the many non-
state actors becoming involved in state-centric multilateralism.899 A more critical 
Coxian analysis of the WTO is therefore warranted, not only because it is five years 
since the O’Brien et al research was published, but also because the O’Brien et al 
framework omitted the most important aspects of Cox’s theoretical framework, such 
as hegemony, nebuleuse, structural power, and especially trasformismo. Indeed the 
concept of trasformismo is important for further research on the influence of any 
social movement or NGO engaged with political institutions – sub-national, national, 
regional or global. 
 
From this Coxian framework the concept of counter-hegemony was employed to 
categorise the protesters that rejected corporate hegemony. The thesis identified an 
alter-globalization movement (see below) from the wide number of protesters 
engaged in counter-hegemony. Rather than tearing down the existing international 
institutions this alter-globalization movement is distinctive because it is campaigning 
for the alternative principles of democratic accountability, environmental protection, 
social justice in economic policies, women’s, human and labour rights, transparency 
and the end of military force as a tool of diplomacy to guide the multilateralism of 
international organizations. Similar to Coxian ‘new multilateralism’, this alter-
globalization movement asserts that civil society groups ought to be actively part of 
the decision-making of international organizations. To understand and evaluate the 
strategies of the alter-globalization movement, the thesis intentionally divided the 
alter-globalization movement into two constituent parts: social movements and 
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NGOs. The distinction was drawn because social movements are organised around 
informal and loose networks which employ unconventional methods of political 
participation, such as mass demonstrations, to shape public consciousness and place 
pressure on political elites, whilst NGOs are formally organised and engage with 
political institutions through formal channels. Although there are official channels of 
access to the WTO, three unofficial strategies were identified to be employed by the 
alter-globalization movement to influence the WTO’s policies and processes: 
demonstrations on the street, assisting developing states during negotiations, and 
submitting amicus briefs to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).  
 
The thesis set out to investigate whether the alter-globalization movement had been 
successful in influencing the policies and procedures of the WTO from 1999 to 
November 2005 through these strategies. Following Cox, it was suggested that in 
order to develop an understanding of the possibilities of influencing an international 
organization, such as the WTO, it was necessary to begin by identifying the social 
forces with superior material and ideational capabilities that were responsible for its 
creation. To this end it was argued that through their control of the institutions of 
production within the prevailing states, a dominant transnational corporate class 
emerged within national and international organizations in the 1980s and built 
consensus on the policies for the coordination of the global economy (nebuleuse). 
Chapters three and four illustrated that the WTO performed the central functions of 
hegemony in the current nebuleuse, as it coordinated, legitimised, enforced and 
provided surveillance measures to ensure that national policies were consistent with 
the demands of a transnational model of production for this transnational elite 
(hegemony). In doing so the WTO was seen to promote a specific ontology for the 
purpose of building consent for international trade to be negotiated, codified and 
regulated through the WTO. Through the examples of the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations (1986 –1994) and the Cancun Ministerial Conference (2003), in chapter 
four, it was demonstrated that some states were more equal than others in both 
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consensus decision-making and before the law of the WTO, and that corporate 
hegemony took precedence over all other interests brought to the WTO. This analysis 
also identifies the ‘structural power’ of corporate social forces to set the framework 
for policies outcomes through determining who can participate and on what terms.  
 
Through a process of dialectics, the contradictions of the WTO created its own 
counter-hegemony forces, which challenging the legitimacy of the WTO’s decision-
making structures. Chapter five illustrated that ‘organic intellectuals’ in a ‘war of 
positions’ propagated to a wider public the contradictions inherent in the policies of 
the nebuleuse, and the WTO. This was to develop a global consciousness that rejected 
the legitimacy of world corporate hegemony. The activities of transnational 
corporations, developments in communication and the changing political context were 
seen to be the factors that had caused social movement and NGOs to cooperate 
transnationally outside of the national setting and form a counter-hegemonic bloc. 
After constructing a four-stage continuum of the many ideological positions held by 
varying groups of the counter-hegemonic forces, it was argued that it was possible to 
identify a specific alter-globalisation movement, which sought to reform international 
organizations in a manner that reflected a Coxian ‘new multilateralism’. In chapters 
five and six attention was drawn to the policy of trasformismo, which had been 
pursued by the political elites of the nebuleuse. Through trasformismo, counter-
hegemonic forces were coopted, distorted and prevented from changing the policy 
outcomes or the structure of the WTO. Indeed the purpose of trasformismo is to 
ensure that institutions can absorb the ideas and forces demanding just change to 
ensure that they contribute to the legitimacy of the existing hegemonic system, rather 
than sustain a challenge and gain wider public support. 
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7.2 Answering the Research Question 
The research question posed in this thesis asked: “to what extent the alter-
globalisation movement has successfully altered the policy and processes of the WTO 
towards the principles of social justice and public accountability”. From the research 
conducted, this thesis concludes that there is very little evidence to suggest that the 
alter-globalization movement has had anything other than very limited success in 
altering the policies and process of the WTO. Although it is possible to identify three 
strategies outside of the official WTO channels for non-state actor participation, such 
as demonstrations on the street, assisting developing states during negotiations, and 
submitting amicus briefs to the WTO’s dispute settlement body, each strategy has 
encountered substantial obstacles due to a policy of trasformismo by political elites 
and the WTO. Thereby there is no reason to believe that the alter-globalization 
movement has been able to alter the current world order. 
 
It was established in the introduction that in order to measure the extent to which the 
alter-globalisation movement has altered or influenced the policies and processes of 
the WTO, the thesis would use the four factors of: (1) recognition of the alter-
globalisation movement as the legitimate representative of a constituency, (2) the 
degree to which the alter-globalisation movement has been able to place its program 
for reform on the political agenda of the WTO, (3) the input that the alter-
globalisation NGOs (Alter-NGOs) of the movement have in the passage of these 
reforms into actual WTO policy, or in helping to ensure the enforcement of that 
policy, and (4) the degree to which the policies of the alter-globalisation movement 
obtained the outcome for which they campaigned. The limited success that the alter-
globalization movement has had in altering the policies and process of the WTO will 
be demonstrated through examining each of these in turn: 
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(1) The recognition of the alter-globalisation movement as the legitimate 
representative of a constituency 
 
As pointed out above, the thesis intentionally divided the alter-globalization 
movement into two constituent parts: social movements and NGOs. There has been 
some recognition of the legitimacy of the alter-globalization movement’s mass 
protests as being representative of a constituency. Initially the protests on the streets 
by social movements were mostly demonised by political elites as an ‘anti-
globalization’ movement, which should be feared because it was violent, incoherent 
and contained extreme politics that threaten the values of liberty, democracy and 
justice. Through this policy of distortion the ‘anti-globalisation’ movement was 
depicted as a radical minority that was not representative of the wider, silent, content 
majority of the public. Although this distortion of mass protests is still practiced, an 
additional policy of trasformismo has been employed, which is evident in the 
conversion of the rhetoric of the nebuleuse. Many of the demands voiced by the 
protesters during the street protests (‘fair trade’, global justice, labour and human 
rights, enhanced transparency and democracy within international organization, and 
sustainable development) have now become the buzzwords embedded in press 
releases and the language of the nebuleuse. Corporate hegemonic elites have 
attempted to present themselves as the real champions of global justice and even 
supporters of the alter-globalization movement’s demands. Both US President Bill 
Clinton and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair have acknowledged the protesters and 
even asserted personal support for their demands - so long as they were consistent 
with a policy of liberalising trade barriers. This represents a dramatic change in 
attitude from Blair towards the protesters after his comments at Genoa, when he 
described the protesters as a minority of anarchists, who were wrong and should not 
be tolerated.900 Similarly in 2003, the World Bank President James Wolfensohn, 
                                                 
900 Tony Blair (Prime Minister). Edited Transcript of a Press Conference by The Prime Minister, Gothenburg, 
Sweden, 16 June 2001. 
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claimed the protesters and the World Bank were pursuing the same goals.901 Such a 
significant turnaround in attitude would suggest that political elites have come to 
recognise the alter-globalization movement as a legitimate representative of a 
constituency of people demanding global social justice and transparency. The 
cooptation of the language of the protesters also demonstrates that political elites 
recognise that the alter-globalization movement threatens the legitimacy of corporate 
hegemony. 
 
In a similar manner to the protesters on the street being demonised, Alter-NGOs have 
been criticised by political elites for being un-elected, unaccountable and 
unrepresentative. Yet, a number of these Alter-NGOs were heavily involved in 
offering their expertise to analyse and write both national and common policy 
positions for developing countries at the Cancun Ministerial Conference. It could be 
claimed that this working relationship with the developing countries is a sign of these 
Alter-NGOs being recognised as legitimate representatives of a constituency that 
demands global social justice in the form of promoting equitable participation in trade 
negotiations. As David Hunter explained, at Cancun: “Civil societies had changed to 
adopt a lot more of the Southern [countries’] concerns in a hope that they would 
recognise our agenda for foreign investment and trade and try to regulate it in a more 
even handed, equitable and sustainable way”.902 Perhaps more accurately it can be 
argued that the developing countries at Cancun viewed these Alter-NGOs as merely a 
free consultancy service, which enabled them to pursue their own national corporate 
interests more effectively. The question of just who or what these Alter-NGOs 
legitimately represented were unimportant. This argument can be supported by the 
fact that the developing countries have fiercely rejected all other aspects of the Alter-
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?5064#Top
901 James Wolfensohn. Choosing a Better World, in Inter Press Service, 22 January 2003. 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wbank/2003/0122betterworld.htm
902 Interview with David Hunter [Former President of the Centre for International Environmental Law]. 
Washington, Wednesday 2 June 2004. 
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NGO agenda, such as NGO access to the WTO’s DSB, a primary goal of these Alter-
NGOs. This would suggest that Alter-NGOs provided a valuable service at Cancun to 
the developing countries, but also that the expertise of Alter-NGOs in deciphering 
WTO trade agreements is more important than the principles or constituency these 
Alter-NGOs represent. 
 
Pressure from Alter-NGOs to bring transparency and public accountability to the 
WTO through access to negotiations and DSB, however, has seen the first movements 
towards the opening of Panel proceedings to public scrutiny.903 In addition, the 
WTO’s Director-General, Pascal Lamy, publicly engaged in dialogue with NGOs 
over the equity of decision-making for the agenda for the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference in 2005. Other political elites have concurred with Lamy’s statements that 
the WTO needs to include the participation of NGO in some part of the negotiating 
process to address its democratic deficits.904 This would suggest that there is some 
recognition of the Alter-NGOs as legitimate representatives of a constituency that 
wish to see great public accountability within the WTO. More critically, and due to 
the continued closed nature of the WTO decision-making, this is perhaps nothing 
more than a further policy of trasformismo to ensure that the public see NGO 
participation, but do not realise that they have no impact on the policies of the WTO. 
Thereby these discussions and public statements by political elites and the WTO 
appear to recognise the alter-globalization movement as a legitimate representative of 
a constituency, but only in order to build legitimacy for the WTO without having to 
change policy or procedures. 
 
                                                 
903 World Trade Organization. WTO Opens Panel Proceeding to Public for the First Time, 12 September 2005. 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news05_e/openpanel_12sep_e.htm
904 Americo Beviglia Zampetti (Former Director General For International Trade, European Commission). 
‘Challenges to the Multilateral Trading System’, in Rodger B. Porter et al. (editors), Efficiency, Equity and 
Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Washington, D. C.: Brooking Institution Press, 
2001, p. 45, Michael Moore. A World Without Walls: Freedom, Development, Free Trade And Global 
Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 216. See Pascal Lamy (European Union Trade 
Commissioner). The Future of the WTO for European Parliament Kangaroo Group, 27 January 2004. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/speeches_articles/spla190_en.htm
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 (2) The degree to which the alter-globalisation movement has been able to place 
its programme for reform on the political agenda of the WTO 
 
It was pointed out in the introduction to the thesis that the recognition of an actor as a  
legitimate representative of a constituency is not an indicator of that actor’s influence 
in a political process.905 Indeed a policy of trasformismo is designed to coopt those 
actors that have public support and appear as a threat to the stability of the current 
hegemony. The programme of reform that the alter-globalization movement has 
campaigned for revolves around the principles of global social justice and public 
accountability in the WTO’s policies and procedures. In relation to the realisation of 
the goal of global social justice both the protests on the street and the involvement of 
Alter-NGOs at Cancun, have aimed at reforming the WTO agreements and 
procedures, to ensure that the interests of the people of the developing countries take 
precedence in WTO negotiations. One could argue that the WTO has placed this 
demand for reform onto the political agenda with the establishment of the Doha 
Development Agenda in 2001. In addition, and as pointed out above, there are a 
number of political elites that have discussed and proposed the reform of the WTO to 
allow accredited Alter-NGOs to participate in some form within negotiations and the 
DSB. These reforms, however, have not been placed on to the WTO’s agenda. Indeed, 
discussions on the reform of the DSB as a whole have not been successfully 
negotiated to a conclusion since the WTO was created in 1995.906 Therefore it would 
appear that the alter-globalization movement has only been successful in revealing 
                                                 
905 Edwin Amenta and Neal Caren. ‘The Legislative, Organizational and Beneficiary Consequences of State-
Orientated Challengers’, in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (editors), The Blackwell 
Companion to Social Movements, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, p. 262. 
906 A 1994 Ministerial Decision said that the dispute settlement rules should be reviewed by 1 January 1999. The 
review started in the Dispute Settlement Body in 1997. The deadline was extended to 31 July 1999, but there was 
no agreement. In November 2001, at the Doha Ministerial Conference, Member governments agreed to negotiate 
to improve and clarify the Dispute Settlement Understanding. Ministers said that the new negotiations should be 
concluded not later than May 2003. These negotiations take place in special sessions of the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB). On 24 July 2003, acknowledging the fact that the DSB special session needed more time to conclude 
its work, the General Council agreed to extend the special session’s timeframe by one year, to May 2004. 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm#news
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itself as a threat to the legitimacy of the WTO and that a policy of trasformismo has 
been required to disarm the campaign for reform. 
 
(3) The input that the Alter-NGOs have in the passage of these reforms into actual 
WTO policy, or in helping to ensure the enforcement of that policy 
 
There is no evidence to suggest that the alter-globalization movement has had any 
input into the passage of reforms into actual WTO policy or in helping to enforce that 
policy. Alter-NGOs have been refused admission to WTO negotiations and the DSB 
with the one exception. The case of the shrimp/turtle dispute did allow Alter-NGOs an 
avenue to place environmental concerns within the WTO.907 It can be argued that this 
was an attempt by the US government to coopt the support of high profile NGOs to 
gain public sympathy with their cause. On all other accounts attempts by Alter-NGOs 
to place their principles into the DSB through submission of amicus briefs have been 
rejected and met with hostility by the majority of developing member states. 
 
(4) The degree to which the policies of the alter-globalisation movement have the 
intended outcome for which they campaigned 
 
There is very little evidence to suggest that the policies that the alter-globalization 
movement have campaigned for have had the outcome that they would have wanted. 
Although the Doha Development Agenda asserts that the WTO ought to put the needs 
of the least developed states to the fore of WTO negotiations this has still to be 
realised. Critically, Joseph Stiglitz has argued: “today's Development Round does not 
deserve its name. Many of the issues that it has addressed should never have been on 
the agenda of a genuine development round, and many issues that should have been 
                                                 
907 World Trade Organization. United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Request 
for Consultations by India, Malaysia, Pakistan And Thailand, WT/DS58/1, 14 October 1996. 
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on the agenda have not”.908 Four years after the Doha Development Agenda was 
celebrated there is still no decrease in the subsidies of the EC and US on agriculture 
and textiles. The so-called ‘peace clause’909 that allowed WTO members to maintain 
agricultural subsidies without being challenged has authorised the continued 
agricultural and textile subsidies of the EC and US, which are detrimental to the 
welfare of the people of the developing world. In January 2005 the ‘peace clause’ 
expired and the EC and US have attempted to convince members of the WTO to 
renew its terms.910 In fact the US almost doubled its subsidies on cotton in 2004. In 
contrast, as was seen at the Cancun negotiations, the developing countries were asked 
to reduce their tariffs to agriculture and to accept the Singapore Issues (investment, 
transparency in government procurement, market access and trade facilitation), which 
are for the corporate interests represented by the EC and US.  
 
Consequently, it can be argued that the emergence of the Doha Development Agenda 
suggests that a policy of trasformismo has been employed by the WTO. Once again it 
appears that the language and demands of the alter-globalization movement have been 
coopted by political elites to quell the demand for change. Yes, the rhetoric of the 
WTO states that the needs of the people of the developing world are at the fore of 
negotiations, but the reality is that the position of subservience and exploitation are 
maintained. Similarly, the opening of the first DSB Panel proceeding to public 
observation and the discussions for further reform of the WTO towards transparency 
and accountability through NGO access could be seen as no more than trasformismo. 
This ‘reform from above’ ensures public acknowledgement of the inclusion of Alter-
NGOs into the WTO’s institutional framework, and thus manufactures greater 
                                                 
908 Joseph E. Stiglitz. The Development Round that Wasn’t, Webdiary, 17 November 2005. 
http://webdiary.com.au/cms/?q=node/1058
909 Uruguay Round Agreement. Agreement on Agriculture, Part VII, Article 13. ‘Due Restraint’, 15 November 
2005.                               
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_02_e.htm#articleXIII
910 Oxfam America. Immunity from Challenge at WTO Would Undermine Development Round, 13 December 
2005. 
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/press_releases/press_release.2005-12-13.7485082947
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legitimacy - but this inclusion is deliberately tailored to ensure that Alter-NGOs are 
prevented from gaining access to decision-making and influencing policy outcomes. 
Therefore there is no evidence that the actual policy reforms of the WTO reflect the 
reforms that the alter-globalization movement intended. 
 
In the final analysis, and by using the above model to measure success, the thesis 
comes to the conclusion that the alter-globalization movement has had very little 
impact in altering the policies and process of the WTO. At present it appears that the 
WTO’s and the nebuleuse are paying lip service to reforming the WTO towards 
policies of global social justice and public accountability or ‘new multilateralism’ as 
promoted by the alter-globalization movement. The WTO remains closed to public 
scrutiny and public accountability, and appears to perform all of the functions of a 
hegemonic institution as defined by Cox: (1) embodies the rules which facilitate the 
expansion of hegemonic world orders; (2) is a product of the hegemonic world order; 
(3) ideologically legitimises the norms of the world order; (4) co-pts the elites from 
peripheral countries; and (5) absorbs counter-hegemonic ideas.911 Procedures at the 
WTO to preserve sovereign equality are ignored and access to a just dispute 
settlement is inaccessible for many states because of resource inequalities and the 
widening ‘knowledge gap’. The corporate hegemony represented by the EC and US 
are thus able to reap profits at the expense of the weakest people on the planet under 
the legitimising ideology of the WTO’s non-discrimination principles and the 
promises of collective prosperity, peace and sustainable development. Guarding the 
access points for any challenge by the Alter-NGOs stand the lawyers of corporate 
hegemony. Indeed the ‘structural power’ of corporate hegemony is able to ensure that 
any participation in the WTO is limited by the rules of this elite. The WTO continues 
to be successful in coopting reformers and expanding the sphere of corporate 
hegemony through the acceptance of trade liberalization as the only means to peace, 
                                                 
911 Robert W. Cox. ‘Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay on Method’ (1983), in Robert W. 
Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair. Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 138. 
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prosperity and sustainable development. This was suggested to be evident as 
Argentina, Brazil, India and Pakistan used the WTO’s DSB to demand that the 
markets of the EC and US be opened for agriculture and goods from these countries, 
rather than challenge the legitimacy of the existing structure of power. 
 
At present there is no reason to believe that this challenge to the corporate hegemony 
represented by the EC and US from these states will bring any of the values and 
principles promoted by the alter-globalization movement to be realised in terms of 
labour rights, environmental protection or ‘new multilateralism’. Rather it is perhaps 
more evidence of the expansion of the nebuleuse as more political elites enter the 
process of building consensus for transnational capitalism to prosper. As Thea Lee 
explained the states from the developing world that have asserted themselves to 
contest the EC and US trading agenda, have also been the most verbal objectors at the 
hint of the word labour:  
 
all we were asking for is to have a conversation about workers rights and 
we have been thoroughly rebuffed. That [labour rights] was the horrible 
proposal in Seattle that was so objectionable to so many countries and 
again in Doha where countries like India and Pakistan threatened to walk 
away from the entire talks if the word ‘labour’ showed up anywhere in 
the Doha declaration.912 
 
It would therefore appear that corporate hegemony is being incorporated by political 
elites across the globe and the demands of the protesters further rejected. 
 
Dwelling on this point, the thesis has demonstrated that political opportunities 
presented to the alter-globalization movement are minimal. Social movements and 
                                                 
912 Interview with Thea Lea [Assistant Director of International Economics] American Federation of Labour-
Congress of Industrial Organisation (AFL-CIO), Tuesday June 1 2004. 
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Alter-NGOs have had very limited access to the WTO. Therefore in conjunction with 
demands for ‘new multilateralism’ there must be similar participation by civil society 
at the local, national and regional level. As Cox points out  
 
The only effective way to confront the salient issues of the late 
twentieth century … is to reconstitute public authority at local, 
national and global levels that are firmly based on public support. Only 
strong public authorities are capable of dealing with these problems. 
Such a movement would have to come from the bottom, from a 
reconstitution of civil society as a support for political authorities 
attentive to peoples needs (where as much of the movement in civil 
society recently has been towards a withdrawal from alienating 
government and corporate power).913 
 
Thereby changes to the policies and processes of the WTO will require changing the 
policies of states because it is only states that have the authority to sit at the 
negotiating table and negotiate on behalf of a recognised constituency, and only states 
have the authority to change this norm towards ‘new multilateralism’.  
 
The realisation of ‘new multilateralism’ in the current world order then rests on the 
alter-globalization movement’s ability to mobilise wider public and to place pressure 
on states’ elites and transform the policies they make in the name of the demos. 
Indeed it is the public opinion/consciousness of the citizens of the most powerful 
states that the alter-globalization movements will have to change if ‘new 
multilateralism’ is to be realised at the WTO, and in become a norm of the current 
world order. Joe Brandy and Jackie Smith accept this point:  
 
                                                 
913 Robert W. Cox with Michael G. Schechter. The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on 
Power, Morals and Civilization, London: Routledge, 2002, p. 94. 
 295
States, corporations, and multinational agencies tend to heed change 
more readily when mass support is available than when it is not. Despite 
the expansion of social movement opposition to economic globalization 
in recent years and the Herculean effort of activists and scholars to 
promote dialogue about the costs of globalization, there has been 
relatively little mass support for reform […] [T]he participants in global 
justice movements, although growing in number, are still a very small 
minority of the worlds citizenry.914 
 
In addition the street demonstrations by the alter-globalization movement are aimed at 
changing public consciousness to reject corporate hegemony and the state political 
elites from which it draws support, but state leaders have absorbed the rhetoric of 
these campaigns and used the language of the protesters without changing policies. 
Illustrating this to a wider public through the breaking down of complex legal trading 
arguments or international investment clauses to make the public aware of what is 
being negotiated in their name is never going to be easy. Illustrating the contradiction 
of hegemony and gaining wider public support has its difficulties when the hegemony 
is so powerful. As David Cromwell points out: “it is difficult to bring the publics 
attention to the argument […] the vast majority of people are just not interested in 
being ‘radical’ […] [are] struggling to make a living or are content – or resigned”.915 
Leslie Sklair points to the mainstream media in the West as being part of the problem 
as it produces swathes of mindless ‘entertainment’ which detracts from meaningful 
debate on the issues of the global economy: “as long as the media are directly, or 
indirectly through commercial leverage, under the control of the transnational 
capitalist class, it is difficult to see how the socialist project can get a fair and 
                                                 
914 Joe Bandy and Jackie Smith (editors). Coalitions Across Borders: Transnational Protest and Neoliberal Order, 
Oxford: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2005, p. 236. 
915 David Cromwell. Private Planet: Corporate Plunder and the Fight Back, Charlbury: John Carpenter 
Publishing, 2001, p. 218. 
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balanced hearing in the newspapers, on television and radio or anywhere else”.916 
Indeed the message that ‘There Is No Alternative’ to corporate hegemony still appears 
to be dominant. Ultimately, this is the crux of the problem for bringing about the 
realisation of the principle of the alter-globalization movement and altering the 
current world order, “another world is possible” if enough people are interested and 
believe it is possible.  
 
John Keane, however, warns against such fatalism and cynicism: “Fatalism feeds 
wistfulness. It turns its back on the job of naming and mapping these governing 
institutions, in order that they may better be judged, defended, reformed or 
fundamentally transformed”.917 The “cardinal question of political life concerning 
power and rule, namely: who rules, in whose interests, by what means and for what 
ends?” is still important, so that political elites know they are answerable to the 
demos.918 Therefore, demonstrating the injustice of the global political economy of 
international trade is not an end in itself, these arguments are essential for mobilising 
people to take issue with any perceived abuse of political and economic power. The 
difficulty, however, for the alter-globalization movement will be to convince more of 
the demos that its principles of global social justice, transparency and ‘new 
multilateralism’ are causes worth pursuing and that alternative world orders are 
possible in practice and not just alive in rhetoric. The achievement of this goal will 
always be difficult, as this thesis has demonstrated, because trasformismo is a 
powerful weapon for suffocating public support for alternatives. 
 
                                                 
916 Leslie Sklair. The Transnational Capitalist Class, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2001, p. 325. 
917 John Keane. Global Civil Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, P128. 
918 David Held and Anthony McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization, London: Polity Press and Blackwell 
Publishers, 2003, p. 58.  
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7.3 The Original Contribution of the Thesis 
Applying Coxian historical materialism to the relationship between the WTO and the 
alter-globalization movement establishes this thesis’s original contribution to 
knowledge. As pointed out in this thesis, mainstream theorists of the discipline of 
International Relations (IR) have ignored the critical theoretical framework of Cox 
during their analysis of international organizations. Cox is labelled a dissident and at 
the periphery of the IR discipline on the grounds that he is too Marxist or too 
reductionist because he wants to discuss social relations, ideas, the exercise of power 
within the many inter-related institutions of the global political economy. Yet, by 
drawing our attention to the fact that social forces, ideologies and institutions are all 
interlinked within the current ‘historical structure’, Cox brings a more insightful 
understanding of the ‘seamless web’ of social relations that are the real world. In 
doing so Cox rightly raises the question of why the state-centric analysis of IR has 
been allowed to dominate, and just whose interests are protected by the perpetuation 
of this mode of thinking. Similarly, Cox points out that it is not enough to list  factors 
that have changed in social life under a heading of ‘globalization’ because it conceals 
the agents responsible for exercising power and bringing about new oppressive power 
relations.  
 
Consequently, this thesis highlights why the Coxian concepts of nebuleuse, ‘new 
multilateralism’ and trasformismo are essential for developing existing knowledge 
and understanding of the relationship between the WTO and the alter-globalization 
movement. Firstly, this is because the concept of nebuleuse is able to grasp the 
manner in which international organizations reflect a transnational corporate elite who 
are able to coordinate and legitimise economic policies, which touches almost every 
corner of the world, through the construction of hegemony. In addition the concepts 
of ‘new multilateralism’ captures the manner in which social forces are rejecting 
corporate hegemony, whilst also identifying the democratising strategies employed by 
some factions of counter-hegemony to bring public accountability and social justice to 
the institutions of hegemony. Ultimately, the obstacles created through a policy of 
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trasformismo at the WTO establish a framework for understanding the suppression of 
demands for democratisation at the WTO. The application of these Coxian concepts 
therefore establishes an original contribution to knowledge. 
 
7.4 The Implications of the Thesis for Wider Knowledge 
The thesis’s application of a Coxian theoretic framework to the WTO and the alter-
globalization movement has repercussion for the study of international organizations, 
NGOs, and the process of reforming and democratisation international organizations, 
but also the study of discipline of IR. In recent years a volume of literature has 
emerged debating the pros and cons of the democratisation of the institutions of 
global governance.919 Pippa Norris, using the results of the World Values Survey 
(1995-97), points out that humanity is still a long way from establishing identities 
consistent with being members of a global community, which are required for this 
form of global democracy. On the one hand, she asserts that regardless of global flows 
of capital, trade, communication and the existence of institutions of global governance 
individual identities remain largely national and not cosmopolitan. On the other, she 
illustrates that there is evidence that the post-war generation, which has experienced 
greater urbanization, education and less nationalist wars, shows signs of a more 
cosmopolitan outlook. This growth in cosmopolitan attitudes, she asserts, will cause a 
new generation to be more concerned with the democratic credentials of global 
governance.920 It is essential for any theoretical model of global democracy to take 
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920 Pippa Norris. ‘Global Governance and Cosmopolitan Citizens’, in David Held and Anthony McGrew (editors), 
The Global Transformation Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate (2nd Edition), Cambridge: Polity 
Press/Blackwell Publishers, 2002, p. 287-297. 
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note of the many different obstacles that can be placed in the way of meaningful 
participation and democratisation of the international organizations of global 
governance. This thesis identifies three factors that should be taken into consideration 
by future research in global governance, namely: structural power, cooptation and 
trasformismo.  
 
For example through identifying the ‘structural power’ of dominant classes within 
international organizations the thesis has sought to illustrate the manner in which 
institutional arrangements and procedures are constructed in such a way as to ensure 
specific outcomes. Transnational corporate elites played a significant role in creating 
and writing of Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the WTO, and 
influencing governments participating in WTO negotiations. Therefore the thesis 
illustrated the role corporate elites had in maintaining and expanding their dominance 
through the manner in which they had structured the mechanisms for decision-making 
and dispute settlement. Each of these decision-making bodies was crafted to ensure 
that the superior material capabilities of corporate hegemony could overcome the 
principles of consensus decision-making and equality before the law stated in the 
WTO’s Charter. This was clearly demonstrated at the Cancun Ministerial Conference 
as the ‘green-room’ decision-making and the external issues of debt and bilateral trade 
agreements were mobilised to bring pressure on member states to agree to specific 
trade policies. Although Cancun illustrated that this structural power was being 
contested, it also demonstrated that corporate hegemony was being reinforced as those 
contesting EC and US demanded greater trade liberalization. Active and equal 
participation within each of these decision-making bodies was also restricted by the 
highly complex nature of trade agreements and its legal vocabulary. A ‘knowledge 
gap’ was therefore seen to exist, which resulted in decision-making and dispute 
settlement being exclusive. However, the engagement of the developing world with 
the WTO’s legal system after Cancun also helped to legitimise the WTO’s DSB, and 
the neoliberal ideology that legitimises corporate hegemony.  
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The analysis of NGOs undertaken by the thesis also illustrated the need to be critical 
about the participation and representational functions that NGOs perform in the 
decision-making process of international organizations. The distinction between 
Alter-NGOs and Market Orientated-NGOs (Ma-NGOs) reinforces the necessity for 
critical awareness of just whom NGOs represent and whether they are actually 
advocating or challenging corporate hegemony. It was suggested that corporate 
hegemony addressed the demands for public participation and democratisation of 
international organizations and treaties through defining public participation solely in 
terms of NGOs and then provided Ma-NGOs to perform the legitimising function. 
Similarly it was argued that Alter-NGOs had become coopted by corporate hegemony 
so that the legitimacy of the institutions were enhanced rather than criticised. In doing 
so the allegation of the exclusion of public oversight and the existence of a democratic 
deficit could be deemed to have been addressed, but without having to change any of 
the policy outcomes of hegemonic institutions. Finally, further critical analysis of the 
manner in which powerful transnational aid and advocacy NGOs were brought into 
the negotiation processes also illustrated some important consequences. This analysis 
drew attention to the problems of smaller, less professional, and less organized 
indigenous social movements being pushed out of participating in decisions that 
directly affected them. As this occurred, it was illustrated that concerns had been 
raised over the deradicalization of campaigns as these professional, resources and 
knowledge intensive NGOs brought further western middle class values and 
‘problem-solving’ solutions to the decision-making table that were compatible with 
corporate hegemony. Consequently, this ‘globalization from the middle’ was taking 
primacy over ‘globalization from below’ so that these large NGOs were becoming 
partners in legitimising corporate hegemony and not resistance.  
 
Through identifying ‘structural power’, Ma-NGOs, and NGO cooptation and 
deradicalisation this thesis demonstrates the manner in which hegemonic 
organizations are able to avoid demands for reform or democratisation. In illustrating 
the ‘structural power’ within the WTO, this thesis provides a framework for analysing 
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the biases institutionalised within the decision-making process of other organizations 
– including NGOs. Similarly the role NGOs can play in enhancing or undermining 
reform and democratisation of organizations is informative for NGO and institutional 
analysis. The concept of trasformismo is important for any research on social 
movement or NGO engaged in attempts to reform political institutions – sub-national, 
national, regional or global. Finally, this research reinforces the argument that the 
dominant paradigm of state-centric analysis is redundant because it cannot account for 
the concepts of nebuleuse, ‘new multilateralism’ and trasformismo, which are 
essential for understanding the social forces and strategies involved in the process of 
reform and democratisation of international organizations. In place of the state-centric 
paradigm this thesis strengthens the argument that the interaction of economic and 
political domains ought to be the central methodology in international relations, rather 
than being seen as a sub-discipline of IR.921 
 
7.5 A Critical Reflection on the Limitations of the Thesis 
Through embarking on this research project a number of lessons have been learned. 
As Donna Lee eloquently draws attention  
 
Theorising about international relations without proper data can be an all 
too abstract and barren enterprise. At the same time, grubbing in archival 
data without theoretical guidelines risk the proverbial ‘missing the forest 
for the trees’. The archival records of international relations are not the 
exclusive province of diplomatic historians; they are the proper data of 
international relations theory.922 
 
                                                 
921 Robert O’Brien. ‘International Political Economy and International Relations: Apprentice and Teacher?’, in 
John MacMillan and Andrew Linklater (editors), Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International 
Relations, London: Pinter Publishers, 1995, p. 89 – 106. 
922 Donna Lee. Middle Powers and Commercial Diplomacy: British Influence at the Kennedy Trade Round, 
Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1999, p. vii. 
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In many respects Lee highlights the main problems encountered in this research. The 
necessity of establishing a coherent understanding of the theoretical framework that is 
being applied to evaluate primary materials is paramount to successful research. 
Perhaps this was more important because initially the methodological approach for 
this project was based upon interviews with the many different actors involved in the 
global political economy of the WTO. Many of the interviews for this thesis took 
place via face-to-face meetings in Brussels, Geneva and Washington D.C. Therefore 
there was only one opportunity to conduct the interview. Without a sound 
understanding of the theoretical framework being applied the interviewer is in danger 
of not only asking the incorrect questions, even worse the wrong people are being 
asked. A Coxian framework was favoured from the start of this research because it 
focused on the social forces, material capabilities, and ideologies embedded in 
institutions, and illustrated the relationships between social forces, forms of states and 
world orders. Having grasped the main thrust of the Coxian approach the subtleties of 
the role of the nebuleuse and trasformismo were unfortunately overlooked. 
Consequently, the visits to Brussels, Geneva and Washington could have been more 
fruitful had I ventured outside the nebuleuse and NGO community.  
 
Interviewing elites is exciting and a researcher is made to feel that they are gaining 
access to information that is not available on the websites of these institutions – in this 
case the WTO, the EC and the US government. In actual fact the researcher is 
experiencing the process of trasformismo first hand. As this thesis has pointed out 
above, the institution of the nebuleuse is now expertly versed and impressive at 
marketing its institutions and policies. A human being can convey so much more 
sympathy and convincingly distort the legitimacy of an institution or policy than any 
website or written argument. After approaching the WTO, it was clear that the 
Secretariat were eager to engage with the academic world and receive good publicity. 
This was reinforced by the warm welcome that the Secretariat extended. The 
interviews themselves, however, brought little information that was not available on 
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the WTO website. Therefore perhaps the most insightful aspect of the visit to the 
WTO was a chance meeting with a member of an Eastern European delegation who 
was part of her country’s agricultural negotiating team at the WTO. She explained 
that she was exhausted from spending the whole day in a warm room with nothing to 
negotiate because her country was too small to impact on the negotiations. She also 
alluded to the ‘knowledge gap’ in the WTO negotiations as she complained about the 
difficulty in keeping up with the technical terminologies of agriculture and 
international trade law. Similarly, it is only on reflection of the interview in an 
ostentatious office with the WTO’s giant Deputy Director-General, whose height was 
matched by his booming Texan voice, that the intimidating nature of the WTO is 
remembered. Indeed it has to be admitted that on returning from four days of 
interviewing at the WTO the argument that the WTO was misunderstood seemed 
valid. Therefore on one hand the interviewing experience did a great deal to cloud the 
fact that the job of the Secretariat since 1999 has been to appear transparent and 
cooperative in order to tell the public about the brutal way that their work is distorted 
by the protesters. On the other hand, the personal experience of trasformismo at the 
WTO reinforced the need to focus on this concept throughout the thesis.  
 
In hindsight the research trip to the WTO in Geneva should have been replaced with 
interviews with more of the Alter-NGOs in Geneva, such as International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development. This may have brought more evidence on the 
official and unofficial channels of access open to NGOs at the WTO for chapter six. 
Similarly the research trip to Washington D.C. was focused too heavily on the 
government elites and more time should have spent time with grassroots activists. 
Interviews that were conducted with the Centre for International Law (CIEL) 
provided invaluable debate and discussion, which went well beyond the textbook 
accounts of a question and answer interview. Dan McGrew gave an insightful account 
of the advocacy role the CIEL had played for the developing states during preparation 
for the Cancun Ministerial Conference. David Hunter of the CIEL engaged in an 
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interesting discussion on the need to reject the label of ‘anti-globalization’ movement 
on the grounds that global social justice and global sustainable development were not 
anti-global, rather they were arguments for an alternative globalization rejecting 
corporate hegemony. Interviews with John Cavanagh (Director of the advocacy NGO 
International Policy Studies); Thea Lea (Assistant Director of International 
Economics of the American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial 
Organization, (AFL-CIO)) and Carl Pier (the NGO Human Rights Watch) all 
provided valuable insights on the form of movement against corporate hegemony and 
the need for the term alter-globalization movement and Alter-NGOs. It was only as 
these interviews were finished in my last week in Washington D. C. that it became 
clear that these types of social movements and Alter-NGOs ought to have been 
targeted for the thesis.  
 
7.6 Questions and Directions for Future Research 
Alternatively to Geneva and Washington, engagement with the grassroots social 
movements at the World Social Forum (WSF) would have been more beneficial for 
the thesis. These interviews would have enhanced the continuum constructed to 
understand the many different ideological positions of the counter-hegemonic 
movement and perhaps brought my attention to other strategies used by social 
movement and NGOs to influence the WTO. Indeed the questions and the direction of 
future research on the relationship between the alter-globalization movement and the 
WTO would revolve around conducting interviews at the WSF. It was Cavanagh that 
stressed that 
 
What you need to remember is that the previous demonstrations brought 
together people from around the world who were against corporate 
globalization. From there transnational networks of activists were built, 
which shared information and worked on common goals together. Similar 
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with the WSF, it is not the speeches out front that are the most important, 
it is the face to face meetings of people from all over the world who have 
built and are building the necessary networks to challenge these global 
institutions. People have now made contacts and the networks now exist, 
these are the important things to make a better world possible.923 
 
Conducting research at the WSF therefore seems to provide the direction for future 
research. Indeed discussion with Boaventura de Sousa Santos924 and Susan George925 
have led me to believe that establishing a greater knowledge of the alter-globalization 
movement and their strategies to influence the WTO would provide the material to re-
evaluate the WTO in three to five years from now.  
 
Therefore future research on the WTO and the alter-globalization movement would 
involve an attempt to illustrate the extent to which the WTO’s trasformismo policies 
have prevented the development of a Coxian ‘new multilateralism’ within this time 
scale. It is possible to speculate that the alter-globalization movement may find itself 
in a similar position to the Green Movement in the 1990s, which saw government 
create Ministers and departments of government charged with advocating and 
campaigning for the ‘greening’ of public policies to the extent that the radical edge of 
the green movement was diluted and pushed to the periphery.926 Perhaps in the near 
future corporate hegemony will ensure that all governments and institutions of the 
nebuleuse have a department or representative campaigning for transparency and 
global social justice in the global political economy. Thereby, trasformismo will have 
ensured that the principles of the alter-globalization movement appear to be satisfied 
                                                 
923 Interview with John Cavanagh [Director of International Policy Studies], Washington D.C. Friday 5 June 2004. 
924 Discussion with Boaventura de Sousa Santos at Law, Politics and Power in the Global Age: The Legal and 
Social Theory of Boaventura de Sousa Santos, University of Glasgow, 3 November 2006. 
925 Interview with Susan George [Director of Transnational Institute],St Johns Church, Edinburgh, 28 June 2006. 
926 John C. Stauber and Sheldon Rampton. ‘Democracy' for Hire: Public Relations and Environmental Movements, 
in The Ecologist, Vol. 25, No.5, 1995, Andy Rowell. Green Backlash: Global Subversion of the Environmental 
Movement, London: Routledge, 1996, Brian Tokar. Earth for Sale: Reclaiming Ecology in the Age of Corporate 
Greenwash, Boston: South End Press, 1997, Jim Green. Green Business, Greenwash, Green Left Weekly, No. 364, 
9 June, 1999. 
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to the general public, whilst also ensuring that this campaign only involves hegemonic 
political elites and coopted NGOs. Constantly being frustrated by the trasformismo 
can weaken the demand for radical change, as Cox’s points out, “Hegemony is like a 
pillow: it absorbs blows and sooner or later the would be assailant will find it 
comfortable to rest upon”.927 On a more optimistic note, perhaps the seeds of 
participation now planted at the WTO will have flourished and ‘new multilateralism’ 
will be further woven within WTO structure or policies. Thereby the claims that 
‘another world is possible’ will be on their way to being realised. Only future research 
will bring evidence for these claims, but at the moment trasformismo has ensured the 
alter-globalization movement have had very little impact on the policies and process 
of the WTO.  
                                                 
927 Robert W. Cox. ‘Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay on Method’ (1983), in Robert W. 
Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair. Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 139. 
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